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Linden Farrer and William Lay 
The Confederation of Family Organisations in the European Union
Spotlights on Contemporary Family Life combines the four volumes of the 
FAMILYPLATFORM Online Journal. Covering issues of cross-cutting importance 
to families, it is one of the outcomes of FAMILYPLATFORM, a ‘social platform’ 
working together to chart and review the major trends of family research in the 
European Union, critically review existing research, attempt to foresee future 
challenges facing families, and to bring all of this work together in the form 
of a research agenda on families for the European Union. The diagram below 
sketches out the steps taken towards realisation of the research agenda1.
 
Diagram: Outline of key steps to the European Research Agenda
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Although the main outcome of the project is the European Research Agenda, 
none of the steps leading up to this - the summary of the major trends of families in 
the “Existential Fields” of family life, the critical review of existing research, and the 
‘future of families’ exercise - would have been possible without the active partici-
pation of representatives of policy, scientific and social organisations from across 
Preface
1 Final reports of all of the main steps are available from the FAMILYPLATFORM website 
(http://www.familyplatform.eu). All of these reports will be available in Family Wellbeing: Challenges for 
research and policy (Uhlendorff, Rupp & Euteneuer, 2011).
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Europe. As representatives of family organisations, the Confederation of Family 
Organisations in the European Union (COFACE) - alongside Mouvement Mondial 
des Mères - Europe (MMMEurope) and Forum delle Associazioni Familiari - helped 
galvanise the support of different stakeholders, and ensure that the grassroots 
concerns of families were properly represented in FAMILYPLATFORM. The idea 
was to enable the input of stakeholders at every stage, and this included the three 
Info Days (organised in Budapest, Milan and Brussels), the two conferences taking 
place in Lisbon and Brussels, and online on the interactive website.
In addition to raising the profile of FAMILYPLATFORM and encouraging par-
ticipation of stakeholders, one of the main responsibilities was publication of 
the FAMILYPLATFORM Online Journal. Four volumes were to be produced, but 
neither the subject matter nor the format had been defined. Early on, roles 
were made clear: COFACE would manage editing and dissemination of the 
volumes, and the editors of each of the four volumes would be responsible for 
agreeing the subject matter and soliciting contributions. This arrangement 
was first tested by Leeni Hansson and Epp Reiska (University of Tallinn), and 
apart from a few changes that gave a greater voice to policy makers and civil 
society, the model continued without change for the next three volumes.
When it came to deciding on content, one thing was very clear early on: 
certain subjects are of cross-cutting relevance to families in Europe, and con-
nect the different fields of family life (the so-called “Existential Fields”) and 
the different policy questions discussed by participants during the course 
of the project. For this reason, the Online Journal was an opportunity to 
discuss important subjects that might otherwise be overlooked.
With this in mind, Chapter 1: Structures and Forms (previously Volume 1) pres-
ents an overview of issues relating to the structure and the form of families in 
Europe today. From an academic perspective, the issues are quite clear: the 
characteristics of different forms, the numbers and proportions of people liv-
ing in different family forms, the causes and consequences of the emergence 
of new family models. For policy makers and family associations the issues are 
more complicated. Many family organisations do not represent all family forms, 
and the debate can get quite heated on what constitutes a family and what 
effect different family forms have on the wellbeing of members of families, par-
ticularly children. It is for this reason that FAMILYPLATFORM agreed early on not 
to define the family, and concentrate instead on different aspects of family life. 
This seemed the best way of avoiding intractable debates and excluding voices 
from publicly funded research. Needless to say, Chapter 1 presents a thorough 
overview of key trends across Europe, and illustrates some of the differences 
found between different parts of Europe: a reminder that no ‘one model fits 
all’ family policy is currently applicable or relevant to all of the countries of the 
European Union.
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Chapter 2: Solidarities in Contemporary Families saw Carmen Leccardi and 
Miriam Perego (University of Milan-Bicocca) take up the editorial baton, this 
time to describe the shifting solidarities found within European families. Too 
often the issue of an ‘ageing society’ is simply reduced to the problem of 
over-burdening social care systems – but longevity also represents oppor-
tunities for new kinds of solidarities inside families and family networks, 
and new relations between family members. As such, the subject covered 
in Chapter 2 cross-cuts with an issue high on the European policy agenda: 
intergenerational solidarity. It is therefore no surprise that 2012 is currently 
designated the European Year of Active Ageing, though it is hoped that the 
title will soon include the words “intergenerational solidarity” as well.
Next in line was Veronika Herche at the Demographic Research Institute, who 
edited Chapter 3: Demographic Change and the Family in Europe. With articles 
giving voice to stakeholders with quite different opinions on the issues at stake and 
the opportunities and challenge they raise, this chapter opens up a lot of areas for 
further discussion – areas that are high on the policy agenda, this time being a pri-
ority of the (current) Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union.
The final chapter, Chapter 4: Volunteering and the Family, was edited by col-
leagues at MMMEurope. It would have been an oddity if this issue had strayed from 
issues of importance to European policy, and this issue was no exception. Inspired 
by the MMMEurope survey of mothers, and by family associations who argue that 
families play a big role in volunteering, this chapter gives an overview of what’s 
known - and what isn’t - about volunteering by families. Coinciding with the Euro-
pean Year of Volunteering 2011, it is a timely look at the efforts that families put into 
volunteering across Europe and the important benefits that Europe gains from all 
of this voluntary effort.
Although the four volumes were originally only meant to be published elec-
tronically, they were deemed worthy of being printed and becoming a more 
permanent feature in the literature on European families. In addition to the many 
reports of FAMILYPLATFORM, the different brochures and booklets, and of course 
the European Research Agenda which is in many ways a distillation of all of the 
different messages heard whilst working on this project, we hope that Spotlights 
on Contemporary Family Life raises awareness of important issues, and helps pave 
the way for family policies that work towards improving the wellbeing of families 
in Europe, both today and tomorrow.
8
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The Institute for International and Social Studies of Tallinn University, Estonia
This is the first chapter of Spolights on Contemporary Family Life. The overall 
objective of the FAMILYPLATFORM project is to elaborate a research agenda 
that addresses fundamental research issues and key policy questions for fu-
ture research and family policies in Europe. The aim of the project is to im-
prove the well-being of families by understanding future challenges families 
in Europe will face. FAMILYPLATFORM is not a research project: it addresses 
research issues and policy questions by reviewing existing research, identi-
fying significant trends and differences between countries, and by exposing 
research gaps and problems relating to methodology. 
This chapter, being the first, focuses on broad - but nevertheless - im-
portant issues relating to research on families. The first paper addresses 
the difficulties of trying to define the family. In everyday life “family” is a 
commonly used word and everyone seems to understand what the word 
means. However, the second half of the twentieth century has witnessed 
major changes in family formation and family behaviour that have resulted 
in a diversification of family forms. Because of this, it has become more and 
more difficult to use a general and universally acceptable definition of the 
family. Concepts and definitions of the family have changed over time, and 
are used differently in policy formation and in academic literature. The ar-
ticle by Leeni Hansson Towards a Definition of the Family traces changes 
in the definition of the family both in academic literature as well as in 
policy formation. 
The other purpose of this first chapter of the journal is to give an over-
view of the major trends in family behaviour in different European countries. 
In the article Major Trends in Family Behaviour in European Countries, Leeni 
Hansson addresses issues such as the child leaving the parental home, the 
choice between marriage and cohabitation, having children, family break-
up and “living apart together”. Based on those developments three visions 
for the future of families are highlighted. 
Leeni’s article is followed by short insights on family issues in four Eu-
ropean countries that represent different paths and outcomes in the de-
velopment of the family – Finland, Germany, Italy and Hungary. The article 
by Marjo Kuronen, Teppo Kröger and Kimmo Jokinen from Finland centres 
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mainly on the drawbacks of the allegedly woman-friendly welfare state, 
where extensive public day-care is provided, offering possibilities to com-
bine family life and paid work. Ursula Adam, Loreen Beier, Dirk Hofaecker, 
Elisa Marchese and Marina Rupp describe the incidence of the so-called 
“middle-class nuclear family”, and the developments leading to this con-
cept in Germany. Carmen Leccardi and Miriam Perego from Italy write about 
changes in the prevalence of marriage and within the couple itself towards 
a more equal relationship of women and men. Last but not least, develop-
ments in the Hungarian family are described by Zsuzsa Blaskó with refer-
ence to other European countries.
We hope that the contributions presented in the first chapter of our jour-
nal bring to your attention the complexity of issues related to families, and 
provide you with a better understanding of the similarities and differences 
in the developments in the institution of the family in different parts of 
Europe, which is ultimately the aim of our project.
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1.1 Towards a Definition of the Family?
Leeni Hansson,  Institute of International and Social Studies
The family is one of the basic social institutions or, as Goode (1964: 4) put 
it “the only social institution which is formally developed in all societies”. In 
western culture, the family was traditionally defined in terms of a married 
couple with children, who shared a common home and divided family-relat-
ed tasks and responsibilities along gender lines (Strong/DeVault, 1993). De-
spite major changes in many societies that have had a significant impact on 
family formation and family behaviour, the institution of the family retains 
its social importance. However, due to these changes in patterns of family 
formation and the diversification of family forms, it has become increasingly 
difficult to find a general and universally accepted definition of the family. 
In everyday life “family” is a commonly used word, and everyone seems 
to understand what the word means. However, John Peters (1999: 55) has 
stated that “the term ‘family’ is one of the most misused concepts in the Eng-
lish language” because the word reflects a wide variety of social relationships. 
Furthermore, concepts and definitions of the family have changed over time. 
The goal of this paper is to trace how the definition of the family has 
changed during the course of the second half of the twentieth century, both 
in academic literature and in terms of policy formation.
Structure and functions of the family
According to Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (1993), the word 
“family” derives from the Latin word “familia” that originally meant house-
hold, and included the householder and his family members as well as kin 
and servants. In contemporary usage, the word “family” is most often used 
to refer to at least two different types of relationships: (1) to related people 
who live together in the same household - most often a husband, his wife 
and their child(ren), or (2) to a larger circle of persons – a network of relatives 
and kin not necessarily confined to one household. 
Sociologists focus on two key issues when dealing with the family – 
the structure of the family, and its functions. The structure refers to the 
composition of family, i.e. to family members, their positions in the fam-
ily, such as mother, father, son, daughter, grandfather, grandmother, and 
to family organisation, i.e. the set of rules that govern patterns of inter-
action within the family. We can differentiate two main structural types 
of families: nuclear families and extended families. A nuclear family is 
composed of two generations, parents and their offspring, while differ-
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ent extended family types are composed of at least three generations, 
for example parents, their children, grandparents, etc. 
The functions of the family refer to the common and essential responsibili-
ties that families fulfil both for society as well as for individual family members. 
For example, a family universally provides food and shelter, nurture and inti-
macy, and strategies for managing conflicts for its members. One of the most 
important functions of the family is the socialisation of children. This process 
includes raising and educating children, and familiarising them with the tradi-
tions and value systems of the community and culture they belong to. 
Each society assigns specific roles to the family members. For example, 
up until the middle of the twentieth century, western countries were char-
acterised by stereotypical attitudes towards family roles: it was assumed 
that the father was the main provider and instrumental task leader, and 
the mother was the main carer and homemaker (Scanzoni, 2001). Even 
today we can find unwritten social norms regarding the ‘proper’ roles of 
family members. 
Definitions of the family used by social scientists
The definition of the family in western countries relied on three cornerstones - 
marriage, sex, and childbearing - up till the 1950s (Allan/Hawker/Crow, 2001). 
Marriage between a man and a woman was considered the foundation of the 
family and the only acceptable way of forming a new family. The ideal family 
type was a nuclear family headed by a man who was permanently married to 
his wife with the couple living with their common children. Another essential 
element of the family was a common dwelling place. 
The best known definition of the family used in the mid-twentieth 
century was presented by American anthropologist George Peter Mur-
dock in his study on social structure (Murdock, 1949). Murdock studied a 
sample of 250 different societies. Based on the results of his study, Mur-
dock came to the conclusion that some forms of family existed in every 
society, and there was a common pattern that made it possible to formu-
late a definition of the family. According to Murdock’s definition the family 
was as follows:
“a social group characterized by common residence, economic  
cooperation, and reproduction. It includes adults of both sexes, at 
least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relation-
ship, and one or more children, own or adopted, of the sexually 
cohabiting adults”  
(Murdock, 1949: 1-2).
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Thus, the definition of the family formulated by Murdock was heteronor-
mative, and characteristic first of all of the marriage-based nuclear family. 
According to Murdock’s definition, a single mother with her children or a 
cohabiting couple, whose sexual relationship was not socially approved in 
the late 1940s, did not fit into the concept of the family. Murdock also iden-
tified what he believed to be the four main functions of the family: sexual, 
economic, reproductive and educational. These functions were supposed 
to reproduce the values and norms of the culture and community, and pass 
these values on to the next generation. 
Talcott Parsons (1955) viewed the family as a sub-system within society, 
with its nature determined by its functions. Similar to Murdock, Parsons de-
fined the family as a unit consisting of a married couple who co-operate in 
rearing children and who share a common place of residence. Parsons identi-
fied two essential functions of the family – socialisation of children and ‘stabi-
lisation of adult personalities’. Parsons also differentiated between gendered 
parental roles – the father’s instrumental role on one side, and the mother’s 
expressive role in the family on the other. Although there are debates as to 
how prevalent this family type actually was, it was given the label of ‘tradition-
al’ family (Popenoe, 1987) and later the ‘standard’ family (Scanzoni, 2001). 
In the 1960s, Europe experienced far-reaching demographic changes, 
mostly interpreted as responses to major economic developments, changes 
in the labour market and increasing female employment, and changes in atti-
tudes towards gender roles. Across Europe, fertility and marriage rates declined 
and divorce, remarriage and unmarried cohabitation became accepted ele-
ments of family life. However, the definitions of the family used in the first 
half of the 1960s remained ‘traditional’. For example, similar to Parsons, Coser 
(1964, cited in Peters, 1999) presents a definition of the traditional family as:
“A group manifesting the following organizational attributes: It 
finds its origin in marriage; it consists of husband, wife, and chil-
dren born in their wedlock, though other relatives may find their 
place close to this nuclear group, and the group is united by mor-
al, legal, economic, religious and social rights and obligations (in-
cluding sexual rights and prohibitions as well as such socially pat-
terned feelings as attraction, piety, and awe” 
(Coser, 1964: xvi cited in Peters, 1999: 56).
Besides changes in demographic behaviour, the 1960s were also charac-
terised by increasing tolerance and permissiveness in family life (Jallinoja, 
1994). The cornerstones of the family of the 1950s - marriage and sex - were 
replaced by permissive attitudes towards interpersonal relationships and 
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sex. As a result, marriage was no longer considered a lifelong commitment, 
and the 1960s were characterised by a considerable increase in rates of 
divorce and remarriage. Increased permissiveness brought about alterna-
tive lifestyle choices like non-marital cohabitation and extra-marital births. 
These radical changes in family behaviour made it increasingly difficult to 
define the family using the old touchstones that had formed the foundation 
of definitions in the 1950s. The model of the traditional family was no longer 
the only socially acceptable model because of the existence of a great vari-
ety of patterns ‘hidden’ behind this one concept (Liljeström, 2002).
In the 1960s and 1970s, the share of couples characterised by alterna-
tive lifestyle choices, i.e. non-married cohabiting couples with or without 
children, cohabiting homosexual couples, group marriages, communes, 
etc., increased in many western countries. However, even in the 1970s and 
1980s, many family researchers still preferred to use traditional definitions 
of the family. For example in 1987 Eleanor Macklin still used the traditional 
definition of the family, similar to those used in the 1950s: 
“a legal, lifelong, sexually exclusive marriage between one man 
and one woman, with children, where the male is primary provid-
er and ultimate authority” 
(Macklin, 1987: 317). 
Soviet family sociology used a definition of the “proper” family, which was 
based on legal marriage, till the late 1980s; for example, the Dictionary of 
Sociology defined the family as: 
“a social institution characterized by whole complex of social 
norms, sanctions, and modes of behaviour which regulate the re-
lationship between the spouses and among parents and chil-
dren’ and ‘a small group, founded on marriage or blood relation-
ships, members of which are united by a common household”  
(Kratkii slovar…, 1988: 301 in Narusk, 1992). 
Thus, according to the definitions used by social scientists in the late 1980s, 
it was still assumed that the family should be based on heterosexual mar-
riage, children, and a common place of residence. A divorced single mother 
with her children, cohabiting couples with or without children, married cou-
ples living in separate households because of geographically separate jobs, 
and homosexual couples did not qualify as families. 
In the 1980s, alternative living arrangements increased in popularity in 
the majority of European countries. However, these new family forms and 
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living arrangements were still perceived as non-standard or deviant com-
pared to the traditional normative family, or not even families at all by policy 
makers (Scanzoni, 2001; Jallinoja, 1994). 
However, while there were researchers who stuck to the definition of the 
normative family, there were also others who began to show a growing in-
terest in the plurality of family forms and alternative lifestyle choices. Gener-
al acceptance of diversity of family forms made it obvious that the definition 
of the family would expand. In the following statement, Rapoport and his 
colleagues characterised the changes that had taken place in the family:
“families of today are in a transition from coping in a society in 
which there was a single overriding norm of what family life should 
be like to a society in which a plurality of norms are recognized as 
legitimate and, indeed, desirable” 
(Rapoport/Fogarty/Rapoport, 1982).
American sociologist Judith Stacey (1996) also described the changes that had 
taken place in the family as drifting away from the single dominant family mod-
el towards an increasing variety of family relationships. Stacey was among the 
first to state that gay and lesbian families - extremely diverse themselves - had 
a great role in developing the postmodern family. According to Stacey, it was 
high time to start speaking of the western family as the “postmodern family”. 
Contrasted to the “traditional family”, the postmodern family was characterised 
as ambivalent in terms of its gender and kinship arrangements. 
By the 1980s, sociologists began to speak of a loosening of the strong 
marital bond between husband and wife, and of its diminishing significance 
as the primary family bond. Instead of the marital bond, parent-child rela-
tionships became the backbone of the family. Accordingly, based on the 
new family ideology, James White defined the family as: 
“an intergenerational social group organized and governed by so-
cial norms regarding descent and affinity, reproduction of the young” 
(White, 1991: 37).
If the common home of a married couple was one of the essential elements 
of definitions of the family in the 1950s, by the 1980s and 1990s it was not 
excluded even if family relations were dispersed over several households, 
and even over several cities or countries. 
In European countries, the demographic changes that had had signifi-
cant effects on the family took place at different times and at different rates 
(Hantrais/Letablier, 1996; Gauthier, 1996; Hantrais, 2005): there were coun-
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tries where marriage was no longer a necessary precondition for setting up 
a family, and there were countries where divorce was not even acceptable in 
the 1990s. Whether cohabitation was considered a proper setting in which 
couples could have children or not also varied across countries. In Nordic 
countries, for example, cohabitation acquired an equal footing with mar-
riage (Liljeström, 2002). Accordingly, it is not a surprise that the definitions 
of the family provided by Nordic sociologists give a considerably broader 
picture of the family than traditional definitions, as demonstrated by Nor-
wegian family sociologist Arnlaug Leira: 
“Usually, the term ‘family’ refers to at least two persons,  
either two adults who share bed and table, as a Norwegian expres-
sion goes, or one or more adults who take parental responsibility 
for one or more children. It may also refer to one or more adult 
child(ren) who share(s) a household with his/her parent(s)”
(Leira, 1996).
Thus, according to Leira’s definition, different family forms can include males 
and females regardless of whether they are married or have children, and 
they can include women or men cohabiting with a partner of the same sex 
regardless of whether they have children or not, and even include people 
who live with siblings or non-related others. 
In the 1990s, there was increasing recognition that the definition of the 
family needed to be more inclusive and less restrictive. Theresa Rothausen 
defined the family as:
“a group of people who are interested in one another due to de-
pendence, obligations or duty, love, caring, or cooperation” 
(Rothausen, 1999: 819). 
Thus, in Rothausen’s definition, the concept of the family is expanded to 
include individuals who are not necessarily tied by marriage and reproduc-
tion, but also those who are tied by love and caring functions. 
In 1990, Jaber Gubrium and James Holstein published a book titled What 
is Family? that was deeply critical of traditional family sociology. The main 
point of the book was to reject the concept of “the family” and to begin to 
develop a concept of the process associated with ‘being a family’. Gubrium 
and Holstein’s ideas were later supported by several family sociologists. 
Diana Gittins (1993) suggested that due to major changes in family struc-
ture, it would be more appropriate to use the term “families” than “the family”. 
Even today there are different opinions as to what the family is or should be. 
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The majority of definitions coming out of the late 1990s had one thing in 
common – concepts of the family were no longer strictly related to marriage. 
Indeed, Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2002) pointed out that few institutions 
changed in the last decades of the twentieth century more than the family.
Definitions of the family in official use
The way the family is defined by the state determines what rights and respon-
sibilities are recognised and expected by legal and other social institutions 
(Skolnick, 1981). European countries recognise the family as an important 
social institution and the majority of countries have adopted different poli-
cy measures designed to protect and support the family. However, whether 
these measures are targeted at one particular type of family or at all families 
depends on how the family is defined by the policy makers. For example, 
in countries with strong Roman Catholic beliefs and where marriage is still 
considered a defining feature of the family, some of the policies could easily 
be targeted at the ‘standard’ family only (Hantrais/Letablier, 1996). 
Besides family policies and different social policies, official definitions of 
the family are needed to conduct population censuses. Over the course of 
the last few decades, definitions of the family used in censuses have also 
changed. For example, the definition of the family proposed by the United 
Nations in 1974 for use in population and housing censuses was based on 
marriage as the main defining criterion for the family (Hantrais, 2005). In UN 
recommendations for population and housing censuses published twenty 
years later, reference to marriage as a defining characteristic of a family was 
replaced by reference to ‘cohabiting partners’ (UNECE, 1998: 191). 
Whilst acknowledging that significant changes have taken place in the 
institution of the family, it is easier for policy makers to target measures 
at the traditional marriage-based family. In only a few countries are non-
marital cohabiting couples legally registered and considered to be families. 
Accordingly, Moen and Schorr (1987) proposed that rather than using a 
universal definition of the family, it would be more appropriate to define 
the family according to the particular issues involved. They suggested that 
when dealing with issues of child support the use of a definition including 
households with children is most appropriate, and when dealing with prop-
erty settlements of cohabiting adults the use of a definition that includes in-
timate primary relationships would be more useful. Thus, in designing new 
policy measures, policy makers have to adjust to a diversity of family forms.
In 2002, the European Commission Directorate-General for Employment 
and Social Affairs published a research report from 15 EU member states, 
plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (European Commission, 2002), which 
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revealed two categories of countries. First, there were countries which made 
a clear distinction between the concept of ‘family’ and ‘household’. In these 
countries a sociological and legal value was attributed to the term ‘family’, 
and an economic value to the term ‘household’. The group of countries with 
a clear distinction between the two concepts consisted of southern Euro-
pean countries plus the United Kingdom. The other group of countries either 
made no distinction between the concepts of ‘family’ and ‘household’, or used 
only the term ‘household’. However, definition of the family - where it was 
used - was not universally the same. In some countries like Italy it was linked 
with marriage and in others it was not. Finally, there was the extreme case of 
Norway, where even an unmarried person living alone was considered to be 
a family (European Commission, 2002). The study revealed that in answer to 
the question on the role of the term ‘family’ in family benefits there were dif-
ferences between countries that had used a precise definition of the term and 
those that had not. For example Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, Liech-
tenstein, Norway and the United Kingdom frequently used the term ‘child’ in-
stead of ‘family’ when defining family benefits (European Commission, 2002). 
In a majority of European countries, new forms of family (cohabiting 
couples, re-married couples, single-parent families, step-families, etc.) 
are entitled to benefits on an equal basis with marriage-based families. In 
this respect homosexual couples might be an exception. By the time the 
above mentioned report was published (2002), homosexual couples were 
legally recognised in France, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland and Sweden 
(ibid.). Today, debates on the issue of homosexual families are in progress in 
several countries. 
Conclusion
Arlene Skolnick has stressed that defining the family is not just an academic 
exercise, because the way it is defined determines which kind of families 
are considered normal and which are considered deviant (Skolnick, 1981). 
Although families continue to play a very important role in society and the 
nuclear family is still a normative ideal of family in many European countries, 
during the last few decades family structures have become highly diverse. 
New definitions of the family reveal that it is practically impossible to define 
the family using the touchstones of the family that characterised definitions 
used in the 1950s or 1960s.
When carrying out comparative studies on changes in family behaviour, 
and in the course of comparing family policies across governments, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that the definitions used may well not be the same. 
At the same time, these different definitions not only highlight different 
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realities but also act as a window on the different values held by people 
across Europe towards the family. 
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1.2  Major Trends in Family Behaviour in  
European Countries
Leeni Hansson
Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn University
In the majority of western countries, the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury was characterised by significant changes in the family as an institution 
and an increasing plurality of family forms. The new form of family formation 
alongside families based on registered marriage - unregistered cohabitation 
- became an alternative to marriage-based families. Besides cohabitation, the 
share of other novel family structures – single-parent families, reconstituted 
families, living apart together (LAT), living together apart (LTA), etc., has also 
increased. Family sociologists attribute changes in the institution of family to 
a process of individualisation and de-institutionalisation of the family (Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002) that is reflected in increasing variability of individual choic-
es concerning the timing of family formation and the form of the union itself. 
The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the major changes that 
have occurred in the family in different EU countries. 
Changes in family formation
Leaving parental home
Although there are differences in cultural attitudes and family policies, there 
is a trend for young people across Europe to remain in their parental home 
for longer than young people did some decades ago (Cherlin et al., 1997; 
Corijn/Klijzing, 2001). According to a Eurobarometer survey carried out in 
2005 (Mobility in…, 2006), young Europeans leave their parental home at 
the average age of 21, though this differs considerably across European 
countries. According to this survey, young people leave the parental home 
at a younger age in Nordic and Baltic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), than in southern Europe (ibid.). On average in 
2008, half of the female population had left parental home by the age of 23, 
and half of male population by the age of 26 (The Social Situation…, 2010). It 
is characteristic of all the EU countries that women leave the parental home 
at a younger age than men. The general trend of remaining in the parental 
home for longer can be explained first of all by the increasing number of 
years spent in education and by postponement of marriage. Geographical 
differences in turn are mainly explained by the differences in opportunities 
to participate in the labour and housing markets.
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Marriage-based families
Marriage was considered the primary foundation for family formation and 
a socially normative precondition for having children in western countries 
until the 1960s. In the second half of the twentieth century however, the 
situation changed, and since the 1970s the crude marriage rate, i.e. number 
of marriages per 1,000 population in the year, has decreased signifi cantly in 
the majority of European countries (Kalmijn, 2007). According to Eurostat 
population data (Europe in…, 2010; The Social Situation…, 2010), in 1960 the 
crude rate of marriage was considerably lower in the ‘old’ EU countries (7.9) 
than in the ‘new’ member states (such as Latvia 11.0, Romania 10.7, Lithu-
ania 10.1, and Estonia 10.0). The marriage rate was below the EU average in 
Nordic countries, but lowest in Ireland – 5.5 marriages per 1,000 of the pop-
ulation. According to population statistics (ibid.), during the period between 
1960−2007 the diff erences in marriage rates levelled, and in the countries 
where marriage rates had been high in the 1960s the decline was steep-
est. The steepest decline in marriage rates took place in the Baltic countries, 
which in the 1960s were characterised by relatively high marriage rates. For 
example, compared to Sweden where the crude marriage rate was already 
low in the 1960s, the decrease was from 6.7 in 1960 to 5.2 in 2007, whereas 
in Estonia the decrease was from 10.0 in 1960 to 5.2 in 2007, and in Latvia 
from 11.0 in 1960 to 6.8 respectively (The Social Situation…, 2010).
Figure 1. Marriages per 1,000 persons in 1960 and 2008 (EU27)
* Cyprus – data of 1970, data of 1960 not comparable.
Source: Europe in Figures – Eurostat yearbook (2009).
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One explanatory factor for the declining marriage rate is that family for-
mation has increasingly become connected to alternative living arrange-
ments, i.e. an increase in the share of cohabiting unions as an alternative 
to a marriage-based family (Kalmijn, 2007). The other explanatory factor is 
postponement of marriage. It is a general trend in the majority of Europe-
an countries that the mean age of women at first marriage is increasing. In 
Northern Europe it has increased by almost four years during the past few 
decades. While in the EU15 the average age of women at marriage is 27.5 
years, in northern countries it is close to 30 years. In Sweden a woman’s aver-
age age at marriage increased from 24 years in 1960 to 30.2 years in 2000, 
in Denmark it increased from 22.8 to 29.5 years, and in Finland it increased 
from 23.8 to 28 years (Population Statistics, 2006). 
It was characteristic of the former socialist countries that women got mar-
ried on average two years earlier than women in western European countries. 
Although in both groups of countries the mean age of women at first marriage 
increased, by the turn of the century the differences between the EU15 and the 
12 new member states remained about the same. Among new member states, 
the mean age of women at first marriage is highest in Slovenia (26.7), Malta 
(26.7) and Cyprus (26.4) – but they are all lagging behind the EU15 average. 
The only “old” EU country where the average age of women at first marriage is 
similar to the average of the new member states is Portugal (25.7); among the 
countries of EU15, it is the lowest age of a woman at first marriage.
Cohabiting unions 
The crude rate of marriage is a statistical measure that takes into account 
only officially registered marriages and disregards other forms of partner-
ship. Accordingly, in many countries, there are no relevant statistics con-
cerning cohabitation available. Based on data contained in different sur-
veys (e.g. European Social Survey, Eurobarometer Survey, Fertility and Family 
Surveys, etc.,) we can conclude that since the 1970s the popularity of living 
together without getting married has increased in the majority of European 
countries but the rapidity of the increase in cohabitation differs according 
to country (Brown & Booth, 1996). On the basis of these differences, several 
typologies of cohabitation have been constructed (Kasearu, 2007). 
First, on the basis of the proportion of cohabiting unions, Kasearu (ibid.) 
divides European countries into three broad groups. In the first group are 
countries with a high proportion of cohabitating unions. The share of co-
habitating unions among 26-35 year-old men and women is highest in Swe-
den, where 43% of people in that particular age group are cohabiting. Finland, 
Denmark, Norway and France are also characterised by relatively high levels 
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of cohabiting unions, with around one in three individuals aged 26-35 in a 
cohabiting union. In the second group we find the United Kingdom, Bel-
gium, Luxembourg and Estonia. In these countries, cohabitations constitute 
one in four unions; Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Slovenia have co-
habitation level of about 20%. The third group is characterised by the lowest 
levels of cohabitation, and these are seen in Greece, Portugal, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Spain, Italy and Ireland, where the share of 
people in cohabiting unions is under 10%. The two EU countries that were 
not included in Kasearu’s analysis - Bulgaria and Romania - appear to belong 
to the group of countries with low levels of cohabitation (see Hoem et al., 
2007). Therefore, it can be concluded that in many European countries mar-
riage is losing its former popularity and cohabitation is increasing.
However, knowing the proportion of cohabiting couples does not pro-
vide us with a thorough overview of union-formation patterns and their 
causes in European countries. For example, in Portugal and Greece, the co-
habitation level is low because the marriage rate is high: around two-thirds 
of women in their late twenties are already married, a fact that consider-
ably lowers the proportion of cohabiting couples. The situation is different 
in Spain and Italy where women in their twenties are neither cohabiting nor 
married. This suggests that in some cases we cannot describe cohabitation 
as a substitute for marriage; however, in some other countries this explana-
tion can be statistically proven (Kiernan, 2002).
In most countries, the share of cohabitation is age-dependent. This 
means that cohabitation is most popular among people in their twenties, 
and that the proportion of cohabiting unions declines with age (Kiernan, 
2002). Cohabitation may have different meanings to different age groups. 
While for young people, living together without marriage may constitute a 
test period before marriage rather than an alternative to marriage, in older 
age groups cohabitation is often justified by external factors (people await-
ing a divorce, adult children disapproving of the remarriage of their parents, 
reasons related to property, etc.). 
Kiernan (ibid.) provides her own typology, which is constructed on the 
basis of the social acceptance of cohabitation. Acceptance is determined 
by childbearing outside marriage on the one hand, and through increases 
in the number of cohabiting couples on the other. A number of stages can 
be identified and are drawn from the experience of the Swedish population 
because Sweden has a long-standing tradition of non-marital cohabitation 
as a family form.
According to Kiernan, in the first stage cohabitation is chosen by only a 
small subgroup of a population as an alternative lifestyle choice; marriage 
is still overwhelmingly considered the foundation of the family. In the second 
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stage, cohabitation becomes popular as a test period before marriage, 
though it is usually followed by marriage; this means that cohabitation is a 
short time period during which the quality of the relationship and the part-
ner’s personality is tested. Cohabiting partners usually have no children dur-
ing this test period. In the third stage, cohabitation is a socially acceptable al-
ternative to marriage and children are not rare in these relationships. Finally, 
cohabitation becomes an alternative form of family formation, cohabitation 
and marriage become equal, and the only thing that makes a difference is 
the existence or non-existence of the marriage certificate. According to Ki-
ernan, Nordic countries have reached the fourth stage, and recent trends in 
eastern European countries suggest that some of the new member states, 
for example Estonia, are also making a transition to the fourth stage. 
Families with children
The rapid decline in rates of birth caused concern throughout Europe in the 
early 1990s. Generally the countries with the most marked decrease in the 
birth rate were those where they used to be high, such as southern Euro-
pean and Baltic countries. Although the rate of decline was influenced to a 
certain extent by differences in population age composition, the real rate of 
decline was clear (Recent Demographic…, 2002). 
According to Eurostat data (The Social Situation…, 2010), in the EU27 
in 2007 the total fertility rate, i.e. the average number of children born to 
a woman, was 1.55, with the highest being found in Ireland (2.01). Rates 
above 1.8 children per woman were recorded in France, Sweden, Denmark 
and United Kingdom. Although in these countries the total fertility rate was 
considerably higher than the average in EU countries, it was still below re-
placement level (2.1). Countries with a critical level of births were Slovakia, 
where the total fertility rate was as low as 1.25, but also Romania (1.3), Po-
land (1.31), Portugal (1.33) and Italy (1.35). However, compared to the sig-
nificant fall in fertility rates that took place in many countries in the first half 
of the 1990s, we can today speak of a certain recovery. 
Several population surveys have revealed an interesting fact: in most Eu-
ropean countries the actual number of children in the family is below the 
desired number of children (Cliquet/Avramov, 1998). Socio-economic factors 
(education, work, income), relational factors (age at start of childbearing, mar-
ital status), and biological-reproductive factors have been seen to influence 
the discrepancy between actual and intended number of children (ibid.).
A recent, statistically important development in some countries with 
very low fertility levels is a substantial increase in the number of childless 
couples. According to the OECD family database (OECD Family Database, 
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2008, SF 7) in 2007 in the age group 30-34, the share of women without chil-
dren was the highest in Luxembourg (42.9%) and lowest in Slovakia (9.2%). 
Part of the reason for the diff erences in the rates of childlessness is post-
ponement of having children – characteristic of many EU countries. In 1960 
in EU15 countries the mean age of a woman giving birth to her fi rst child 
was 25.2. By 2007, the mean age was highest in Ireland (31.1) and lowest in 
Bulgaria (26.7) and Romania (27.9) (The Social Situation…, 2010). This trend 
of postponement of birth of the fi rst child and a longer period of childless-
ness leaves young people more time for individual choices between the 
family and career, and can be seen as a sign of the de-institutionalisation of 
the family.
An increase in extra-marital births is one of the most characteristic 
changes in Europe in the decades analysed. In the EU15, the share of extra-
marital births has increased from 5% in 1960 to 36% in 2007 (Population 
Statistics, 2008). The rate of extra-marital births has increased approximate-
ly evenly both in the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU countries. However, there is a wide 
gap between the rates of extra-marital births in the diff erent geographic 
regions, and this gap has widened over the decades. In northern countries 
the increase in the share of extra-marital births has increased considerably 
(in Sweden from 11% in 1960 to 55% in 2007; in Denmark from 8% to 46%, 
and in Finland from 4% to 41% respectively) though this increase has been 
much less marked in southern Europe, e.g. Greece (4.9), Italy and Spain, all 
three remaining below 10% in 2000.
Figure 2. Births outside of marriage in 2007 (%)
* Ireland and Spain, data of 2006.   
Source: 1960 - Eurostat: Population Statistics (2004:119).
Source: 2008 - Eurostat: Europe in Figures - Eurostat Yearbook (2010:183). 
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The ‘new’ EU countries reveal similar geographical patterns of extra-marital 
births: the rates are highest in Estonia (59%) and Latvia (43%) and lowest in 
Cyprus (The Social Situation…, 2010). It is worth mentioning that in Iceland, 
a non-EU country, 64% of all births were extra-marital in 2007 (ibid.); the 
proportion of extra-marital births is also high in France (51%). The majority 
of extra-marital births are accounted to cohabiting couples, i.e. most children 
born outside marriage have a cohabiting mother and father (Lanciery, 2008). 
Family break-up
The crude divorce rate1 has increased over the past decades in most EU 
countries, except for Estonia and Latvia, where divorce rates were already 
high in the 1960s (The Social Situation…, 2010). In the 1960s, divorce rates 
were generally signifi cantly higher in socialist block countries than in the 
western countries, but divorce rates increased faster in the ‘old’ EU countries, 
and diff erences between the country groups had levelled by 2000. Accord-
ing to Eurostat data (Europe in Figures, 2009), in 2007 among EU15 countries 
the crude divorce rate was high in Finland (2.5), Denmark (2.6), Spain (2.8) and 
Belgium (2.9). Among the new member states Lithuania (3.4) and Latvia (3.3) 
were characterised by the highest divorce rates followed by the Czech Repub-
lic (3.0) and Estonia (2.8). In contrast, Poland (1.7) and Slovenia (1.3) had the 
lowest number of divorces per 1,000 inhabitants among the new member 
states. There is no data for Malta as divorce is not legal there. Among the EU15, 
Greece (1.2) and Italy (0.8) had the lowest divorce rates in 2007 (ibid.).
Figure 3. Divorces per 1,000 persons in 1960 and 2007 (EU27)
       
BE   BG  CZ  DE   DE  EE    IE    GR  ES  FR    IT    CY*  LV   LT   LU  HU   NL  AT  PL    PT  RO  SI    SK    FI    SE   UK
1960   2007
*France, data of 2006; no data for Malta as divorce is not legal.    
Source: 1960 - Eurostat: Population Statistics (2004 :126). 
Source: 2007 - Eurostat: Europe in Figures - Eurostat Yearbook (2010:184).
1   Calculation based on the number of divorces in a given year per 1,000 inhabitants.
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Because the dissolution of cohabiting relationships is not recorded, and 
non-marital cohabitation is increasing in the majority of European coun-
tries, it is very difficult to determine the real level of family break-ups. 
Post-divorce families
In the 1960s, divorces were not widespread in western European countries, 
but the proportion of divorcees who re-married was considerably higher 
than today. While in the 1960s, 60-70% of divorcees (in Nordic countries 
55%) re-married, by the end of the twentieth century this share had fallen 
to about 20%. Thus, today many divorced persons prefer not to remarry, and 
new permanent relationships are established as cohabiting unions instead. 
Marital instability and an increase in separation and divorce have resulted 
in an increasing proportion of single parent families (Pryor/Rodgers, 2001). Ac-
cording to the OECD (OECD Family database 2008, SF 2), in 2007 the share of chil-
dren aged 0-14 living in single-parent families was highest in United Kingdom 
(24%), followed by Estonia (18%) and Latvia (15%). The share of single-parent 
families was lowest in Romania (3%), Greece (4%), Italy and Malta (both 5%).
Living Apart Together (LAT)
The phenomenon of ‘living apart together’ (LAT) - where partners share 
common living arrangement for some periods of time, but also have sepa-
rate residences (Trost, 1998) - is a relatively new living arrangement. LAT re-
lationships are more common in Finland and Germany (for more detail, see 
OECD Family database 2008, SF 9). However, categorisation of the people 
involved as either single or partnered is problematic, because the situation 
can vary across countries and individual cases, and accordingly needs fur-
ther study (Speder, 2007).
The future of the family
The increasing variety of family forms in recent years is the basis for several hypoth-
eses regarding the future of the family (Cliquet/Avramov, 1998). In general, there 
are three main visions of the future of the family: (1) disappearance of the family; (2) 
restoration of the traditional family; (3) further increase in family variation.
The first scenario – disappearance of the family
Recent trends in various demographic indicators of family life, such as the 
decreasing popularity of marriage, instability of the family, decreasing fertility, 
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different alternative living arrangements, and voluntary childlessness, have 
led some researchers to suggest that the traditional family is about to van-
ish (Cooper, 1986). However, evidence from a variety of studies (e.g. Kiernan, 
2002) reveals that most people still establish a permanent relationship and 
continue to have children. Although the popularity of marriage is decreas-
ing, studies have shown that cohabiting couples resemble married couples 
in many ways (Brown/Booth, 1996) and are able to fulfil one of the main 
functions of the family – socialisation of children.
An increase in divorce rates in the majority of western countries may also 
be interpreted as a threat to the existence of the traditional family. However, 
research shows (Kalmijn, 2007; Kiernan, 2002) that most divorced people are 
ready to establish new and enduring relationships. Some concerns about 
the future of the family are also related to low fertility levels. However, some 
fertility surveys have revealed that in the absence of extreme environmental 
pressures against having children, the vast majority of married and cohabit-
ing couples want to have at least one child. 
Thus, the thesis of ‘the death of the family’ based on a quick reading of 
population statistics is most probably not the most likely scenario for the 
future of the family. Beck has considered family a “zombie category – dead 
but still alive” (Beck-Gernsheim, 2002).
The second scenario – back to the traditional family?
This scenario speaks of restoration of the traditional family, but it is unclear 
what is meant by ‘traditional family’. If it is the traditional economic family 
with the father as the sole breadwinner and the mother as homemaker, then 
in twenty-first century Europe with highly educated women and changing 
attitudes towards gender roles, it seems quite unrealistic to return to a fam-
ily model with a stay-at-home mother. Alternatively, does the traditional 
family mean a family that excludes premarital sex and non-marital cohabi-
tation? At least in Europe both are widespread, and it seems to be unrealistic 
to expect present sexual ‘permissiveness’ to be replaced by the strict sexual 
norms attributed to the first half of the twentieth century.
The third scenario – further increases in variation of family forms
Family sociology has demonstrated increasing variation in household types 
and more complex family life courses in recent decades (Jallinoja, 1994). 
Modernisation has led to acceptance of a variety of family forms based on 
the individual choice (Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1987; Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). It 
gives us reason to expect that the diversity of family types, including fami-
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lies based on same-sex relationships, will continue to increase in the future.
Increased geographical mobility and career opportunities offer the pos-
sibility or even facilitate the increase of a LAT relationship (living apart to-
gether). LAT relationships may be entered into for a variety of reasons or 
circumstances (employment location, mobility requirements, family phase, 
financial position, etc.). Due to psychological burdens and also economic 
problems, it is likely that LAT relationships will remain a minority among 
partnership choices (Trost, 1998). 
In conclusion, we can say that the changes taking place in European fam-
ily behaviour and in the family in the western world in general are extremely 
interesting and sometimes even unexpected, requiring further exploration 
and analysis. The future of the family is one of the issues that will provoke 
serious discussions among the researchers involved in FAMILYPLATFORM.
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 1.3 Changes in Finnish Families: Towards Full-Time  
Motherhood and a New Familialism? 
Marjo Kuronen, Teppo Kröger and Kimmo Jokinen
Family Research Centre, University of Jyväskylä
Finland has become known internationally as one of the Nordic woman-
friendly welfare states where extensive public day-care provision for young 
children has given women an “exit out of family responsibilities”, thereby of-
fering possibilities to combine family life and paid work. This interpretation 
has probably always been too ideal. Raija Julkunen (1992: 47) reminded us 
back in the early 1990s that the woman-friendliness of the Finnish welfare 
state needed to be critically analysed, because even the “best reforms for 
women in the whole world” might have unintended consequences. 
Finnish women have been described as working mothers. Traditionally, 
Finnish women have worked full-time, including mothers with young chil-
dren. What has also been typical for Finland is that the employment rate of 
lone mothers has been even higher than for married or cohabiting mothers: 
in the mid-1980s, 90% of all lone mothers were in paid work. The dual-earner 
family model was also strongest at that time in Finland (Haataja, 2004). 
However, the situation has changed quite dramatically during the last 20 
years. Full-time motherhood has become more popular and youngest chil-
dren are taken care of at home, mostly by their mothers. Even if family policy 
actively encourages men’s involvement in parenting, it is only very slowly 
changing gendered practices of child care. In the early 2000s, the maternal 
employment rate of mothers of children under the age of three was unam-
biguously low in Finland (32%) compared to the European, not to mention 
even the Nordic level (Lister et al., 2007: 126). In this respect, Finland is mov-
ing in the opposite direction to most of the other countries of Europe. The 
reasons for this are a complex mixture of political decisions, changes in the 
economic situation and in working life, gender relations, and ideological 
changes in society.
In Finland, ever since the 1980s, there have been two simultaneous but 
contradictory trends in child care policy: gradual expansion of public day-
care provision, and financial support for parental child care. This has very 
much been a political compromise. In 2005, the take-up rate of publicly fi-
nanced day-care for children was much lower in Finland than in the other 
Nordic countries. For children aged 1-2 years old, it was 37% in Finland com-
pared with 54-85% in the other Nordic countries, which can be explained 
by the extensive use of home care allowance schemes. Even in the older 
age group (3-5 years), the rate is clearly lower in Finland, at 69% and 91-95% 
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respectively (Eydal/Kröger, 2010: 25). However, it should be mentioned that 
for Finnish women full-time motherhood represents a temporary phase in 
life. The vast majority of mothers return to paid employment at the latest 
when their youngest child turns three, that is, when their eligibility for child 
home care allowance ends. Financial support for home care is a controver-
sial issue: on the one hand, it is an important right for families with young 
children and official recognition for unpaid care work; on the other it main-
tains gender inequality and weakens the position of women in the labour 
market (Repo, 2009).
Financial support for home care is not the only factor in explaining the 
rapid change: a deep economic recession in the early 1990s strongly influ-
enced the employment rate and had lasting consequences for the Finnish 
labour market. Its influence has been remarkable especially among lone 
mothers, whose poverty risk has dramatically increased since the early 
1990s mainly because of growing unemployment but also because of cuts 
in family benefits. For some of them full-time motherhood has offered a 
more positive identity than unemployment even if it has also meant a fi-
nancial struggle in daily life (Krok, 2009). There are also full-time mothers 
to whom it has offered an option to exit working life, which is increasingly 
characterised by a hardening of demands and a worsening of conditions. 
Since the 1990s, career options for even academically trained women have 
been increasingly insecure and fragmented.
Attitudinal changes have also taken place. Many feminist researchers talk 
about a new familialism, where families instead of the state - and especial-
ly women in families - are expected to take more responsibility for caring 
(Mahon, 2002: 150-3). Even a turn towards a new kind of full-time mother 
society (Anttonen, 2003: 178-9) can be recognised, where the rhetoric of 
“the best interest of the child” and “parental choice” has made the general 
attitudes towards paid work of mothers with young children more negative 
than before. This is rather new and unique phenomenon in Finnish society. 
This example from Finland shows not only that welfare state models are not 
everlasting, but also that there can be unintended backlashes against them.
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1.4  Short Account of Changes in the Family in Italy
Carmen Leccardi and Miriam Perego 
Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Milan-Bicocca
In Italy, as in the majority of western countries, the family has undergone 
considerable change and taken on a range of new forms, especially since 
the 1960s. In fact, in the course of the last thirty years it has become more 
and more common to see a variety of new family models – from the unmar-
ried couple, to the single-parent family, to the reconstituted or recomposed 
family, to the “mixed” family (the family or couple made up of an Italian and 
a foreigner).
Quite apart from the degree to which each of these family forms has spread, 
we should emphasise the strong likelihood that each of us in the course of our 
lives will come into contact with this new multiplicity of forms of family life. 
Thus, analysing the principle forms of transformation that the family is going 
through means getting to grips directly with the actual life experiences of the 
individual – the young people involved, both male and female.
Official ISTAT statistics confirm that Italy, like other countries, is charac-
terised by a progressive increase in the presence of unmarried couples or 
free unions. Moreover, although the overall number of such unions is still 
relatively low compared with the figures for the rest of Europe (in 2006, 
637,000 out of a total of 14 million couples), the rate of growth has increased 
from the 1990s onwards – in the period between 1994 and 2006, from 1.6% 
to 4.5% of all couples (ISTAT, 2005). Notwithstanding this, for the majority 
of unmarried couples in Italy today living together still constitutes a kind 
of “preparation” for marriage and is regarded as a transitory phase of life 
(Sabbadini, 1997; Buzzi et al., 2008). Compared with the rest of Europe, Italy 
continues to show a clear preference for the model of the traditional family 
(marriage with children generated within it) even though, as stated above, 
gradually increasing numbers of people (in particular among the younger 
generations) are choosing to live together.
It is interesting to focus attention in particular on how young people, 
both male and female, are postponing their exit from their family of ori-
gin and subsequent formation of a new family. Indeed, of the 27 European 
countries, Italy (together with other Mediterranean countries) is the country 
in which children wait the longest to leave their families of origin. In 2003 
for example, the number of unmarried young people between 18 and 34 
- male and female - who lived with at least one of their parents numbered 
7,600,000 (60.2% of the total). The tendency to continue to live in the pa-
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rental home even after having achieved economic independence has been 
called the “long family”1 , and it is also accompanied by new ways of creating 
families on the part of young men and women. 
At a general level, it must be stated that in Italy the incidence of mar-
riage has also fallen noticeably. In 2006 for example, the ratio of the number 
of marriages to the number of residents was 4.1 marriages for every 1,000 
inhabitants, with a contraction between 2001 and 2006 of 7.8%. The birth 
rate in our country is also particularly low, 1.17%, while the European mean 
is about 1.5%.
The nature of relations within the couple, and their behaviour, are also 
changing, above all as a consequence of the emergence of a more equal 
relationship between the genders. This, at least within the private sphere, 
is contributing to making women more independent, furnishing them with 
a greater degree of liberty and decision-making power. In fact, in the case 
of unions that are no longer considered satisfactory, women often decide 
to cut the tie rather than maintain the relationship. Nevertheless, the fre-
quency of divorce in Italy is still very low, lower not only than in northern 
European countries (50-55 per 100), but also if compared to other southern 
European countries (9 divorces per 100 in Italy, 18 per 100 in Greece).
Italy’s territorial divide also finds expression in terms of marital breakdown. 
While the regions of central and northern Italy are closer to European norms 
- hence characterised by a more marked tendency to resort to separation 
and divorce, those of southern Italy are more traditionalist. In fact, southern 
couples are on average less inclined to resort to a definitive dissolution of the 
marital tie, even though the evidence shows that over recent years in this re-
gion too there has been an increase in the incidence of divorce (De Sandre et 
al., 1999). In any case, the increased tendency of couples to decide to separate 
and divorce is producing forms of the family in Italy that are more articulated 
and complex than was the case a few decades ago.
Another phenomenon that it is worth focusing attention on is that of 
single-parent families. Although the number of such families in Italy - in 
contrast to other European countries - is relatively low, there has nonethe-
less been a significant increase. In particular, there has been a noticeable 
shift from the old form of the single-parent family, which was the outcome 
of unavoidable or unsolicited events (the death of a spouse, abandonment, 
etc.), to a new form of single parenthood: the result of a deliberate choice 
(Barbagli et al., 2003). Figures for the years 2006-2007, for example, indi-
cate that in Italy single-parent families - in line with the rest of Mediterra-
nean Europe - constituted 5-10% of the total number of nuclear families. 
1  In Italy the expression refers to the prolonged presence of parents and children under the same roof.
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In Belgium, France and Holland, by contrast, the incidence of single-parent 
families is greater: between 11 and 15%, while in northern Europe, in par-
ticular Great Britain and Germany, single-parent families make up a fifth of 
the total (Zanatta, 2008).
Finally, there is yet another type of family that is becoming more com-
mon in Italy just as elsewhere: the so-called “mixed family”. In a period of ten 
years or so the number of marriages between Italians and foreigners has 
quadrupled, rising from 58,000 in 1991 to 200,000 in 2005 (ISTAT, 2004). This 
has been also accompanied by a 22% increase in the number of children 
born into mixed couples (ISTAT, 2004).
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1.5  Trends in the German Family Model:  
Pluralisation of Living Arrangements, and  
Decrease in the Middle-Class Nuclear Family  
Ursula Adam, Loreen Beier, Dirk Hofaecker, Elisa Marchese, Marina Rupp
State Institute for Family Research, University of Bamberg
As in a number of other European countries, family arrangements in Germa-
ny in recent decades have become more diverse. Especially the incidence of 
the ‘middle-class nuclear family’ (a household with married parents and the 
biological children of both spouses) has decreased. This trend is driven by 
developments common to a lot of western countries: an overall decrease in 
and postponement of marriages, more divorces, low and delayed fertility, 
and a rising number of children born outside marriage.
A decline in marital unions, which are being entered into at ever higher 
ages, has led to an increase of the mean first marriage age, which has shifted 
from 25.6 in 19701 to 33 years in 2008 for men, and from 23 to 30 years for 
women. In the new Länder (the former German Democratic Republic) the 
first marriage age in 2000 was somewhat lower; however it increased faster 
than in the old Länder2 since 1990, which points to a convergence between 
East and West Germany. This trend is complemented by an increasing di-
vorce rate: while in 1970 there were 0.51 divorces for every 100 marriages, 
the number of divorces more than doubled by 2007 (in 2007 it stood at 
1.03). However, the incidence of divorce is lower in the new3 than in the old 
Länder4 (0.84 vs. 1.07 in 2007). (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009c)
Following the trend for delaying marriage, family formation shifted likewise: 
the mean age of married mothers at first childbirth5 has increased by 5.8 years 
since 1970, up to 30.1 years in 2008 (ibid.). At the same time the share of births 
outside marriage has risen significantly, from 5.5% in 1970 to 32% in 2008. Es-
pecially in the new Länder6 the share of births outside marriage in 2008 was 
more than double the share of that in the old Länder (57.8% vs. 25.8%). Taken 
together with the trends in divorce, these trends point to a generally lower sig-
1 Data for Germany in 1970 (territory of the Federal Republic of Germany before 1990).
2 Excluding the Federal State of Berlin.
3 Excluding East Berlin.
4 Including East Berlin.
5 Up until 2008 the German “Mikrozensus” (annually population census based on a sample of 1 per cent     
of German households) only collected data on the age of mothers at the first birth of a child born in a 
marriage.
6 Including the State of Berlin.
Spotlights on Contemporary Family Life - Chapter 1: Structures & Forms
40
nificance of the institution of marriage in the eastern part of Germany.
Following the delay in family formation, total (period) fertility rates (average 
number of children of all women between the age of 15 and 49) in Germany 
also show a long-term decrease: while in 1970 it was 2.02 (Heß-Meining/
Tölke, 2005: 231), by 1990 it fell significantly, to 1.45, with a less dramatic 
reduction by 2007 (to 1.37). The development in the new Länder, however, is 
unique in that fertility decreased sharply following the unification with West 
Germany from 1.5 (1991) to a record low value of 0.8 in 1994, but it has been 
gradually converging to the level of the old Länder since then (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2009c).
These trends are accompanied by notable changes in household struc-
ture, especially a decreasing number of people living in family households 
(with single children of any age in household). The share of those living in 
family households relative the whole population in Germany dropped from 
67.2% in 1970 to 50.9% in 2008 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009b). The com-
position of family households also changed dramatically: in particular, the 
incidence of larger families with three or more children has declined (19707 
22% of families, in 2008 11.8%; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010). Further-
more, there was a striking change in the importance of living arrangements: 
whilst in 1996 a distinct majority (84.4%) of children under the age of 18 
were living in one household with their married parents, and only 4% lived 
in a cohabitation (couples, living together without being married) or same-
sex household and 12% in a single parent household, these numbers had 
changed to 77%, 7% and 16% (respectively) by 2008 (Statistisches Bunde-
samt, 2009b, ifb-calculations).
As a result, there has been a decrease in the so called ‘middle-class nuclear 
family’: in 1996 about 81% of family households consisted of married parents 
with their minor children; however, by 2008 this figure had dropped to 73%. 
Accordingly the share of single parent households8 increased from about 14% 
to 19% during the same period of time. Taking a longer-term perspective, the 
share of divorced and separated as well as of single parents has increased 
sharply while the share of widowed persons has correspondingly declined 
(since 19709). An increasing number of these single parent households10 are 
composed of mainly sole-parent mothers (87%) (ibid., ifb-calculations).
Alongside the decrease in family households with married parents with 
their minor children and the increase in single parent households, Germa-
ny has seen a moderate increase in cohabiting parents, from 5% of family 
7 Findings of the 1970 population census.
8  With minor children without age limit.
9  Findings of the 1970 population census.
10 Including cohabiting parents until 2002.
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households with minor children in 1996 to 8% in 2008. This share of cohabiting 
parents is about three times higher in the new Länder11 than in the old Län-
der (ibid.). 
Finally, according to data from the Generation and Gender Survey , in 
2005 about 14% of family households in Germany were stepfamilies with 
minor children: 9% families with children of one partner and 5% with at 
least two children not directly related (Steinbach, 2009: 165f ). The majority 
(about 69%) were stepfamilies with stepfathers, a third (about 27%) step-
families with stepmothers and a small minority (about 4%) with stepfathers 
and mothers (GGS, 2005; Steinbach, 2009: 167). Overall, stepfamilies are 
more common in the new than in the old Länder (ibid.).
The described trend towards a pluralisation of living arrangements and 
the simultaneous decrease in the middle-class nuclear family in Germany 
resembles the experience of most European societies. However the differ-
ent development of family models between the new and the old German 
Länder appears to be unique in Europe: the end of the “Golden Age of Mar-
riage” with its high fertility rates, an almost completely married generation, 
low divorce rates and an early start to the building up a family, has in the 
old Länder been accompanied by the pluralisation of family forms since the 
1960s. In contrast, in the new Länder the model of the “nuclear family” was 
more stable until the 1970s. However, dramatic changes in family factors in 
the new Länder, reflected in the sharp decline of fertility and marriage and a 
steep rise in divorce rates, were almost simultaneous with the reunification 
of East and West Germany. One reason was the ending of political support 
for the model of the “nuclear family”, as well as rising insecurity through-
out the political transformation. Since the middle of the 1990s, however, 
the situation has become more stable, and fertility as well as marriage and 
divorce rates have started to increase again, though they have not reached 
the same level as in the old Länder (see Peukert, 2008: 341ff). 
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1.6  Families in Hungary 
Zsuzsa Blaskó 
Demographic Research Institute, Hungary
Although the timing, pace, and characteristics of family trends are national 
in nature in all countries, the main trends seen in families in Hungary are 
similar to those seen in other European countries. These include an ageing 
society, an increasing popularity of cohabitation without marriage, a de-
creasing number of births, together with a growing proportion of births out 
of wedlock, as well as increasing fragility of relationships. 
Two-thirds of Hungarian private households were a family-type household 
in 2005. More than half of them were based on a married or cohabiting couple 
with or without children; the rest of the families (10% of all the households) 
consisted of a single parent with one child or more. Sole-person households 
accounted for almost 30% of all the households. Multiple families or multiple 
generations living together were rare (Hungarian Central Office). 
Typically, there are one or at most two children in a Hungarian fam-
ily today. In more than 50% of the families with children there is only one 
child, and there are two in another 35%. At the same time 10% of families 
are a “large family” with more than three children. Comparing the 2005 ra-
tios to data from previous years shows a slow decrease in the percentage 
of couple-based households together with an increasing number of sole-
person households. These tendencies are partly attributable to an ageing of 
the population, which is at least partially associated in turn with a growing 
number of widowed persons living on their own – in most of these cases 
these widowed people are women. Single persons at younger ages are also 
a significant and slowly growing subgroup of those living by themselves, al-
though it is not usually an affordable option for young people in Hungary. 
With just over 10% of households consisting of a sole-parent family, Hun-
gary was at about the middle of the European ranking list in 2001, in be-
tween Spain (9.9%) and Ireland (11.7%). In Hungary – just like in most of the 
European countries, sole-parent families are typically headed by the mother 
rather than the father. 
The proportion of sole-parent households has remained relatively sta-
ble since 1990 – though the divorce rate has increased and the proportion 
of births to unmarried women has also increased. At the same time, how-
ever, there have been more childless marriages among those breaking up 
in 2005 than in 1990, and in 2005 the majority (two-thirds) of births to 
unmarried women took place in a cohabiting partnership – rather than to 
a single mother.
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Indeed, cohabitation has spread rapidly as a form of living in the last two 
decades. In 1990 only 4% of families were based on cohabitation, but this 
number had tripled by 2005. Not only has the number been changing: while 
previously it was very often the widowed or divorced elderly who chose not 
to marry, today this form of family formation is much more popular among 
younger generations. In fact, for many people today cohabitation is a transi-
tory form of living that will either be turned into marriage after a test period 
or ended. Nevertheless, seven out of ten first cohabiting relationships start-
ing between 2000 and 2004 took the form of cohabitation without mar-
riage. This tendency took place alongside increased social acceptance of co-
habitation, although this form of partnership is still considered a kind of test 
period prior to marriage itself, which would ideally follow the success of the 
test period. Statistics from the Hungarian Central Office show that cohabit-
ing partners remain childless more often than married couples, however, 
and they are also more likely to have one child rather than more.
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Carmen Leccardi and Miriam Perego
Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Milan-Bicocca
This chapter of the FAMILYPLATFORM Journal is dedicated to a theme that 
is of great importance not just for families but for contemporary societies 
as a whole: intergenerational solidarity. Paradoxically, it seems, the growing 
tendency towards individualisation has been accompanied in more recent 
times by the rediscovery of forms of solidarity, at times quite unprecedent-
ed, within the family. Today, the various generations that make up the family 
- ever more frequently, as a consequence of demographic changes, consist-
ing of as many as four generations - seem to be engaged not so much in 
conflict as in a continuous contest to offer solidarity.
The traditional conflict between older and younger generations, char-
acteristic of western societies in the twentieth century, exploded, as is well 
known, with particular virulence in the sixties and seventies, the years of the 
youth and political movements. Starting from the nineties, thanks in large 
part to the spread of ever less authoritarian family relations (as Claudine 
Attias-Donfut underlines in this chapter of the journal), forms of compre-
hension, help and reciprocal support between the various components of 
the family have been rediscovered as a major resource in the resolution of 
problems confronting the various generations in social life.
Simultaneously, the turn of the new century has seen the emergence and 
spread of new expectations of family solidarity. These involve in an analogous 
way both the young and the less young. The young, for example, confronted 
by ‘precarity’ and instability in the labour market, expect to receive economic 
and relational support from their family; young adults expect help in fulfill-
ing their new parental responsibilities; and the elderly expect support in con-
fronting the material, health and psychological difficulties that advancing age 
brings with it. And in fact - this needs to be underlined - all these expectations 
are brought to bear on the baby-boomer generation. Today’s fifty/sixty-year-
olds thus find themselves at the centre of converging expectations. It is no ac-
cident that the French scholar Claude Martin has recently defined this genera-
tion as the ‘pivot generation’: a generation destined to carry on its shoulders 
multiple generational pressures, often difficult to reconcile.
It is in fact the first time in the history of humanity that such a large 
number of generations find themselves living together in the same histori-
cal time and on the same social scene. A situation, as is highlighted by the 
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articles contained in this edition of the journal, capable of generating a 
scenario that was unthinkable up to a few decades ago – a scenario full of 
positive features but also, inevitably, of contradictions and ambivalences. 
Indeed, this latter characteristic constitutes a central theme of the interview 
with Ariela Lowenstein.
In this scenario an unprecedentedly central role is played by grandpar-
ents. The growth in the period of life in which people are grandfathers and 
grandmothers in good health and active on the social scene - albeit no lon-
ger in the labour market - is in fact continual. This new reality has changed 
not only the social profile of grandfathers and grandmothers and represen-
tations of them, but also the role they are able to play in offering active 
support to other members of the family: no longer just care-receivers, then, 
but also care-givers. Consider, for example, as confirmed by European data 
(taken into consideration here in particular by Francesco Belletti), the caring 
capabilities that grandparents demonstrate in respect of grandchildren, es-
pecially those not yet of school age – a form of help that, in contrast to oth-
ers, is particularly widespread in southern Europe, where the welfare system 
is less extensive. Although in this respect too the gender variable is of cru-
cial importance (grandfathers and grandmothers do not furnish the same 
amount, or quality, of care time: this theme is taken up in the interview with 
Carla Facchini and Marita Rampazi), there can nonetheless be no doubt as 
to the positive role that both exercise in the vitalisation of forms of solidarity 
within the family: both through financial and non-financial help.
In short, it is necessary to reconsider the prevalent notion that the elder 
generations are the exclusive recipients of help provided by the younger 
generations. It is also appropriate to distinguish, as is also underlined in oth-
er articles in this edition of the journal, between the elderly and the ‘old el-
derly’. It is above all the care of the latter that has constituted in the last few 
decades a problem of great strategic importance in the increasingly older 
societies of Europe. There is no doubt that this situation is exacerbated by 
the growing instability of the family, together with the fact that an increas-
ingly large number of adult women cannot undertake unpaid labour within 
the family, on account of their involvement in the labour market. Neverthe-
less, it would be an error not to draw attention to the other side of the coin: 
the ‘young’ grandparents that distinguish themselves by their capacity to 
play an irreplaceable role in the practice of forms of family solidarity.
It is important to remember, however, in relation to the question of fam-
ily solidarity, that support and reciprocal help that continues to originate 
from the family is not and cannot be considered to be a substitute for public 
support (as Attias-Donfut rightly underlines). In fact, whatever the form and 
degree of support of public policies, and whatever their actual capacity to 
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respond to needs, solidarity within the family tends to combine with public 
services rather than replace them. The variety of forms and manifestations of 
solidarity can therefore be explained at least in part by starting out from the 
differences in welfare policies in national and regional terms. Account must 
always be taken, albeit in terms of the variety of situations in question (for ex-
ample, in respect of so-called ‘large families’: in this regard see the thoughts of 
Raul Sanchez) of the indisputable strategic importance of solidarity between 
the generations in guaranteeing the wellbeing of the family.
In the final analysis, public and private can come together constructively 
to confront problems - and overcome the social obstacles and uncertainties 
characteristic of our times - that fall on the shoulders of families. Nonethe-
less, a certain number of more general goals - for example, promoting dia-
logue and awareness between generations and actively involving the elder 
generations in solving the problems that relate to them - remain the specific 
responsibility of the public sector (as is documented here in the article by 
Lorenza Rebuzzini, who illustrates the outcomes of initiatives undertaken 
by Turin and Manchester municipal councils to this end).
In conclusion, the various points of view expressed by scholars and 
exponents of the world of family associations in this chapter of the jour-
nal confirm our direct experience: today, solidarity between generations 
within the family appears more alive and vital than ever - and also more 
and more alive, we might add, the more the future becomes gloomy. At the 
same time, taken as a whole, these testimonies induce us to reflect on an 
important strategic feature of this reality, i.e. the increasingly social nature 
of this help and solidarity. These forms of help and solidarity thus emerge 
as outcomes of specific historical circumstances, which have generated 
requirements and needs of an unprecedented nature in terms of support 
between the generations.
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 2.1 How Social Change is Transforming Relations  
Between the Generations
Interview with Claudine Attias-Donfut
Caisse nationale d’Assurance vieillesse
  What has brought about the biggest recent changes in    
 intergenerational solidarities? 
Intergenerational solidarities have always existed, but they have become 
more prevalent in recent decades due to three main conditions: 
demographic changes related to lengthening life expectancy; •	
changing values and attitudes that have profoundly affected •	
the family; 
last but not least, the development of social protection systems •	
embodied in the welfare state: because intergenerational solidarities 
complement and are even conditioned by public solidarities. 
1. Demographic changes 
Lengthening life expectancy impacts on all stages of life: youth is extended 
and old age is deferred in the sense that people are living longer in better 
health. People are also grandparents for longer – in some cases up to half 
their lifetimes.
This rise in life expectancy is producing so-called “vertical” multi-gener-
ational families (three, four, or even five) with very few members in each 
generation. This differs from families in traditional societies, which are more 
“horizontal” in the sense that they have more children but fewer genera-
tions coexisting. Many families now have more grandparents and great-
grandparents than grandchildren. This is a significant reversal of family 
age structures.
2. Changing family relations 
Increasing gender equality and a declining patriarchal system have also pro-
duced profound changes in intra-familial relations. Education has become 
less authoritarian; the generations have grown more self-reliant, starting 
with the oldest, which has seen its standard of living improve and is increas-
ingly co-residing less with other generations. Parent-children ‘co-residentiality’ 
has also increased, as young people are spending longer in education and 
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finding it harder to integrate into the labour market. 
These changes have produced a diversification of family models: the 
middle-class family model (two parents with two children) still exists, but is 
only one of others like blended families, lone-parent families, and so on. These 
models have brought about a new kind of family mindset that seeks to bal-
ance interdependence between family members with personal autonomy: 
the “freedom in togetherness” described by sociologist François de Singly. 
Clearly, these changing family relationships are also affecting the bonds 
connecting the generations, but another factor has been more crucial still: 
the development of social protection. 
3. The development of social protection 
The development of social protection has particularly benefited young peo-
ple and pensioners. Financial support has enabled young people to con-
tinue their education, but not without changing their status: children and 
adolescents are viewed more as adults in the making than as producers, as 
they still were in mid-twentieth century. This support has also encouraged 
parents to focus on their children’s education and strengthen intergenera-
tional solidarities by supporting them in education. 
Universal entitlement to - and higher - pensions has given more financial 
autonomy to the adult generations and reversed the direction of solidar-
ity flows. Many currently elderly people started work at a very young age 
(in the fields or mines), handing over their entire pay packet to the family. 
Solidarity flowed from the children to the oldest family members. This has 
now reversed, as the development of social protection has given the older 
age groups financial independence so that they are no longer financially 
dependent on their own adult children. 
  What are the particular forms of non-monetary intergenerational   
 solidarity today? 
There are at present several kinds of non-monetary support between 
generations: 
personal care for elderly people and children, people with disabilities, •	
or adults who have care needs at some point in their lives; 
co-residentiality with one’s parents, children or grandchildren; •	
grand-parental childcare for grandchildren.•	
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 In addition, there are other forms of practical help: 
‘odd jobs’ about the home, gardening, transport, domestic chores; •	
administrative help such as form filling, tax returns, health and •	
social security, etc.
Who gives to whom? Who receives from whom? These questions were an-
swered by the findings of one of the first surveys done on intergenerational 
solidarities – a tri-generational study on a sample of nearly 5,000 people 
representing 2,000 three- (sometimes four-) generation families living 
across France but not necessarily in the same household. The representa-
tives of each generation were asked what they had given to and received 
from the other two in the previous five years. 
Unsurprisingly, the higher-educated, higher income groups were givers. 
However, the low- and middle-income givers gave more than the high-in-
come groups proportionate to income: in other words, the lower earners 
did more.
Where does the giving go? Mainly to the children as support while in 
education, unemployed, unmarried or at risk of social exclusion. In these 
cases, the giving partakes of an investment in human capital. However, 
more is given to girls than boys, simply because girls tend to stay in educa-
tion longer. 
Who gives most? Chiefly, the pivotal generation - the family founders - 
but also the childless through giving to their nephews, nieces or collateral 
relations, etc. The truth of the old adage a father gives more to ten children 
than ten children to their father was also borne out by the findings.
The rate of giving decreases with ageing, but not in retirement: the 
amount of giving is the same before and after retirement, and even increas-
es. Giving declines throughout old age, but never stops entirely. It decreases 
with the move into advanced age. Giving decreases for children but not for 
grandchildren (who are, by then, in higher education).
The survey1 distinguishes between cash gifts and services:
Cash gifts: the oldest generations were found to give most money •	
to the so-called pivotal generation and the grandchildren; those 
in the pivotal generation give to their children, but little to their own 
parents; very few young people give to their parents (none give 
to their grandparents). In other words, financial solidarities flow 
1 The research is that mentioned above, i.e. tri-generational research on a sample of nearly 5,000 people 
representing 2,000 three- and four-generation families living across France but not necessarily in the 
same household.
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downwards between the generations. This may seem self-evident 
because that is the experience of most of us, but historically it is a 
new phenomenon: before universal social protection came in, and 
even before it was improved, solidarity flowed upwards (children 
started working young to help their parents). 
Services (care, childcare, etc.): these are more evenly distributed •	
between the pivotal generation (which provides help to 
dependent parents) and grandparents who provide occasional 
childcare. 
State help goes more towards the older (through old age •	
benefits and pensions) and younger (through study grants) 
generations than to the pivotal generations (who have a greater 
income tax burden). 
The methodology used to evaluate services in percentage terms was that 
the nearly 5,000 respondents interviewed – 1,958 from the pivotal genera-
tion (aged 49-53), one of their parents (1,217, average age 77) and one of 
their adult children (1,493, average age 27) - were asked to specify the fre-
quency and time represented by each service provided (help with house-
work, loan of a car, care, help with homework, shopping, etc.). The results 
were then valued in cash terms. This showed that the family contribution 
(more often made by women than men) is a significant effort that justifies 
being described as a “domestic economy”. These findings also highlighted 
the special role of the pivotal generation (a concept which has since come 
to be recognised) represented by the fifty-somethings. 
One of the kinds of help provided deserves fresh attention: grandpar-
ental childcare. It has always been there, but it is now taking a new form. 
In the research, the sample groups were asked to specify what help they 
received from their parents. The finding is that young people today are re-
ceiving more help than the two earlier generations. Today’s grandparents 
are spending more time with their grandchildren. 
This might seem illogical given the increase in collective support through 
the expansion of nursery schools and day nurseries. The explanation for it 
lies in the increased needs of young working couples. Not only are wom-
en working, they are also engaging more with their careers. And young 
couples also want more “me time”, and so often draft in both sets of grand-
parents. Meanwhile, grandparents have fewer grandchildren. But it is less 
common today for grandparents to have direct responsibility for bringing 
up their grandchildren – mainstream psychological opinion goes against 
it, stressing the importance of parents raising their children themselves. In 
contrast, grandparents are more readily enlisted for occasional help to look 
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after a sick child, for example, or to supplement public childcare provision. 
This increased involvement by grandparents can also be put down to the 
higher rate of marital breakdowns. Grandparents are the first-line bulwark 
to cushion the effects of family crisis whose help is more readily enlisted in 
the event of divorce. In fact, the first US surveys on the role of grandparents 
were prompted by the grandparental role in relationship breakdowns. 
Contrary to popular beliefs on family decline, family solidarities are ultimately 
more enduring today than ever before and more reliant on the grandparent gen-
eration. At the end of the day, what impact does grandparental support have? A 
study carried out by economists is informative: it seems to help young mothers get 
into and stay in the labour market. Their availability also influences the decision to 
have a career. Added to this is their contribution to child-raising and giving roots in 
a family tree. Through transmission, they act as “resident historians”, to quote one 
interviewee. 
 How does France compare to other European  countries in terms of   
 intergenerational solidarities?
  
A European comparative study done in 2004 and repeated in 20062 - SHARE 
(the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe) - shows common-
alities and distinctive features. 
The common trends included: 
enduring intergenerational solidarities, whatever the level of •	
self-absorption and type of social protection; 
the pivotal generation plays a central role in every country •	
(flows to the younger generations for monetary support, more 
generalised flows for time-based help); 
financial transfers flowed downwards through the generations •	
in all welfare systems, while social support tended to flow 
upwards (with the exception of grandparental help). 
But there are several differences, too: 
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands have a higher proportion •	
of people involved in exchanges of practical support and care, 
2 The same surveys were carried out simultaneously in a dozen European countries plus Israel in 2004 
and 2006 on the same individuals (longitudinal surveys) supervised by Axel Borsch-Supan (Mannheim 
Institute of Economics of Ageing) under the aegis of the European Commission.  
See http://www.share-project.org/.
Spotlights on Contemporary Family Life - Chapter 2: Solidarities in Contemporary Families
53
but these are inter-household, occasional flows. The mutual 
assistance network is largely composed of family members, but 
also of a substantial minority of non-relatives.
In Spain, Italy and Greece, by contrast, exchanges are exclusively •	
focused on family members, especially within the household. 
They are regular and intensive, and only occur between a 
handful of people. 
The other countries - France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland - fall be-
tween these two groups, combining elements of tight local networks and 
more widely dispersed networks. 
  What is the relationship between public  support and intergenerational  
 solidarity?
Contrary to another popular belief, the frequency of help is not greatest in 
the more family-centric, co-residential southern Europe, but rather in the 
northern countries, which also have the most extensive social solidarity 
networks that include both family and friends. But northern Europe is also 
where we find the most public support for children, the disabled and the 
elderly. So family support networks complement this, and this enables a 
larger number of people to be reached.
This European comparison between public and private solidari-
ties is borne out by SHARE. It highlights the fact that those who were re-
ceiving public support in 2004 but not in 2006 did not benefit from in-
creased family solidarity. Conversely, those who did not receive public 
support in 2004 but did in 2006 suffered no loss of family solidarity. In 
other words, an increase in public support is not a disincentive to fam-
ily help. This is clearly visible when tracking the same families over time: 
where public support decreases, the family does not necessarily step in; 
the two forms of support complement and play into one another. It might 
even be said that the reason why the family has been able to maintain its 
role is because the development of social protection has brought order to 
the relations between generations precisely by giving the family the re-
sources needed to provide support to one or other of its members. Most 
of the surveys show this. Some have implied a substitution effect between 
private and public help. But what we are actually seeing is a change in the 
nature of the help provided through intergenerational solidarity, such as 
where home help is brought in to do the work previously done by a family 
member. Family members will continue to help, but in other ways (keep-
ing company, shopping, etc.). Likewise, study grants enable the family to 
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do more to support young people in education. In this way, public support 
gives leverage. 
A family does not live in a self-contained world, but in an environment 
on which it depends for its inputs. Without those environmental inputs, it 
may collapse. In a crisis, the family pulls together to help its members in dif-
ficulty, but if the crisis endures, and no public support is forthcoming, the 
family will eventually become depleted.
  What is the link between intergenerational solidarities and    
 inequalities? 
Where inequalities are concerned, the effects pull in opposite directions de-
pending on which transfers we are looking at. There is no doubt that trans-
missions of assets are a factor - or even a perpetuating factor - in widening 
inequalities. In France, half of all inheritances include the transmission of a 
house which is often kept, or a gift which is used to buy a house. In both 
cases, the transmission further widens equality gaps. 
Various studies confirm that in comparable social circumstances, two 
young couples will have different life courses depending on whether or not 
they have benefited from a transmission of assets: those who have been 
gifted money get onto the housing ladder earlier, with a smaller mortgage. 
And home ownership has knock-on effects throughout the rest of life.
In-life transfers, however, have the reverse effect: they benefit those 
most in need, where there are several children. This is because amongst 
siblings, the most successful highest earners tend to help out those who 
are having difficulties. Those in the most difficult circumstances receive 
the most from their parents. Similarly, it is elderly parents on the lowest in-
comes with children who earn more who receive help from their children. 
In short, there is a tendency to balance living standards within the family, 
with the better-off paying for the worst-off. So solidarities operate to reduce 
intergenerational inequalities.
 What are the consequences of the current crisis? And what are the   
 future prospects? 
The first challenge is the problem of pension funding: we are already seeing 
public pensions falling and an increase in private insurance-based systems 
that only the best-off can afford. The big question mark is how the labour 
market will develop. A return to full employment would largely resolve the 
problem. But demographic trends - against the background of an ageing 
population - raise the spectre of shrinking resources to meet growing needs. 
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The second challenge is changing attitudes, where the trend is to-
wards greater individualisation, especially among young people. This 
trend is reflected in a reduced willingness to make life sacrifices and, 
beyond that, a belief that the existence of public help and private ser-
vices enables support to elderly parents to be outsourced. This trend il-
lustrates the process of “denaturalisation” of help identified by Guber-
man/Lavoie (2008), in a Quebec study: what was seen as natural (i.e. 
taking care of others, for the older generations) no longer is. It is felt to 
be the community’s responsibility to organise itself to provide help to 
those in need.
There is therefore a risk of a return to large pockets of poverty among 
pensioners, wider inequality between families, the risk of a polarisation 
between the casualties of the crisis who are bereft of family solidari-
ties, and the unscathed who benefit from such solidarities. Pensioners 
will be less able to help their families and will need even more help 
from them. 
This latter scenario requires social policies to be redefined either: 
by reorienting social protection to target the worst-off (as •	
practiced by ‘Anglo-Saxon tradition’ countries) and letting the 
market meet the needs of the rest, in particular through the 
development of a private insurance system for elderly people 
with care needs while the state funds coverage for the poorest 
groups; or
by pursuing a proactive policy to reduce income disparities: •	
this is the path chosen by Nordic countries, where the entire 
population receives public support in return for reduced 
income disparities. 
What makes social policy reforms even more important is that the harm 
done to the social protection system often cannot be undone.
  Isn’t the idea of intergenerational solidarities just a way of diverting   
 public attention from falling social protection standards? 
It can be. Hence the need to stress how these solidarities and public solidar-
ity play into one another. The family cannot take the place of public help 
because it is sustained by it. Strong family-centric attitudes as found in 
southern European countries are not enough to develop intergenerational 
solidarities. You still need a system of substantial public help. Families need 
this public support to continue doing what they do. 
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 What can local authorities do to support that interaction? 
Local authorities can help through initiatives promoted by self-help groups 
and even cultural organisations: by helping to bring people from different 
generations together, they help build an attachment to society and have a 
decisive impact on family functioning. 
Voluntary organisations act preventively if only by giving young people 
something to do, so that they are not left to their own devices. Unfortu-
nately, active voluntary groups are the first casualties of cuts to subsidies in 
a recession. 
 You talked about the attachment to society created by private and   
 public solidarities. But surely employment is the main pathway to   
 inclusion? 
  
Employment is certainly a key issue, especially as the financing of social 
protection depends on it. But we must not undervalue the role of family 
solidarities in helping to find a job and even get into work. Families play a 
key role, both in helping to steer people towards good training courses, or 
leveraging their social networks to identify job vacancies.
Even someone in work needs intergenerational solidarity to organise 
their life, look after their children if any, and so on. In short, a job alone is 
not enough. You need to be in social networks. Support from the family can 
help to improve the way we live. 
 How do migration and intergenerational solidarity play into one   
 another? 
The literature on the subject presents contrasting views of the relationship. 
One, following the modernisation theory, argues that migration speeds up 
or itself partakes of the modernisation process: this theory argues that ac-
culturation brings about a more individualised lifestyle, a change in gender 
relations, a weakening of authority structures and a change in relations with 
the extended family. These structural changes interact with cultural chang-
es to create sources of conflict between young people, whose adjustment 
to the host society culture is more rapid, and their parents who live in a form 
of biculturalism in which the cultures of the country of origin and the host 
country mingle without blending.
Contrasting with this picture of conflicted families on the brink of disin-
tegration, the other view depicts immigrant families as actually typified by 
great cohesion, closeness and intergenerational solidarities, more acutely 
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family-centric, responding to a need for protection in an alien or hostile 
environment.
Although apparently at odds, these two portrayals are not inconsistent: 
solidarity can exist alongside different cultural orientations, as well as with 
conflicts, which also embraces the ambivalent relationship which the in-
sights offered by the sociologist Kurt Leuscher tell us characterises all gen-
erational relations. There is much to be said here for looking more deeply 
into the impact of these within-family relationships on the pathways to in-
clusion or integration of immigrants and successor generations. This would 
also include exploring their macro-social and intercultural implications, be-
cause intergenerational ties in transnational families are powerful vehicles 
of two-way cross-cultural influences between emigration and immigration 
societies.
These influences are particularly significant and fast-acting on the vexed 
issue of women’s status. Significantly, more women than men choose to stay 
and integrate into the host country when it affords them greater freedom 
and equality than they had in the country of origin. And if they do return for 
any reason, they can become active agents of change to that effect. In other 
cases, the influence is exerted through those who have not emigrated but 
kept up lasting, long-distance ties with those who have.
Just to close off these few brief thoughts on migration, let me say a word 
about the interest of a read-across approach to the two big demographic 
trends, ageing and migration, which produce specific phenomena like re-
tirement migration, i.e. return migration by those who want to spend their 
retirement years elsewhere than where they have lived and worked. Female 
labour migration is also expanding to meet the growing needs of the elderly 
services sector, which has far-reaching consequences for the intergenera-
tional family ties of these migrant women. This is a big issue which, although 
not recent and already researched to some extent, seems destined to loom 
even larger.
Let me conclude by emphasising that while these few thoughts reflect 
my roots in French society, they apply to all societies - adjusted to suit the 
context, obviously - but especially that future research should wherever 
possible be both international and comparative in approach. The paradigm 
of intergenerational relations contains universal aspects that only interna-
tional comparisons can bring to light. In the meantime, we must continue 
to explore the matter and go beyond the debates that tend to reduce the 
whole issue to a generation gap, which simplifies a far more complex reality.
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2.2  Family Solidarity and the New Forms  
of Social Uncertainty
 
Interview with Carla Facchini and Marita Rampazi
University of Milan-Bicocca / University of Pavia
 Professor Facchini, in your view, who are the elderly today? How can   
 they be defined? 
Before answering this question it’s necessary to recall that in the course of 
the last few decades average life expectancy has increased dramatically, ris-
ing from about 65 years of age at the beginning of the fifties to about 70 in 
1970/1971 and almost 80 in 2010. This means that, in contrast to the first 
half of the last century, after reaching 60-65 years of age - the age at which 
in the statistics the label “elderly” gets applied - the majority of people can 
expect to live on average another 15 to 20 years. Moreover, it is quite likely 
that these people will spend over half of this time in physical and economic 
circumstances not unlike those they enjoyed in their mature adulthood. So 
it is completely misguided to view the elderly as a homogenous block. Even 
more than with adults, the elderly are characterised by a wide variety of 
conditions both in terms of their health and self-sufficiency and in terms of 
their economic resources, family type and degree of social inclusion.
This multiplicity is without doubt related to gender, social conditions, the 
socio-economic characteristics of the geographical contexts in which their 
lives unfold and the various forms of welfare available in them. But just as 
fundamental is the role played by age - in all its aspects. By this I mean both 
age understood as a progression along the life course and age conceived 
in terms of subjects belonging to a particular generation. Marita Rampazi 
and I use this term in the sense that Mannheim attributes to it1, in that we 
want to underline that the cohorts born between the first few decades of 
last century and the fifties experienced in their youth, or in other words, in 
the life phase that is most important from the point of view of biographi-
cal ‘projectuality’, historical events that had huge symbolic significance for 
the construction of their identity. These events took the form above all of 
the war and (especially in Italy and Germany) the transition to democracy 
for the older generations and of the political movements of the late six-
ties for the following generations. Moreover, in many European countries, 
particularly those like Italy, Spain or Portugal, which underwent modernisa-
1 I refer here to Karl Mannheim’s reflections on the generations. See Mannheim (1952).
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tion (industrialisation, universal education, secularisation and the loss of the 
importance of traditional family membership) at a later stage, these ‘histori-
cal’ generations also took the form of fully fledged ‘social’ generations. 
If we consider the “old elderly”, or those who are older than 85 today, we 
should bear in mind that generally in Italy these people did not go to school 
beyond primary school, and began to work at a very young age as unskilled 
workers in industry, construction or agriculture. These are sectors that were 
characterised by physically very demanding work and a low level of skill, 
but which also witnessed the development of increasingly extensive social 
security provisions. The extreme precarity associated with the war was the 
thing that marked this generation more than anything else (or, more pre-
cisely, that constituted it as a generation in sociological terms). On the other 
hand, in cultural terms, this generation enjoyed firmly established certain-
ties of another form, in a context still strongly influenced by pre-modern 
traditions, especially as far as the structure of the family and the nature of 
family roles were concerned. The ethic that characterised it was centred, for 
men and women respectively, on economic production and biological re-
production. In the course of their lives these people also came to know, or 
better still, acquired ‘new’ certainties, thanks to the development in the post-
war period of systems of civil and social security. These new certainties were 
added to those already in existence, thereby contributing to the construction 
of a cultural model in which collective ‘progress’ was closely intertwined with 
individual advancement – obviously on condition that the beneficiaries re-
spected the restrictions imposed by their given work and family roles.
Let us now turn to the following generation, the generation of people 
born between the mid-thirties and the war years. These subjects enjoyed 
at least a basic education and rarely started working before the age of four-
teen. Generally, they worked in industry or the tertiary sector, and though 
they did jobs that were often physically demanding and of a limited skill 
level, they identified to a significant extent with their work – an identifica-
tion which was underpinned by regular wage or salary increases and im-
provements in conditions and also by some form of career progression. In 
its youth this generation experienced a world that was undergoing huge 
political, social and economic changes (the end of the war and in some 
countries the return to a democratic system). We need only recall the pro-
cesses of industrialisation and urbanisation or the migratory flows between 
and within European countries that took place in the fifties and sixties. But 
what it is particularly important to underline here is that that these process-
es went hand-in-hand with the extension of socio-economic rights. So, if we 
wanted to make use of the twofold term certainties/precarity, we could say 
that these processes went hand-in-hand with an expansion in the sphere of 
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‘certainties’, especially with regard to protection against the risks of sickness 
and disability that had affected previous generations. As is well known, from 
the sixties onwards, systems of universal welfare were instituted at varying 
speeds in European countries.
Finally, let us consider the generation of those aged 60-65 today. These 
subjects not only enjoyed a basic education but in many cases also had 
the opportunity of studying at school and university: in Italy only 5.2% of 
people in this age bracket do not have any school certificate whatsoever, 
as against 40.3% of the older generations; and 20% have at least a middle 
school certificate, as against 5% of the older generations. As far as their oc-
cupational status is concerned, most of these people worked in industry or 
the tertiary sector, as blue- or white-collar workers, but generally with some 
professional qualifications and with a high degree of job stability. Generally 
speaking, the people who were in their twenties in the period between the 
sixties and the seventies belong to a generation that in its youth and its mature 
adulthood lived through a historical phase in which the problematic features of 
the ‘change of epoch’ taking place in the post-war years also came to the surface. 
Alongside the consolidation of the certainties in social and work environments 
there was an increase in ‘uncertainties’ in the private sphere, both regarding the 
fate of one’s marital relationship and the social and family condition of one’s 
children. As a matter of fact, today’s young people are increasingly exposed to 
growing ‘precarity’ both at work and in their personal relations.
In this third generation we find people who are currently facing a phase 
of transition to the third age, which can go on for many years. In this sense 
the label “elderly” is undoubtedly too narrow to characterise their condition. 
Many of these people continue to enjoy a state of health and engage in 
physical activities very similar to those of a mature adult: we might refer to 
them as “late-adults”. Others, though continuing to enjoy good health, begin 
to experience a change in their social and family situation that leads to the 
assumption of roles that are much closer to those traditionally associated 
with old age: in this case we might adopt the definition “young elderly”.
 In your opinion, how does intergenerational solidarity between   
 grandparents and grandchildren (and between grandparents   
 and children in general) manifest itself and take form within the   
 contemporary family?
To understand the key features that characterise solidarity between grand-
parents and grandchildren today it is particularly important to keep in mind 
that as a consequence of the increase in life expectancy there has been a 
continuous growth in the number of situations in which the family scene is 
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made up of three if not four generations. In this regard it is sufficient to note 
that the latest comparative survey conducted by SHARE (Survey of Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe) has revealed that about one-third of 
people over 80 form part of a family that extends over four generations. This 
figure rises to between 40 and 50% in the majority of countries in north-
ern and central Europe but falls to 20 to 30% in Austria, Switzerland and 
the Mediterranean countries, i.e. in those countries where there has been 
more rapid ageing but that at the same time are characterised by a limited 
birth rate and a tendency to have children at a later age. Alternatively, one 
could cite data from ISTAT (Istituto Italiano di Statistica), which shows how 
in Italy 98.2% of people under the age of 15 have at least one grandparent 
still alive (indeed, on average they have 3.1), and how 87.2% of those be-
tween the ages of 15 and 24 have at least one living grandparent. What this 
means is that people are much more likely to establish a relationship with 
their grandparents than in the past, and that this relationship extends over 
a considerable time, constituting one of the fundamental components of 
family relations.
At the same time, the last few decades have seen a marked increase in 
the employment of adult women or, in other words, married women with 
children. In Italy over the last 40 years this figure has risen from about 30% 
to almost 50%. This has led to a reshaping of the requirements and capaci-
ties for care-giving within families. It has meant, especially in countries like 
Italy with limited services for young children, that the elderly in their capac-
ity as grandparents have been increasingly involved in the care of grandchil-
dren. The latest Multiscopo survey by ISTAT, conducted in 2007, shows that, 
of the elderly that have at least one non-cohabiting grandchild, 85.6% take 
care of their grandchildren at least sometimes and that only 14.4% never 
take care of them. 24.4% of these grandparents take care of their grandchil-
dren often, 15.7% in emergencies, 9.3% when their grandchildren are sick 
and 8.9% during the school holidays. What this means is that even when 
the care of grandchildren is not continuous, the presence of grandparents 
and the possibility of being able to rely on their support is nonetheless a 
fundamental factor, in that better use can be made of the services that are 
available, dealing with the gaps that they leave open due to the way they 
work (limited opening hours, closures during holidays, or unavailability in 
the case of children’s illness).
The support that grandparents provide for their grandchildren and the 
closeness that derives from it is hugely important for both parties, above 
all in terms of affection, in that it enriches their relationship. This is particu-
larly important if one considers the overall impoverishment in the quality 
of the social networks to which they each belong: the children, in that they 
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increasingly tend to live in families in which they have only one sibling, or 
none at all, or in which there is only one parent; and the elderly, in that, 
when they retire, they often see a reduction not only in their social role but 
also in their network of friends.
But this support and this relationship are important for another reason: 
they introduce into the everyday life of the subjects in question two mutu-
ally reflecting temporal aspects – 1) a ‘projectual’ aspect for the grandpar-
ents, and for the grandchildren, 2) a different positioning in the history of 
the family (and perhaps also in history as a whole).
 How does this role of grandparents impact on the relationship   
 between elderly parents and adult children? Are there any gender   
 differences in this regard?
The supporting role that grandparents play in relation to grandchildren 
tends to reinforce the relationship between the grandparents and their own 
children as well. For example, the daily care provided to grandchildren has 
the inevitable effect that everyone sees each other and discusses how the day 
has gone. Besides that, the parents’ support makes it possible for young wom-
en to work and thereby pursue their own biographical project. The help of 
grandparents increasingly takes the form of an opportunity offered to young 
mothers to continue to pursue their plans for a professional career.
In Italy, for example, it is no accident that research conducted over the 
last ten years has revealed a marked tendency for the different generations 
to live very close to one another. 5.5% of the people who have formed a 
family of their own live in the same apartment block as their mothers (11.6% 
within 1 kilometre; 11.2% in the same town/city). The figures in respect of 
people’s fathers are only slightly lower: 4.8%, 10.5% and 11% respectively. 
Certainly, the regularity of contact and the support offered and received is 
facilitated by this physical proximity, but it is reasonable to assume that the 
proximity is actually desired and sought after precisely because these rela-
tions between the generations are regarded by both parties as a fundamen-
tal building block for the construction of their identity and for their social 
relations.
We should not forget, however, that there are significant gender dif-
ferences at least in terms of the identity of the major care-giver. All the re-
search shows that both the relations between parents and children and the 
relations between grandparents and grandchildren are more systematic in 
the case of women. Although the role of grandfathers is becoming increas-
ingly significant, the process of caring continues to revolve around women. 
One reason for this is the fact that within the family, intergenerational sup-
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port has been reinforced particularly in terms of care-giving (while sup-
port in terms of financial assistance has tended to become relatively less 
important), with a consequent expansion in women’s contribution to family 
solidarity. This process of ‘feminisation’ is one of the most important char-
acteristics of the change currently taking place in the forms of intra-family 
solidarity. Another type of change in intergenerational relations is emerging 
in certain contexts in Europe (above all where there is a strong tradition of 
family-based welfare): a reversal in the direction of family solidarity, or, in 
other words, no longer from young people to elderly people, but vice- versa. 
What is involved, however, is a partial reversal: for late-adults with parents 
of a very advanced age the traditional logic continues to prevail, which sees 
them as the principle care-givers of more elderly family members, but here 
too it is women who are involved to a greater extent.
 Professor Rampazi, in your view do the elderly experience a degree   
 of social uncertainty? And if so, why?
The research that Carla Facchini and I have done over the years clearly dem-
onstrates that this social uncertainty does exist, even though it takes on a 
range of different forms in the heterogeneous set of subjects normally la-
belled as “the elderly”. The interesting thing is that while in the past the pre-
dominant aspect for the elderly seemed to be that of insecurity, for many of 
them today there are new situations of uncertainty, which have a number of 
features in common with those experienced by young people. 
To clarify these claims I must first of all explain how “uncertainty” differs 
from “insecurity” and call to mind what the characteristics of uncertainty are 
in the experience of young people today. The principle feature of insecurity 
is fear, while the salient characteristic of uncertainty is doubt. Fear is pa-
ralysing, while doubt has an ambivalent effect: it can variously represent a 
brake on or a stimulus to action.
What does a person who feels insecure fear? Our hypothesis is that he/
she is afraid of losing something that he/she possesses, or of not being able 
to compensate for the lack of “something” that he/she aspires to possess – 
something to which important characteristics of his/her personal and social 
identity are tied. When the possible loss - or lack - depends on factors that 
the subject definitely knows that he/she cannot control, an experience of 
precarity emerges (whether real or perceived) that can create a sort of pa-
ralysis of the will. Insecurity depends in part on the characteristics and the 
personal histories of the subjects in question, and in part on the type of 
guarantees that different social structures offer against the risks of physical, 
psychic, relational and economic difficulty.
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What does a person in a situation of uncertainty have doubts about? 
Above all he/she has doubts about his/her capacity to make sense of his/
her experience, to make the right life choices, to realistically evaluate the set 
of opportunities, risks and constraints that are present in his or her particu-
lar social context. The less defined and constricting the ‘structuration’ of the 
context in which one lives, the more generalised is the uncertainty: doubt 
implies the freedom to make choices, the meaning and consequences of 
which are not automatic, given a priori. In a situation of uncertainty one can 
be overwhelmed by the fear of not having sufficient resources to manage 
responsibly the liberty one has or that one thinks one has. But one can also 
be encouraged to exercise capacities of self-reflection, to define autono-
mously the direction of one’s life course. In this sense, uncertainty contains 
within it both potential elements of insecurity and the possibility of devis-
ing strategies that enable one to control them.
The cultural framework of modern industrial society did not leave much 
room for the experience of uncertainty. The situations that were “not auto-
matic” were viewed as exceptions, not the norm. Usually these coincided 
with particular key turning points or with the arrival at the thresholds of cer-
tain age brackets tied to the transition from one phase of life to the next. In 
particular, uncertainty was thematised as the principle characteristic of the 
moratorium conceded to young people as they sought to define their plans 
for adult life in line with their abilities and capacities. This type of project 
implies a choice between life courses whose meaning is clear-cut, whose 
evolution is foreseeable and whose unfolding is largely irreversible. In the 
past, the certainties entailed in such paths were guaranteed by a shared cul-
ture and by a structured and intelligible institutional system. Once a young 
person’s doubts about what course was feasible and appropriate were re-
solved, he/she had no more to do than embark upon that path, knowing for 
certain that its overall direction and individual stages were implicit in the 
initial choice.
For this reason perhaps, uncertainty has traditionally been excluded from 
the analysis of the condition of adults and the elderly. By contrast, a great deal 
of attention has been given to the insecurity of certain categories of people, 
those subject to the risk of increased precarity in their lives. As far as this risk is 
concerned, the elderly have been and still are viewed as particularly exposed, 
because the process of ageing brings with it a potential loss of resources, in 
particular, resources connected with three important aspects of identity: the 
body, economic and social circumstances, and interpersonal relations. 
The risk of increased precarity is linked with that of exclusion, in a logic 
of disengagement, and on this basis the idea emerges that old age coincides 
with a phase of life in which the time for plans is over. Generally, the event 
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that symbolically marks the conclusion of this course is retirement. In the phase 
that opens up after withdrawal from active working life there is little to be done 
other than manage the loss of psychological, physical, and relational capacities 
associated with ageing. At the most, one can rely on the affection of the family 
to ward off loneliness and to preserve some form of projection into the future, 
however indirect: sharing the hopes of one’s children and investing part of the 
time that remains in following the growth of one’s grandchildren. There is no 
uncertainty in the idea of disengagement: becoming old is a natural, ineluctable 
fact. At most there may persist some element of unpredictability in respect of 
the greater or lesser rapidity with which a person’s decline takes place after a 
certain age.
Today changes are occurring which are bringing new elements of un-
certainty into the experience of youth and at the same time are undermin-
ing the system of certainties on which the elderly and late-adults have 
constructed their life courses. The de-institutionalisation taking place in 
late-modern societies goes hand-in-hand with a progressive individualisa-
tion/diversification in biographies. ‘Non-automatic’ life prospects are begin-
ning to become a normal and generalised component of individual experi-
ence. On the one hand, there is an increase in the propensity to insecurity, 
tied to the economic and institutional crisis that has affected many western 
countries. On the other hand, there is an increasing emphasis, in the cultural 
imagination, on the idea that when the future is not automatic, not only will 
there be risks but also opportunities – opportunities, that is, for a reflective 
construction of oneself, a process which has the potential to develop over 
the course of one’s entire life.
For young people this means having to formulate plans that are open 
to changes of mind and possible changes of direction. In the future, new 
opportunities and new constraints could emerge, difficult to foresee in 
the present, which will have to be managed with flexibility and inven-
tiveness. Professional and affective equilibriums are becoming provision-
al: they have to be continually renegotiated and subjected to the test of 
doubt. The search for meaning in one’s own life, typical of the moratorium 
phase, is beginning to manifest itself as a permanent challenge, which 
makes it ever more difficult to understand when the crisis of identity of 
youth comes to an end and when the transition to adulthood is brought 
to completion.
For people who are approaching retirement age, or who have already 
reached it, the changes taking place are creating the conditions for ques-
tioning the inevitability of the disengagement normally associated with that 
circumstance. Amongst these conditions there is, first, the fact that people 
age better and later than in the past: psycho-physical decline begins to 
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become a handicap for active life well beyond the age of 60-65. Secondly, 
Western culture is beginning to accept the idea that the elderly, as well as 
being a problem, can also be a resource for society, because they have time, 
energy and capacities to devote to activities of various kinds: profession-
al activity, voluntary work and caring for the family. In the third place, the 
growing instability in sexual relationships and, in general, the transforma-
tions in equilibriums within the family that to a varying degree characterise 
all western societies are changing role definitions for both the couple and 
the parent-child relationship.
As far as the couple is concerned, there is on the one hand an in-
creasing risk of losing one’s partner, given that in addition to the pos-
sibility of his/her death there is now the possibility of separation 
or divorce as well. On the other hand, there is also the possibility of le-
gitimately seeking a new beginning either with one’s original partner, 
when the children leave home, or with another partner, if the previous tie 
breaks down. The novelty is that all this now takes place at an age which 
in the past seemed to preclude any propensity towards a revitalisation 
of the relationship of the couple and, in particular, a full development 
of one’s sexuality.
As far as the parent-child relationship is concerned, after the age of 
60 there opens up a phase, of variable length, in which there is an over-
lapping of various roles. The subjects in question remain for a long time 
children of parents who live to a very old age. At the same time they con-
tinue to be actively present as parents in the life of their own children, 
who are struggling to achieve autonomy as adults. The consequence 
is that it is necessary for them to oscillate between expectations about 
their role that are not only very different but that evolve in ways and at-
temporal rhythms that are difficult to foresee. This increases the uncer-
tainty about one’s place within the family and can generate ambivalent 
effects in the experience of late-adults/young elderly. On the one hand, 
there is an increase in the difficulty of managing everyday life, because it is 
necessary to constantly negotiate the boundaries of one’s own role 
with other family members. On the other hand, one postpones the time 
when one’s place within the family corresponds to that which is “typical” 
of an elderly person: increasingly less active and therefore progressively 
marginalised.
Obviously these changes do not affect all those over 60 to the same ex-
tent, and they do not produce the same effects on the experience of all the 
subjects in question.
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 Could you indicate more precisely what the effects of this new   
 uncertainty are?
As I have said, we are dealing with varied effects because they depend on 
the characteristics of the social system of which the subjects are a part, on 
their personal resources and on the type of biographical course that they 
have behind them.
As far as the characteristics of the social system are concerned, uncer-
tainty tends to manifest itself above all in terms of personal insecurity in 
contexts where there is more weakness and instability in the labour market 
and where the welfare system offers limited protection against the risks of 
unemployment and poverty. It is necessary, however, to keep in mind the 
risk of affective precarity and loneliness, which is particularly high in coun-
tries in which traditional family ties have unravelled to a greater degree. 
These characteristics impact above all on the type of certainties offered to 
young people, but they also impact on the less young, who may be directly 
affected by the dismantling of institutional protection and by the precari-
sation of family relations. The certainties of the elderly, however, can also 
be undermined indirectly, when their condition is in some way influenced 
by the difficulties that the younger generations have in achieving indepen-
dence and stability. We have coined the term “reflected uncertainty” to de-
scribe this phenomenon.
The level of reflected uncertainty is particularly high in countries where 
there continue to be strong ties of intergenerational solidarity, supported 
by a family-based type of welfare system. As Carla Facchini has noted, in 
many countries the direction of solidarity between generations is undergo-
ing a reversal of direction vis-à-vis the past, at least in respect of the type 
of help that young people expect from adults and from the elderly. This 
means, for example, that in the absence of effective policies for ensuring 
economic independence and housing for the young, recourse is made to 
the resources of the respective parents and grandparents. In this way par-
ents and grandparents risk losing substantial economic resources and hav-
ing to subordinate the use of their own time and energies to the needs of 
children and grandchildren. The instability of young people’s family lives 
may also impact on the life of the older generations. We need only think 
of those young people that leave home at an increasingly advanced age 
and then sometimes return home to seek further support when they remain 
single, not infrequently in financial difficulties and/or with young children 
to look after. This can lead to parents having to wait a long time before di-
vesting themselves of responsibility for the psychological support and care 
of their children. One consequence of this, for example, is that the parents 
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of these young people are not able to predict whether or when they will be-
come grandparents, whether or when they will be able to reconsider their 
relationship with their own partner or whether or when they will be able 
to stop worrying about the happiness of their children, so as to be able to 
concentrate primarily on themselves.
For the current group of late-adults/young elderly, however, reflected 
uncertainty may also depend on the type of solidarity that ties them to their 
own parents, still living and often no longer self-sufficient on account of 
their advanced age. In contexts where welfare systems do not guarantee 
adequate home-based and rest-home services for these “old elderly”, it is 
their children, especially their daughters, often over the age of sixty them-
selves, who have to take on the caring tasks. These are extremely onerous 
both in financial terms and in terms of time, effort and emotional stress. The 
weight of this commitment can translate into a deterioration in the material 
and relational resources of these care-givers, to the point that relationships 
with their partners and children are jeopardised.
Systemic factors, however, do not completely account for the different 
ways in which uncertainty manifests itself in the biographies of the differ-
ent categories of the elderly. As we have said, the differences also depend 
on the personal histories of the subjects in question. These histories are the 
product partly of the capacities of each person, partly of the resources and 
constraints connected to his/her original social class, and partly of the man-
ner in which he/she has been exposed to the transformations that Western 
societies have undergone in the course of the twentieth century. As Carla 
Facchini has already underlined, the generic label of “the elderly” conceals 
a number of age cohorts and a number of generations. Membership of par-
ticular age cohorts impacts on people’s psycho-physical resources and on 
their position in the system of family roles. Membership of a generation, 
interacting with economic and cultural status, influences the type of cer-
tainties a person enjoys and the way in which he/she interprets the new 
propensity towards uncertainty that is manifesting itself today.
In other words, having guarantees in terms of health and economic well-
being is a necessary but insufficient condition for being able to identify op-
portunities for biographical construction, once one has reached the age of 
full adulthood. It is also necessary to have adequate cultural resources and 
a propensity towards the reflective construction of oneself, developed in 
the preceding phases of one’s life. In this way, for example, considering vari-
ous generations of Italians over the age of sixty, we have noted that such a 
propensity is greater in those who, as well as enjoying a medium to medi-
um-to-high socio-cultural status, belong to the post-war generation. These 
subjects underwent a kind of pre-socialisation to the culture of uncertainty. 
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As young people, in the years between the sixties and seventies, they expe-
rienced the questioning of the system of certainties typical of modern in-
dustrial societies. As adults, they witnessed the progressive destructuration 
of this system, which has led to the individualisation of life courses. In the 
face of old age, they know that they will be able to remain active for a long 
time, in good health and financially reasonably secure. This allows them to 
think that they still have opportunities for personal development. The fu-
ture remains open, even though they do not always know for certain if and 
how these opportunities will take concrete form, whether they themselves 
will be capable of exploiting them and, if so, for how long they will be able 
to do so.
 You speak of a possible openness towards the future. Could you   
 explain exactly what form the relationship between the elderly and   
 time takes today?
For the reasons already outlined, I do not think it possible to speak in gener-
al terms about a particular relationship between the elderly and time. What 
one can do is consider the different temporal horizon that is opening up for 
subjects no longer young, positioned in various contexts and with different 
resources and variegated histories behind them. Within this multiplicity of 
situations we can identify a certain number of typical-ideal models which, 
nonetheless, do not exhaust the wide array of cases that are present on the 
scene today.
The first model re-proposes the temporality implicit in the traditional 
logic of a project that gives rhythm to the various phases of life. This is the 
logic that, as I have already indicated, lies behind the idea of disengagement, 
once adult life has come to an end: in the present there is nothing more 
to construct, because the project, for better or worse, has been brought to 
completion. One’s identity resides in the past, which at times projects itself 
into the present to the point of engulfing it. The future does not exist, other 
than in the form of the certainty of decline, which one prefers not to think 
about. The dimension of uncertainty, when it is present, for the most part as-
sumes the semblance of insecurity, above all in the case of the “old elderly” 
and, in general, of those who are exposed to a greater extent to the risk of 
poverty, disability and loneliness.
This type of orientation can also be found in some late-adults or young 
elderly, who currently enjoy a series of certainties about their economic, 
physical and affective well-being. These people have internalised the tra-
ditional logic of disengagement and are experiencing a sort of temporal in-
terval, freed from adult responsibilities and from the constrictions of old age. 
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In this interval the present is not just empty time, to be filled up in some 
way, but is rather a reserve of free time to be taken advantage of. It is a time 
for making leisure plans and/or for caring, in the framework of relationships 
with partners, family members and friends. The idea is not so much one of 
personal construction as one of reaping the fruits of what one has become, 
thanks to the life course one has completed.
One could say that for these people the dominant aspect is that of cer-
tainty, if it were not for the fact that some of them are to varying degrees ex-
posed to reflected uncertainty. The level of uncertainty in this case depends 
on the type of solidarity that the subjects in question believe is necessary to 
show towards their own children, now adults, faced with the growing risks 
of insecurity in employment and affective instability. It needs to be kept in 
mind, moreover, that for women especially, reflected uncertainty potentially 
has a twofold origin: the difficulties of their children, on the one hand, and, 
on the other, the precarity of their parents, by now quite elderly. The conse-
quence of this is that they are substantially limited in their ability to manage 
their own financial, temporal and relational resources for themselves. These 
limitations result in the transformation of the potential free time that they 
could enjoy into an excess of bounded time, in the service of family solidarity.
Alongside these various manifestations of the “traditional” temporal 
model we also find a second, more innovative model. This manifests itself 
in some categories of late-adults or the almost-elderly who, as I have indi-
cated, have been pre-socialised to the new forms of uncertainty and who, as 
well as enjoying good financial and health prospects, also have substantial 
cultural resources.
In these circumstances such subjects are able to live out the long tran-
sition towards old age as a period dedicated to self-discovery. The past is 
behind them, and the future is a further more or less extensive segment 
of their biographical life course, open to construction. What is involved is 
a brief future, or an extended present, similar to that which characterises 
the temporal perspective of many young people. The physiognomy of this 
future is defined as one goes along: it depends on the capacity of subjects 
to take advantage of novelties, to exploit the unexpected events that lie hid-
den within everyday life. It might be possible, for example, to take up proj-
ects that have been put aside in the past because of work or family prob-
lems, at times effecting an out-and-out restructuring of one’s biography. Or 
one might undertake new activities, of a professional nature or in the field 
of voluntary work. One might even discover hitherto unknown artistic abili-
ties or plan a whole new beginning to one’s emotional life. 
But within this innovative orientation too, the phenomenon of reflected 
uncertainty can produce interference in the two forms indicated above. 
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Here too, more or less severe restrictions arise on the liberty of late-adults/
the almost-elderly. It is very common for a contradiction to arise between 
the aspiration to explore new courses and the need to fulfil responsibilities 
taken on in the past. For some, this bind is experienced as a lack of control 
over their life, and it can translate into an experience of insecurity. For oth-
ers, reflected uncertainty is a further manifestation of non-automaticity, to 
be managed by seeking a temporary balance between aspirations and real-
ity, in the expectation that sooner or later the situation may change.
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2.3  Ambivalences, Conflicts and Solidarities  
Within the Family Today
Interview with Ariela Lowenstein 
Department of Gerontology / Center for Research & Study of Aging,  
Faculty of Welfare and Health Sciences at University of Haifa
[Editorial note: intergenerational solidarity plays a crucial role today in social 
relations and, in particular, in relations within the family: indeed, the family has 
become the privileged locus of expression for this solidarity. Within the contem-
porary family there are, in fact, a multiplicity of types and forms of support that 
manifest themselves between the various generations, young and less young. 
Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that these forms of intergenerational 
solidarity (or their possible absence) can also, in some cases, generate conflicts, 
a sense of guilt and ambivalence – both in those who offer them and in those 
who receive them. As far as the particular phenomenon of ambivalence is con-
cerned, which forms the central theme of the following interview with Ariela Lo-
wenstein, it is important to provide a definition beforehand. In the present con-
text the term ambivalence is intended to refer above all to those situations and 
specific circumstances characterised by oscillation between opposing attitudes 
and approaches. Because of uncertainty, which goes hand-in-hand with am-
bivalence, choices and decisions become particularly difficult. We have asked 
Professor Ariela Lowenstein to offer her views on these questions.]
 Can you discuss the concept of intergenerational ambivalence,   
 both from a theoretical and from an empirical perspective?
The intergenerational ambivalence perspective to the family as a system 
stems from the modern, or rather postmodern era of the twenty-first cen-
tury. This era is characterised by pluralism and multivalency, thus putting 
the individual in constant existential dilemmas of choosing between com-
peting meanings. This chaos of meaning causes a psychological experi-
ence of ambiguity and ambivalence, characterised by conflicting feelings: 
the need for liberation on the one hand, and the fear of alienation on the 
other. Conflicts and contradictions are not only typical of the individual 
at the micro level, but also characterise society as a whole at the macro 
level. This assumption is the basis for the concept ‘sociological ambiva-
lence’, first formulated by Merton/Barber (1963). They define sociological 
ambivalence as incompatible normative expectations of attitudes, beliefs 
and behaviour. 
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Family researchers have integrated such perspectives dealing with ambiva-
lence at the personal and interpersonal level with the theories dealing with 
ambivalence at the larger social scale (sociological ambivalence) to formu-
late the concept of intergenerational ambivalence. Generally, intergenera-
tional ambivalence can be defined as simultaneously held opposing feelings 
or emotions that are due in part to countervailing expectations about how 
individuals should act. More specifically, intergenerational ambivalence is 
viewed as a concept constructed at two different structural levels: the macro 
and the micro level. As such, its definition should capture these two levels. 
Thus, according to Luescher ‘intergenerational ambivalence’ reflects contra-
dictions in parents’ and adults’ offspring relationships in two dimensions: 
“at the level of social structure in roles and norms - the macro level” and “at 
the subjective level, in terms of cognitions, emotions and motivations - the 
micro level”.
Following these conceptual definitions of intergenerational ambivalence, 
initial attempts were made to define the concept operationally. Luescher’s 
model captures the two dimensions of ambivalence: the structural (macro) 
dimension and the inter-subjective (micro) dimension. Each dimension is 
represented by two poles: the structural dimension is represented by the 
poles of reproduction versus innovation and the inter-subjective dimension 
is represented by the poles of convergence versus divergence.
At the macro level, each family system can be seen as a sociological 
institution, characterised by a specific structure, as well as by norms and 
procedures, which represent the values and conditions of the larger society 
in a specific cultural era and geographic place of living. These institutional 
values and conditions are, on the one hand, reproduced through the acting 
out of relations (solidarity, captivation) by family members. On the other 
hand, these values and conditions could also be modified (emancipation, 
atomisation), thus leading to innovations. Hence, reproduction and innova-
tion are the two poles in which the family is realised as a social institution. In 
this model, these two poles represent structural ambivalence. If one scores 
highly on both poles, then one is viewed as ambivalent in the structural 
sense, since the two poles represent opposite themes. 
At the micro level, each family can be conceived as an emotional, in-
timate unit, which contains the potential for closeness and subjective 
identification, thus reinforcing similarity between the children and their 
parents. Similarity and closeness are psychologically gratifying, on the one 
hand, but on the other hand they can also be experienced by the family’s 
member as a threat to individuality. Thus, the family members are motivat-
ed to keep the unit’s cohesion (convergence), but on the other hand they 
strive for separation and individuality (divergence). Hence, Luescher sees 
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convergence and divergence as two poles representing inter-subjective 
ambivalence. If one scores highly on both convergence and divergence, 
then one is viewed as ambivalent at the micro level. 
An altogether different way that ambivalence can manifest is using feel-
ings of guilt as a key concept representing ambivalence.
 In this sense, how can we define “guilt” and what is its role in the   
 theoretical conceptualisation of ambivalence?
We can view guilt as belonging to what Lazarus/Lazarus outlined as ‘the 
existential emotions’: “Anxiety-fright, guilt and shame are existential emo-
tions because the threats on which they are based have to do with mean-
ings and ideas about who we are, our place in the world, life and death 
and the quality of our existence. We have constructed these meanings for 
ourselves out of our life experience and the values of the culture in which 
we live and we are committed to preserving them”. They see guilt as an 
emotion experienced when one feels personal failure, as a result of a mor-
al lapse. They believe that guilt can be regarded as a kind of anxiety.
Their existential view of guilt is especially relevant when relating to guilt 
that care-givers feel towards their elderly parents. Since the elderly are close 
to the end of their life, being close to them is certainly bound to induce 
existential (death) anxiety. The care-giver, thinking about the institutionali-
sation of his/her parent (or any other close relative) cannot help but think 
about death, consciously or unconsciously. Other authors, such as Wentzel, 
even assume that one of the reasons care-givers find the decision to insti-
tutionalise their elders so difficult is because it makes the care-givers think 
of their own death. 
Lazarus/Lazarus’ view of guilt as connected to morality provides a theo-
retical explanation as to why care-givers often feel guilty towards their el-
derly parents, when it seems to them that they are not providing the best 
care possible. This violates the moral code that one should not neglect his 
parents when they grow old. Some articles describe this link between guilt 
feelings and a sense of moral misdeed and show that care-givers indeed feel 
guilty when they believe they haven’t done the right thing morally, using 
personal stories.
A slightly different conceptualisation of guilt views it not as an existential-
ist, but mostly as social and interpersonal. This way of looking at guilt is con-
cerned with a deed that has violated certain social norms. Another central 
aspect of guilt is the interpersonal aspect. In guilt, as in other emotions that 
are typically related to those close to us, our relationship to our intimates 
is of central importance. People’s descriptions of guilt-inducing situations 
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often highlight neglect of a partner or a failure to live up to expectations. 
This view explains why guilt is often experienced in intergenerational family 
relationships, since these relationships are usually very close and intimate, 
and characterised by high expectations of support in situations of sickness 
and disability. 
Empirical data show, for example, that feelings of guilt are common 
during the placement of one’s parents in a nursing home; it seems that 
institutionalisation of the elderly basically induces one major emotion on 
the part of the care-giver: guilt. However, the picture is more complex. 
Some empirical studies show that the institutionalisation process is actu-
ally accompanied by ambivalent feelings on the part of the care-giver: on 
the one hand, feelings of guilt and grief, but on the other hand feelings of 
relief, that the burden of the care has been lifted (Riddick/Cohen-Mans-
field/Fleshner/Kraft, 1992; Ryan/Scullion, 2000). In sum, guilt feelings most 
often go with ambivalence, with moral considerations and contradicting 
practical considerations. This is one of the reasons why guilt is an emotion 
representing ambivalence.
 Why can guilt be considered a key concept for representing    
 ambivalence?
On a general level, thinking about the different situations when one feels guilt 
within the family, one of the main characteristics of all of these situations is a 
sense of ambivalence, a sense that one is torn between two or more options, 
without being able to feel he has chosen the correct one. Thus, when one 
chooses a specific option, but does not feel he has done the right thing, guilt 
often arises. When speaking about family relations, guilt is bound to arise in 
some specific situations, which can be shown using the heuristic model: 
when a family member uses atomisation, and separates •	
conflictually from other family members, he is likely to feel guilty, 
since in every family there is a side that wishes for solidarity and 
closeness, and wishes to please other family members; 
there are times when a family member uses captivation and •	
does what most family members want, although he may think 
the right or moral decision should have been different. This is 
another situation which may well give rise to guilt feelings. 
Generally, modes of divergence are likely to increase feelings of guilt, as op-
posed to modes of convergence. Thus, feelings of guilt may represent one 
aspect of the inter-subjective dimension of ambivalence.
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 Can you give us an example of “ambivalence” on an empirical level?
A study conducted with Rachman, more than a decade ago, was designed 
to examine the reasons for the decision to institutionalise an older parent, 
comparing the city and the kibbutz in Israel, and to analyse its impact on in-
tergenerational family relationships. The hypothesis was that the following 
four factors would be the main causes for institutionalisation: 1. the burden 
of care; 2. the exchange relationships between adult children and older par-
ents; 3. the role of children; 4. the role of the formal support systems. The 
research aimed to find out how these four factors influenced the decision to 
institutionalise and the relationship between the family members.
It was assumed that this process would generate more conflict in the city, 
since the care-giving burden (economical, physical and emotional) is higher 
and multi-faceted there, while in the kibbutz the burden is much lighter and 
mostly emotional. Another difference between the city and the kibbutz, which 
makes the institutionalisation in the kibbutz a somewhat smoother process, is 
the formal service system, which was at the time much more readily available 
in the kibbutz than in the city. Since formal support systems were found to 
contribute greatly to an effective placement of an elderly in an institution, it 
is reasonable to assume that the support system in the kibbutz would signifi-
cantly ease the process of institutionalisation compared to the city, where it is 
much less accessible and provides less formal help and support. This was con-
firmed. The main idea of this study was to show how the kibbutz’s norms sup-
port institutionalisation, especially since in the kibbutzim studied, the nursing 
homes were part of the kibbutz, making it legitimate and thus diminishing 
guilt and the feeling of ambivalence, while the picture in the city is reversed. 
The theories and findings concerning the role of children and the role of 
the formal support systems are most relevant to an analysis of the norms 
and expectations concerning institutionalisation in the city versus the kib-
butz. The social norms governing children’s behaviour towards their elderly 
parents in the city are based on the concept of “filial responsibility”. This con-
cept means that children feel a personal obligation to ensure their elderly 
parents’ well being, trying to protect them and care for them. These views 
and attitudes are expressed in certain behaviours towards the elderly, such 
as: shared household arrangements, helping with tasks, keeping in touch 
and providing emotional support. These norms have an impact on the de-
cision to institutionalise an elderly parent. Although in the city the instru-
mental and emotional burden is high, over 40 per cent of the care-givers 
doubted and speculated more than half a year before starting to check the 
possibilities of placement in an institution. This confirms the children’s high 
feelings of obligation and responsibility towards their parents. Seventy per 
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cent of the children in the city said that the institutionalisation took place 
when they had no other choice, since there were not enough support services.
In sum, children in the city find themselves in a complicated situation 
concerning norms about institutionalisation: on the one hand, they feel 
responsible towards their parents, and therefore they try to keep them at 
home for as long as possible: on the other hand, the instrumental and emo-
tional burden as well as the lack of formal support systems makes it, in cer-
tain situations, almost impossible to do so. Thus they find themselves in an 
emotional and practical conflict, exhibiting feelings of ambivalence. 
The Israeli kibbutz was still at the time of the study a unique kind of com-
munity, characterised by a full partnership of its members in all areas of life: 
economics, health, education, housing, etc. Each member of the kibbutz 
emotionally experiences the kibbutz’s society as his extended family. Thus, 
in the ideological-social structure of the kibbutz, obligations to the com-
munity are equal to obligation to one’s family. This makes the children less 
personally obligated to provide instrumental support to their parents. They 
tend to take less responsibility for their elders, since they know the kibbutz 
will do so. In many of the veteran kibbutzim, for example, nursing homes 
were built within their grounds to serve their elderly members “at home”.
This is one difference between institutionalisation in the kibbutz versus 
the city: the elderly moving to a nursing home in the city have to adjust to a 
basic change of environment, moving from home to a ‘total’ institution. By 
contrast, in the kibbutz the elderly move from their home to a nursing home 
in the same environment, a move which is less traumatic. Another difference 
between institutionalisation in the city versus the kibbutz is the decision 
itself. In the city, the decision to institutionalise is taken by the close fam-
ily, and often causes conflicts between siblings and between them and the 
elderly parent. This way, responsibility for the decision rests on the whole 
family. In the kibbutz, the situation is totally different. The family is not alone 
in its decision, but the kibbutz’s formal support system takes much of the 
responsibility. When the functional situation of the elderly requires constant 
formal help, the kibbutz’s support system decides that the elderly individual 
has to move to a nursing home. This is an economic decision, because in this 
way there is no need for a private nurse in the elders’ house and the children 
can go back to their productive function in the kibbutz. Thus in the kibbutz 
the family is able to share the decision with others, thus diminishing feel-
ings of responsibility and guilt. Badgwell found that sharing the decision 
with other family members helped to reduce feelings of guilt, as did involve-
ment in local support groups. In fact the kibbutz is sort of a local informal 
support group, helping the members ease the emotional burden, which is 
part of the institutionalisation process.
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 According to the studies and research you carried out, how    
 different are the patterns of intergenerational solidarity, conflict   
 and ambivalence observed across several societies that differ in   
 welfare provision and family traditions?
The data related to the OASIS1 project suggest that the majority of respondents 
in all the five countries considered - Norway, England, Germany, Spain and Israel 
- reported strong and positive emotional solidarity (affective-cognitive solidar-
ity) between adult children and their old parents, whereas the negative emo-
tional feelings (conflict and ambivalence) were low. These findings confirm, in 
cross-cultural contexts, that the extended family today has maintained cross-
generational cohesion with some conflict as well as some ambivalent feelings 
(Pillemer/Luescher, 2004). The data thus support the more recent perspective 
of the solidarity-conflict model. Further study of the balance between solidarity 
and conflict is therefore needed, and a further exploration of ambivalence is 
also warranted, focusing on how it emerges in family relationships.
The similarities as well as the differences found between the countries in 
the various dimensions of solidarity-conflict and ambivalence may reflect 
variations in family norms and behaviour patterns, as well as traditions of 
social policy in the participating countries. This heterogeneity can be attrib-
uted to historical trends over the last century. In linking the testing of soli-
darity-conflict and ambivalence at the micro level of individuals and families 
to the macro perspective of the cross-national study, unique idiosyncratic 
historical and familial developments in the context of the countries involved 
must be taken into account. The higher rates of close parent-child relation-
ships found in Israel may be closely related to the country’s recent history 
and geopolitical situation. However, the higher rates of conflict might reflect 
a culture where open communication between generations is encouraged. 
Similarly, the apparent generation gap between current cohorts of older 
parents and their adult children in Germany may be related to the polarisa-
tion along generational lines of traditional/radical attitudes that occurred 
in the 1960s. In Spain, findings of relatively low rates of close parent-child 
relationships, contrary to expectations, may be due to rapid modernisation 
(reflected, for example, in low fertility rates). Younger generations are more 
exposed to this process, and are better educated and better-off than their 
parents. This could result in the emergence of a significant generation gap. 
1  The OASIS (Old Age and Autonomy: the Role of Service System and Intergenerational Family Solidar-
ity) research project was funded within the 5th Framework Programme of the European Community. 
The overall goal was to discover how family cultures and service systems support autonomy and delay 
dependency in old age, so as to promote quality of life, and improve the bases for policy and planning. 
See http://www.oasis-project.eu/.
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Participating OASIS-countries also represent different contexts and opportu-
nity structures for family life and elder care. They are confronted by similar 
challenges in this area, but are inclined toward different solutions. Of particu-
lar interest is that Germany and Spain are welfare states that tend to favour 
family responsibility and play a subsidiary role (Germany) or even a residual 
(Spain) role. Both countries lay down legal obligations between generations 
but have relatively low levels of social care services, although they may have 
high levels of medical services. By comparison, England and Norway have indi-
vidualist social policies, no legal obligations between generations, and higher 
levels of social care services. Younger generations there find it easier to com-
bine work with family obligations than in Germany or Spain. The mixed Israeli 
model is illustrated by legal family obligations, as in Spain and Germany, with 
high service levels, as in Norway. The solidarity-conflict model was especially 
useful in evaluating the strength of family relationships in the different soci-
eties. However, conceptually, the model does not claim to capture the entire 
complex and diverse picture of late-life family relations, as acknowledged by 
Bengtson et al. This is especially true at points of transition along the life course, 
such as the failing health of older parents or the changing needs of working 
care-givers, when more negative and/or ambivalent feelings may surface. 
The ‘operationalisation’ of ambivalence was in its infancy when the OASIS 
study started, and we used what was suggested by their originators – Luescher 
and Pillemer. Actually in OASIS, ambivalence was best captured through the 
qualitative data. Solidarity-conflict was measured mainly by quantitative data 
over the years but, as Giarrusso, Silverstein, Gans and Bengtson indicate, there is 
an on-going effort to refine the items measuring solidarity and conflict which in 
the years since the study started makes the measuring instrument a ‘gold stan-
dard’ for studying and assessing intergenerational family relations. Using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and the triangulation 
of data bases is recommended in order to further address and examine these 
different concepts.
Recent research attempting to operationalise ambivalence and validate 
it by capturing its individual and structural dimensions in central life course 
transitions has been published (Pillemer/Luescher, 2004). The accumula-
tion of additional empirical evidence would facilitate further theorising and 
identify the ways in which it emerges in family relationships. In this respect, 
some answers are given, but new, intriguing questions and issues arise: 
does ambivalence complement solidarity and conflict as a form of family 
relationship, especially during periods of transition? Is there a need to fur-
ther explore the three concepts - solidarity, conflict and ambivalence - in 
additional cross-national and cultural idiosyncrasies, to better validate their 
accuracy in explaining parent-child relations in adulthood?
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2.4 Intergenerational Solidarity and EU Citizens’ Opinions: 
Some Indications for Policy Making  
Francesco Belletti
Forum delle Associazioni Familiari / Centro Internazionale Studi Famiglia
1. Generations in society and family
Intergenerational solidarity has always been one of the main responsibili-
ties of family life, but it is also one of the fundamental dimensions for social 
cohesion as well. In this twofold perspective, solidarity between genera-
tions has been crucial in building welfare systems at national and local level, 
and today a new balance between the specific contribution by families and 
state intervention seems necessary, especially in the light of the so-called 
“demographic transition” of the last few decades.
“Through its Green Paper Confronting Demographic Change, 
published in March 2005, the Commission initiated a debate on 
the need to strengthen solidarity between the generations. […] 
The debate which then started in Europe on the subject of demo-
graphic ageing has added to this perspective. It has become clear 
that the balance in European societies rests on a set of inter-gen-
erational solidarity relationships which are more complex than 
in the past. Young adults live under their parents’ roof for longer, 
while, increasingly often, the parents have to support dependent 
elderly people (First European Quality of Life Survey 2003, Euro-
pean Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions). The resulting burdens are borne mainly by the young 
or intermediate generations, and generally by women. Equality 
between men and women, and equal opportunities more gener-
ally, would therefore appear to be key conditions for the establishing 
of a new solidarity relationship between the generations” 
(Introduction of the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Promoting 
Solidarity between the Generations”, Brussels, 10.05.2007).
This formal and official declaration from the EU resulted from a gradual 
scientific awareness of the importance of the intergenerational aspects of 
public and private solidarity, such as the prescient warning from Pierpaolo 
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Donati, issued in the 1991 CISF Report on the Italian Family (for more details, 
see http://www.cisf.it): 
“In order to handle the consequences of the demographic transi-
tion we need more than a mere ‘pact between generations’, con-
sidered as age groups confronting each other in the public are-
na and competing for a present or future share of resources (i.e. 
working opportunities or financial resources for pensions); we 
need rather to define which criteria are linking the different age 
groups and connecting the decisions about the present and the 
near future, not only in society, but also in families as well. This gen-
eral framework - the linking criteria - preliminary to the specific inter-
generational pact, can be defined as an alliance between family and 
society […] since families - and generations - are relational goods” 
(Donati, 1991: 404).
In other words, Donati was stressing the importance of the intergeneration-
al dimension of family relations and in society as one of the main elements 
necessary to build social cohesion and solidarity in families and in society.
2. Ageing society and intergenerational solidarity
The relevance of intergenerational solidarity in European societies is strong-
ly stressed also by NGOs lobbying for elderly people, avoiding, in such a 
way, a sort of intergenerational competition for scarce public resources. 
“In our view, enhanced solidarity between generations can play 
a key role in developing fairer and more sustainable responses to 
the major economic and social challenges that the EU is facing to-
day. Our society needs to become more inclusive to allow every-
one to get involved whatever their age, gender, ethnic origin, skills 
and ability. Action is also urgently needed to ensure a fairer redis-
tribution of resources, responsibility, and participation, and to de-
velop greater cooperation between generations in all social and 
economic spheres. It is important in today’s context to maintain 
a high level of solidarity in our social protection systems given its 
proven shock absorber effect during economic crises. Public au-
thorities should develop holistic and sustainable policies support-
ing all generations, facilitate access to adequate income and to 
affordable and quality services, particularly housing, education 
and health for people of all ages, and foster exchange of good 
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practice and mutual learning between different generations. En-
gaging migrant and minority communities in intergenerational 
solidarity initiatives together with majority communities is crucial for 
breaking down harmful stereotypes, bringing communities closer to-
gether, dispelling myths and creating public space for dialogue. Rais-
ing awareness of creative social solidarity initiatives developed by mi-
grant and minority communities, including women’s organisations, is 
particularly important” 
(AGE Platform Europe, 2010) 1.
This approach can also support a positive social representation of elderly 
people (‘Active Ageing’), fighting against negative stereotypes of depen-
dency and economic and social burdens:
“Demographic ageing is strongly affecting the relationships among 
generations and the way European societies function. Rather than 
focusing on the negative challenges of ageing, such as its impact on 
the increased pension and health care expenditure or on the shrink-
ing labour force, demographic reality should be looked at as an 
opportunity, which can bring solutions to many current economic 
and social challenges, but therefore requires a new assessment and 
reworking of several economic and social policies within society”  
(AGE Platform - Press pack: Intergenerational Solidarity, 2010).
3. Elderly people as a resource: information from Eurobarometer
Social and family policies at local and national levels are trying to promote 
intergenerational solidarity among generations as social groups, in the pub-
lic area, but in most nations the strongest flow of mutual help among gen-
erations is found within the family. So it is important to consider how people 
actually perceive the relationships between generations, and the role of el-
derly people in this reciprocal and bidirectional exchange of resources. A 
recent survey provides information on social orientations towards intergen-
erational solidarity and the role of elderly generations. The Flash Eurobarometer 
“Intergenerational Solidarity” (Flash No. 269) fieldwork was conducted between 
20 and 24 March 2009. Over 27,000 randomly-selected citizens aged 15 or over 
were interviewed in the 27 EU Member States. Interviews were predominantly 
1  “Intergenerational Solidarity: the Way forward. NGOs coalition calls for 2012 to become European Year 
of Active Ageing and Intergenerational Solidarity”, from the Joint Press Release in preparation for the 
Second European Day of Solidarity between Generations, 29th April 2010, Logrono, Spain.  
See http://www.age-platform.org.
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carried out via fixed-line telephone, reaching some 1,000 EU citizens in each coun-
try. Parts of interviews in Austria, Finland, Italy, Portugal and Spain were conducted 
over mobile telephones. Due to the relatively low fixed-line telephone coverage 
in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Roma-
nia and Slovakia, 300 individuals were sampled and interviewed on a face-to-face 
basis. To correct for sampling disparities, a post-stratification weighting of the re-
sults was implemented, based on key socio-demographic variables2.
The Flash Eurobarometer Intergenerational solidarity was conducted in 
order to examine EU citizens’ opinions on: 
existing relations between the younger and older generations;•	
costs of an ageing population – particularly in terms of pensions •	
and elderly care;
the need for pension and social security reforms;•	
ways in which older people contribute to society – financially •	
and more broadly;
existing possibilities for autonomous living for elderly EU citizens;•	
the provision of elderly care and support by social services;•	
the role of public authorities in promoting intergenerational •	
solidarity.
In among this vast quantity of data, the paper focussed on a few questions 
that were more specifically devoted to the social representation of elderly 
people (as a resource, rather than a social burden), considering how citizens’ 
attitudes vary between countries and according to social categories (such as 
age, sex, education, urbanisation, occupation). The questions considered are:
“Are older people are a burden for society?”•	
“Are the media exaggerating the risk of a conflict between •	
generations?”
“In [our country], are there sufficient social services to support •	
frail older people so that they can stay in their own home?”
“Are people who have to care for older family members at home •	
receiving good support from social services in [our country]?”
“In the coming decades, will governments no longer be able to •	
pay for pensions and care for older people?”
“Is the financial help of parents and grandparents important for •	
young adults who establish their own households and families?”
“Do older people make a major contribution as volunteers in •	
2 See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_269_en.pdf.
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charitable and community organisations in [our country]?”
“Is the contribution of older people who care for family or other •	
relatives not appreciated enough in [our country]?”
With this information it is possible to evaluate how elderly people are re-
garded by public opinion, how public services can support independent liv-
ing for elderly people and family care-givers, how sustainable people feel an 
ageing society is, and the extent to which elderly people support younger 
generations in family and social life3.
a)  Older people are a burden for society.
In all Member States, at least two-thirds of EU citizens somewhat or strongly dis-
agreed that older people are a burden on society: the total level of disagreement 
ranged from 66% in Lithuania to 95% in the Netherlands. Furthermore, a majority 
of respondents in 19 Member States, and a relative majority in a further eight, 
strongly disagreed that older people are a burden on society. Respondents in Cy-
prus and Greece were the most likely to strongly disagree (together with Ireland, 
while those in the Czech Republic were the least likely to do so (82% and 81%, 
respectively, vs. 37%). This more negative attitude towards the elderly seems to 
be perceived more strongly in the Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia), but also in Portugal and in Malta.
Figure 1: Older people are a burden on society
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 269 (2009).
Younger respondents did not necessarily see older people as a burden on 
society; the oldest respondents (over 64) and retirees were the most likely 
3  Data description is mostly quoted from the report.
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to agree with this statement (25% and 22%, respectively, compared to, for 
example, 12% of 15-24 year-olds and 16% of 55-64 year-olds). 
b)  The media are exaggerating the risk of a confl ict between generations.
Slightly more than 6 in 10 EU citizens thought that the media exaggerates 
the risk of a confl ict between generations: 27% strongly agreed and 34% some-
what agreed with this proposition. 
Greek and Portuguese respondents were also the most likely to think 
that the media exaggerates the risk of a confl ict between generations: 78% 
of Greek and 70% of Portuguese respondents somewhat or strongly agreed 
that this is the case. Although the total level of agreement was rather similar 
in Hungary and Portugal (69% and 70% respectively), only 28% of Hungar-
ians strongly agreed that the media exaggerates the risk of a confl ict be-
tween generations – compared to 36% of Portuguese respondents. Greek 
respondents were once again the most likely to strongly agree with this 
proposition (51%). 
In Luxembourg, on the other hand, only 49% of respondents somewhat 
or strongly agreed - and a similar proportion (47%) disagreed - that the media 
exaggerates the risk of a confl ict between generations. In all other countries 
(except Ireland), less than 4 in 10 respondents somewhat or strongly dis-
agreed that this is the case, and the proportion ranged from 20% in Greece 
to 38% in Malta and Denmark. In Ireland, in total, 42% of interviewees dis-
agreed with this statement. 
Figure 2: The media are exaggerating the risk of a confl ict between 
generations
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 269 (2009).
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c)  In [our country], there are suffi  cient social services to support frail 
older people so that they can stay in their own home.
Only slightly more than a third of EU citizens in total agreed - and 59% dis-
agreed - that there are suffi  cient social services in their country to support 
frail older people so that they can stay living in their own home.
Respondents in Luxembourg were the most likely to feel that there 
are sufficient social services in Luxembourg to allow frail older people to 
stay in their own homes: 37% of Luxembourgers strongly agreed and 
40% somewhat agreed. In four other countries, a slim majority, at least, 
somewhat or strongly agreed with this statement: Austria (61%), Belgium 
(58%), Germany and the Netherlands (both 53%). In Estonia, Romania 
and Poland, on the other hand, at least three-quarters of interviewees 
disagreed that there are sufficient social services to support frail older 
people so that they can stay in their own homes (between 75% and 77% 
strongly and somewhat disagree responses). Furthermore, almost half 
of Estonians (47%) and Poles (46%) strongly disagreed that this was the 
situation in their country; in Romania, almost 6 in 10 (57%) interviewees 
strongly disagreed. Other countries where at least half of interviewees 
strongly disagreed were: Portugal (56%), Bulgaria (52%), Greece (51%) 
and Denmark (50%).
Figure 3:   In [our country], there are suffi  cient social services to support frail 
older people so that they can stay in their own home.
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 269 (2009).
Both the youngest (under 25) and the oldest respondents (over 64) were 
more likely than respondents in the other age categories to think that 
there are suffi  cient social services in their country to support frail older people 
so that that they can stay living in their own home. In accordance with the 
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above findings, it was also noted that full-time students, retired respon-
dents and those with the lowest level of education were more likely to 
agree that there was sufficient support from social services. For example, 
while 40% of retirees agreed that there are sufficient social services in 
their country to support frail older people so that they can stay in their 
own home, roughly only a third of respondents in the other occupation-
al groups agreed that this is the case: 32% of employees, 33% of “other” 
non-working respondents, 34% of self-employed respondents and 35% of 
manual workers.
d) People who have to care for older family members at home receive 
good support from social services in [our country].
Two-thirds of interviewees disagreed that people with caring responsibili-
ties for older family members at home receive good support from their 
country’s social services (35% strongly disagreed and 30% somewhat dis-
agreed). 
Similar to results obtained for the EU overall, respondents in almost 
all Member States were even less likely to agree that people who have a 
responsibility of care for older family members at home receive good support 
from social services than they were to agree to that there are sufficient so-
cial services for elderly people living on their own. In only one country 
- Luxembourg (54%) - did more than half of respondents somewhat or 
strongly agree that there is enough support for family members with car-
ing responsibilities for older family members, while in more than half of 
the EU Member States more than 6 in 10 respondents disagreed that this 
is the case. 
Focusing on those respondents choosing the more extreme negative 
response - i.e. strongly disagree - it was noted that while only a minor-
ity (7%) of Luxembourgish respondents chose this possibility, in Por-
tugal, Bulgaria and Greece approximately 6 in 10 respondents strongly 
disagreed (between 57% and 64%). Respondents in the latter group of 
countries were not only among the most dissatisfied with support from 
social services for elderly people living on their own (as seen above), 
they were also the most dissatisfied with social services support for in-
dividuals who have a responsibility of care for older family members 
at home. Finally, a significant number of respondents in most Member 
States found it difficult to answer this question; the proportion of don’t 
know responses ranged from roughly 1 in 20 respondents in Portugal, 
Finland, Ireland, Spain and Greece to at least one-sixth in Latvia (21%), 
Luxembourg (19%) and Malta (18%).
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Figure 4:   People who have to care for older family members at home receive 
good support from social services in [our country].
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 269 (2009).
Both the youngest (under 25) and the oldest respondents (over 64) were 
more likely than other age categories to think that people caring for older 
family members at home receive good support from social services in their 
country. For example, while 28% of those over 64 and 30% of 15-24 year-
olds agreed that people caring for older family members at home receive 
good support from social services in their country, only between 22% and 
24% in the other age categories agreed with this statement.
e) In the coming decades, governments will no longer be able to pay 
for pensions and care for older people.
Almost 6 in 10 respondents recognised that, in the coming decades, gov-
ernments will no longer be able to pay for pensions and elderly care (25% 
strongly agreed and 33% somewhat agreed).
The statement received a total level of agreement ranging from approximate-
ly 4 in 10 interviewees in Bulgaria and Romania (38% and 40%, respectively) to 
twice as many in Portugal (81%). Other countries at the higher end of the distribu-
tion - with more than two-thirds of interviewees doubting about the aff ordabil-
ity of pensions and elderly care - were Germany (72% somewhat or strongly 
agreed) and Austria (68%). Portuguese respondents were also the most likely to 
strongly agree with this proposition (54%), followed by Greek and German respon-
dents (41% and 38%, respectively). In all other countries, not more than 3 in 10 re-
spondents strongly agreed. Focusing on those choosing the more extreme nega-
tive response - i.e. strongly disagree - it was noted that less than 1 in 10 Germans, 
Slovaks, Czechs and Italians chose this possibility, while in Romania and Bulgaria 
the proportion was more than three times higher (31% in both countries).
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Figure 5:  In the coming decades, governments will no longer be able to 
pay for pensions and care for older people.
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 269 (2009).
Respondents aged between 25 and 54, those with higher levels of educa-
tion and a higher occupational status were the most concerned about the 
aff ordability of pensions: roughly 6 in 10 of these respondents somewhat or 
strongly agreed that, in coming decades, governments will no longer be able to 
pay for pensions and care for older people, compared to, for example, a slim ma-
jority of retirees or respondents with the lowest level of education (both 53%).
f) The fi nancial help of parents and grandparents is important for 
young adults who establish their own households and families.
In total, almost 9 in 10 EU citizens agreed - and a slim majority (55%) strongly 
agreed - that fi nancial help from parents and grandparents is important when 
young adults are starting to establish their own households and families.
In almost all Member States, there was almost no doubt that fi nancial help 
from parents and grandparents is important for young adults establishing their 
own households and families: more than 8 in 10 respondents in 23 Member 
States somewhat or strongly agreed with this statement. The total level of 
agreement, however, was considerably lower in Denmark (59%), the Nether-
lands (65%), the Czech Republic (71%) and Sweden (76%). Furthermore, while 
at least 8 in 10 Portuguese, Greek and Cypriot interviewees strongly agreed 
that parents’ and grandparents’ fi nancial help is important for young adults 
forming their own households and families, only half as many, or fewer, inter-
viewees in the last-named countries - and Slovakia - strongly agreed that such 
fi nancial support is important (29% in the Netherlands and Denmark and be-
tween 38% and 40% in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Sweden).
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Figure 6: The fi nancial help of parents and grandparents is important for 
young adults who establish their own households and families.
Source:  Flash Eurobarometer 269 (2009).
The results for the statement that fi nancial help from parents and grandparents is 
important when young adults are establishing their own households and families 
showed signifi cantly less variation across socio-demographic groups. It did ap-
pear, however, that the over 54 year-olds and retired respondents were more 
likely than their counterparts to express strong agreement (58-60% compared 
to, for example, 51% of 15-24 year-olds and 54% of 25-39 year-olds).
g) Older people make a major contribution as volunteers in charitable 
and community organisations in [our country].
A large majority of EU citizens also agreed that older people make a major 
contribution to society via voluntary work in charitable and community or-
ganisations in their country (44% strongly agreed and 34% somewhat agreed). 
The total level of agreement with this statement ranged from around 4 in 10 
respondents in Poland (39%) and Romania (43%) to more than 9 in 10 of the 
Irish, British, Portuguese and Dutch interviewees (between 91% and 95%). 
The eight Member States where respondents were the least likely to 
agree with this all belong to the group of countries that joined the EU in 
2004 or later; the eight countries where respondents most frequently 
agreed were all pre-2004 enlargement countries. In almost all countries of 
the latter group, at least half of respondents strongly agreed - and less than 
one-tenth somewhat or strongly disagreed - that older people’s voluntary 
work contributes to society in important ways. Portuguese, Irish and Brit-
ish respondents were the most likely to strongly agree with the statement 
(71%, 69% and 65%, respectively). In the former group of countries (except 
for Latvia), only between 15% and 26% strongly agreed that there is a major 
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contribution from older people performing voluntary work, while between 
27% and 47% somewhat or strongly disagreed that this is the case. Roma-
nian respondents were the most likely to strongly disagree (25%), followed 
by Bulgarian and Czech respondents (18% and 17%, respectively). In Latvia, 
however, only 18% in total disagreed with the statement and 21% provided 
a don’t know response.
Figure 7: Older people make a major contribution as volunteers in 
charitable and community organisations in [our country].
Source:  Flash Eurobarometer 269 (2009).
Only 7 in 10 of the 15-24 year-olds and full-time students somewhat or 
strongly agreed that older people make a major contribution to society via 
voluntary work in charitable and community organisations in their country. 
The total level of agreement increased to more than 80% for the over 54 
year-olds, retirees and those with the lowest level of education. Rural resi-
dents were more likely than city dwellers to somewhat or strongly agree that 
older people’s voluntary work makes an important contribution to society 
(80% vs. 74% in metropolitan areas). Finally, men and women held relatively 
similar views about the contribution of older people to society.
h) The contribution of older people who care for family or other 
relatives is not appreciated enough in [our country].
Slightly more than three-quarters of interviewees thought that the contribu-
tion of older people who care for family members or relatives is not suffi  ciently 
appreciated in their country (44% strongly agreed and 33% somewhat agreed).
Respondents in Portugal (91%), the UK (87%) and Finland (85%) were 
the most apt to somewhat or strongly agree with this proposition, while re-
spondents in Luxembourg were the least likely to do so (58%). Luxembourg 
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was the only country where more than 3 in 10 (32%) respondents some-
what or strongly disagreed that older people’s contribution in this respect 
was not being suffi  ciently appreciated. Portuguese respondents stood out 
from the pack somewhat as roughly three-quarters (74%) strongly agreed 
that the contribution to society by older people, who have a responsibility 
of care for family members or relatives, is not appreciated enough in their 
country. In Germany, Finland, Bulgaria, Ireland and the UK, between 5 and 6 
in 10 respondents expressed their strong agreement, while in Luxembourg, 
Estonia, France, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Lithuania and Slovakia, only between 
a quarter and a third strongly agreed.
Figure 8: The contribution of older people who care for family or other 
relatives is not appreciated enough in [our country].
Source:  Flash Eurobarometer 269 (2009).
Respondents between 40 and 64 years of age were the most likely to some-
what or strongly agree that the contribution of older people who have a 
responsibility of care for family members or relatives is not suffi  ciently ap-
preciated in their country, while 15-24 year-olds (and full-time students) 
were the least likely to do so (80% vs. 71%-72%). The results by occupational 
status showed that employees were the most likely to somewhat or strongly 
agree with the above statement (80% compared to 74-76% in the other oc-
cupational groups); however, when looking at those who strongly agreed 
with the statement, it appears that retirees were just as likely as employees 
to select this possibility (47% strongly agreed vs. 46% of employees).
4. Final remarks
According to the perceptions of the majority of EU citizens, the social representa-
tion of elderly people and their role in intergenerational solidarity is rather good: 
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Elderly people are not considered a burden for society by two-•	
thirds of respondents, and about 60% of people believe that 
media are exaggerating the risk of an intergenerational conflict.
conversely, the positive role of public intervention supporting •	
Elderly people is not so strongly shared by respondents: only 
one-third of interviewees believes that social services are 
sufficient to maintain frail older people at home or believe that 
people who care for elderly relatives are adequately supported 
by them; only about 40% of respondents believe that in the 
future governments will be able to pay for pensions and care for 
elderly people; not surprisingly, differences among countries 
here are very high.
The vast majority of respondents believe that elderly people •	
are a very important resource for other generations, in family 
relations and in society; almost 90% believe that parents and 
grandparents are financially helping generations to set up new 
families, and almost 80% believe that the voluntary work of 
elderly people in society is very important.
Finally, and rather controversially, more than 70% of •	
respondents believe that the contribution of elderly people in 
family relations is under-appreciated.
Moreover, national responses vary significantly from one country to another 
(in some questions the distance between the higher and the lower percent-
age is more than 50%), while fewer differences can be found according to 
sex, working conditions, urbanisation; only age seems to cause slight differ-
ences in attitudes, but sometimes elderly people and younger generations 
give similar responses, while adults significantly differ. In other words, it can 
be said that variations in opinions appear to be more determined by the 
general social environment (cultural, social welfare systems) than by indi-
vidual personal condition (including a possible corporative plea for the pro-
tection of a single generation against other generations’ interests).
European citizens seem to clearly acknowledge the existence and the im-
portance of intergenerational solidarity, inside family relationships but also in 
social life (through voluntary work and public redistribution of resources and 
services by the welfare state). Policy makers therefore have to carefully consider 
the intergenerational dimension of social and family policies, promoting the 
existing reciprocal exchange of resources inside family networks, and shaping 
their national and local policies and services in an intergenerational relational 
approach. This could be a powerful tool for coping in a positive way with the cur-
rent demographic transition, supporting both younger and older generations, 
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thereby preventing a possible - and dangerous - social and economic conflict 
between generations. This is potentially one of the most innovative approaches 
that European welfare systems could adopt in the twenty-first century.
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2.5  Intergenerational Solidarity:  
Rebuilding the Texture of Cities
Lorenza Rebuzzini
Forum delle Associazioni Familiari
Everybody experiences in his/her life intergenerational relationships and 
solidarity, but only in recent years has it become a policy issue, particularly 
in urban areas. The mix of people isolation and ageing has become a critical 
point, especially where the young and the old are competing for resources, 
public space and attention. 
As previously noted:
“This has been further exacerbated by the way policies and services 
are normally developed around targeted groups or issues that are by 
their nature disjointed and discriminatory. The aim of intergeneration-
al work is to find ways to develop and strengthen these relationships 
and consequently become an agent of social change with benefits to 
the whole of society” 
(Municipality of Manchester, Looking Backward, Looking Forward).
Combating isolation, rebuilding the social texture, rebuilding “good neigh-
bour” relationships, and promoting active ageing practices is today a ne-
cessity felt in many cities, especially those in which an ageing population, 
migration, and high levels of unemployment among young people are 
mixed together. Therefore, policies to enhance intergenerational solidarity 
are strictly linked to the wellbeing of society, and therefore to the wellbeing 
of families who are a part of society.
In this article two good practices, two projects developed in Turin (Italy) 
and Manchester (UK), will be analysed, in order to understand which char-
acteristics in intergenerational policies make them effective. Both Turin and 
Manchester are mid-sized cities with large metropolitan/suburban areas 
(Turin has 865,263 inhabitants, Manchester 464,200, but if we take into con-
sideration the whole Metropolitan area, they both have almost 2,000,000 
residents). They both developed as industrial cities, although at different 
times, and their industries underwent severe crises; they have both been 
affected by processes of internal and external migration, ageing of the 
migrant population, and high levels of unemployment among young and 
disadvantaged people. In addition, in the nineties they both experienced 
strong urban regeneration programmes and commercial revitalisation, 
changing their productive and economic assets.
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The contents of this article are based on interviews with Renato Bergamin 
(Director of Project Cascina Roccafranca, Turin), and Paul McGarry (Senior 
Strategy Manager, Manchester Generations Together programme). Both proj-
ects have been developed by the municipalities of Turin and Manchester 
and are based on strong alliances with local stakeholders (foundations, volun-
tary or family associations, universities), although they have been built in two 
different (sometimes opposite) ways and according to different goals: while 
the Manchester Generations Together programme specifically targets inter-
generational solidarity, Cascina Roccafranca has been developed as an urban 
development plan. Nevertheless, in both cases, the outcome was an intergen-
erational approach to tackling isolation and rebuilding the urban fabric.
Manchester Generations Together
Manchester Generations Together is a programme started in 2009, with fund-
ing due to end at the end of March 2011 (though the municipality of Man-
chester is putting in place plans to continue it). This programme is part of 
a larger project, the Valuing Older People (VOP) Project, launched in 2003 
by Manchester City Council, the three Manchester Primary Care Trusts and 
community and voluntary organisations. The partners’ aim was to improve 
the quality of life of Manchester’s older adults by working together. 
Valuing Older People represents a commitment to improve services and 
opportunities for the city’s older population. It also challenges Manchester’s 
public agencies, businesses and communities to place older people at the 
centre of the extensive plans for the regeneration and reshaping of the city. 
VOP soon developed an interest in Intergenerational Practice (IP), and in 
2006 started its close collaboration with the Beth Johnson Foundation, a UK 
charity, which convenes the UK Centre for Intergenerational Practice. The 
first phase of the VOP Project, before Generations Together, was based on 
a report commissioned from the Beth Johnson Foundation, Looking Back-
ward, Looking Forward, which included the following elements:
training in intergenerational practice for over 100 front-line staff;•	
stakeholder interviews and analysis;•	
funding for a small number of demonstrator projects;•	
establishment of a learning network;•	
an Intergenerational Practice e-bulletin;•	
strategy and policy development (how ‘intergenerational •	
practice’ adds value to Manchester City Council’s corporate, 
departmental and partnership priorities and how it will 
improve the lives of residents).
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One of the strongest messages that came through from the report was that 
there was a real need to establish opportunities to connect people across 
the generations to build understanding and respect. A large proportion of 
interviewees described age segmentation as an increasing part of our so-
ciety, manifesting itself in decreased contact between younger and older 
people. In looking at community cohesion, it is important to begin to ex-
plore and understand the different world views of the different generations. 
It is also necessary to acknowledge that tensions between generations are 
not a new phenomenon, as each new generation strives to develop its own 
identity and place in society. Indeed, it is the way these relationships are 
negotiated and established that is key. 
It is also important to recognise the role of the extended family where 
this still exists. In this respect, the use of storytelling techniques of group 
learning across ethnic groups has proved to be effective. In the Netherlands, 
for example, a programme called A Neighbourhood Full of Stories has been 
developed. The Netherlands Institute of Care and Welfare (NIZW) has de-
veloped a new method for promoting the integration of generations and 
cultures: ‘neighbourhood-reminiscence’. This method uses memories and 
stories of neighbourhood residents in order to promote exchanges, mu-
tual understanding and respect between different age and cultural groups. 
Neighbourhood-reminiscence is a community development, based on the 
local neighbourhood level (Mercken, 2003).
The “Intergenerational Programme is therefore about building generational 
relationships within community settings between people. It is also a way of 
addressing social exclusion of older and younger people and making places 
friendly for people of all ages”, says Paul McGarry; “Intergenerational approaches 
are an effective way to address a number of issues - many of them key govern-
ment priorities - such as building active communities, promoting citizenship, 
regenerating neighbourhoods and addressing inequality and social exclusion”.
Interest in the IP has developed in the context of a number of social 
policy concerns often linked to community cohesion and social exclusion 
in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This has included concerns about lev-
els of anti-social behaviour and joblessness, in particular involving young 
men, and addressing issues that affect older people, such as loneliness and 
depression: “This has led us to seeing IP as a tool for improving the quality 
of life for older and younger people in Manchester and informed our work 
developing Manchester as an ‘Age Friendly City’. We have recently been ac-
cepted into the WHO Age Friendly City network”1.
1 See http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2010/age_friendly_cities_20100628/en/index.html.
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2 “a term used to describe building, modifying, or repairing of something without the aid of experts or  
professionals” (https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/DIY).
The Valuing Older People team co-ordinates Manchester’s Generation To-
gether programme. The team is located in the Manchester Joint Health Unit, 
a public health team based in Manchester City Council, co-ordinated by a 
Programme Manager (Patrick Hanfling), a Programme Officer (Rachel York) 
a Community Engagement Officer (Tracey Annette) and the leader of the 
IP demonstrator work (Programme Manager Sally Chandler). Progress is re-
ported to the Senior Strategy Manager (Paul McGarry) and a wider Steering 
Group of senior managers in the Council. The programme is therefore deliv-
ered through Manchester City Council, the voluntary and community sector 
and the academic sector, through Manchester Metropolitan University and 
the Manchester School of Architecture.
Manchester Generation Together was funded by the previous Labour Gov-
ernment: £5.5 million was allocated for the programme, which local authori-
ties could apply to (up to £400,000 each). Nearly all Local Authorities (132) 
in England applied and Manchester was one of the 12 successful bids. Man-
chester’s bid involves 13 projects based around four themes: shared spaces, 
shared skills and learning, health and wellbeing, families. 
Five of the Manchester projects will be run through Manchester City 
Council, six through the voluntary sector and two by academic bodies. 
ALL FM community radio project1.  (in the district of Levenshulme), 
is built on the results of past projects, which challenged the nega-
tive perceptions that different generations have of each other. This 
project will target multi-cultural neighbourhoods to identify older 
and younger volunteers to learn all aspects of broadcasting. 
Food Futures Cookery Classes2.  (city-wide) involves young 
people not in employment, education or training and isolated 
older people producing healthy meals together.
Manchester City Council Youth Service’s 3. Intergenerational 
Volunteers in Schools develops sustainable school volunteering 
programmes, involving grandparents and parents in skill sharing. 
Manchester School of Architecture4. , architectures of 
intergenerational engagement, raises awareness of the design 
implications of shared spaces.
Home Improvement Agencies’ maintenance skills 5. 
exchange involves Do-It-Yourself (DIY2) skills taster days, 
DIY training and a makeover of a community building by an 
intergenerational team. 
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Manchester Adult Education Service Adult Education Inter-6. 
generational Buddy Exchange uses Adult Learner volunteers 
to help vulnerable families by offering support to young moth-
ers and learning support to children and young people. 
Generation Games7.  involves extended families in games and 
interactive activities to facilitate better communication between 
family members. It helps them to develop mechanisms that 
boost families’ capacity to support children while supporting 
the adults to become further engaged in volunteering, learning 
or employment. 
 8. The project between Community Service Volunteers (CSV) and 
the Powerhouse Library, ‘Young and Older Voices,’ focuses 
on Moss Side, one of the most culturally diverse areas in the 
city. The project develops more hands-on intergenerational 
volunteering opportunities that sees older and younger people 
becoming active citizens and advocates for social change. 
The Multicultural Cookbook & Community Allotment9.  and 
Inspired Sisters projects provide opportunities for children 
and young people to learn about food growing and sustainable 
living, develop cooking skills and experience preparing and 
sharing food from other cultures. All participants benefit from 
physical activity on allotments. 
The Roby Mental Health Project10.  aims to equip groups of older 
and younger people with advocacy and advice-giving skills as 
tools to address mental health issues within their communities. 
Common Ground11.  involves a Big Brother-style café conversation, 
which teases out attitudes towards people from different 
generations. Participants then work together on shared tasks 
and the process is recorded through video diaries to monitor 
and record changing attitudes as bridges are built. 
Intergenerational Evaluators12.  involves training up younger and 
older people to be able to carry out evaluation of intergenerational 
projects and programmes. This projects aims at enabling people 
to work together and start social and non-profit enterprises. 
The last project has been developed by a gay and lesbian association. All 
of these projects will be evaluated and monitored by a specially appointed 
national agency. Moreover, an independent research organisation called 
York Consulting has been appointed to evaluate the Generations Together 
programme. York Consulting has developed different approaches to collect 
information about each project, including an online management information 
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tool and telephone interviews. Manchester is one of six local authorities to 
have been chosen as a case study site, where more in-depth evaluation of 
some projects will be done.
“Plans for the future involve the development of IP-influenced policy 
with our partners, cities and districts, a partnership with BJF and Leeds lo-
cal authority to develop a toolkit on IP, a specific programme involving Age 
Friendly Cities, the development of new skills by community development 
workers, exploration of UK and European research opportunities in collabo-
ration with partners”, concludes Paul McGarry.
 
Cascina Roccafranca, “The Art of Building a Common Space”
Cascina Roccafranca was an abandoned farm-building in Mirafiori district, 
North of Turin, where a Fiat factory was established in 1939 and is still oper-
ating. In 2007, thanks to funds granted by the EU project Urban 2, the farm 
building was converted into a cultural and recreational centre. 
The conversion was carried out by a team of architects in strict collab-
oration with the team of social workers appointed to the project by the 
Municipality of Turin. “The multidisciplinary approach and the possibility 
of projecting together was shown to be an essential element in building a 
common space, a ‘home for the district’”, says Renato Bergamini. This was an 
uncommon and challenging, but very promising, approach to the concep-
tual work of converting the building in order to create ‘a place for the dis-
trict’. Therefore, from the very beginning, Cascina Roccafranca was meant to 
become an aesthetically valuable and at the same time a functional place: large 
windows, empty but cosy and interchangeable spaces in which many differ-
ent activities can be developed and many different age groups can meet.
Cascina Roccafranca is run and managed by a Foundation of which the 
Municipality of Turin is the Founder, while associations and organisations 
from the district (parishes, schools, informal groups) are the Main Partners. 
The Executive Board is made up of three persons nominated by the Mayor, 
and three persons representing district associations, including the “Gruppo 
Abele” association3, which plays a prominent role. The Foundation has five 
main goals: to build citizenship, to enhance the wellbeing of the commu-
nity, to promote a mainstreaming culture based on solidarity and linkage to 
the territory, to conduct an experiment in social partnership between public 
and private sector, and to promote a culture of respect for different people. 
“The two keywords for understanding the project”, says Riccardo Bergamini, 
“are ‘Welcoming’ and ‘Participation’”. 
3 See http://www.gruppoabele.it.
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Cascina Roccafranca is intended to be a free and welcoming space where 
the staff shares and promotes a bottom-up approach, according to the fol-
lowing guidelines:
Creating synergies among stakeholders: “•	 Experience has 
taught us that content is important, but not fundamental. Instead, 
your methodology is essential and must involve the participation 
of stakeholders, informal groups, and local associations. Social 
workers have to allow space for interests brought by the people, 
even if they think such content is irrelevant. The social workers’ 
point of view is one point of view, it is not the point of view. 
We propose a dialogic method in planning events, actions and 
initiatives”. According to this methodology, Cascina Roccafranca’s 
staff try to create synergies among the different stakeholders 
that share similar interests, ideas and projects.
Using a plurality of languages:•	  “Many different forms of 
communication are used to convey messages: music, dance, 
theatre, etc. The storytelling technique has also been developed 
in an intergenerational project, I Nonni raccontano (‘grandparents 
telling stories’), in which older people share their memories with 
younger people on how the district was in past times.
Increasing skills: •	 “Groups, associations, persons who come to 
Cascina Roccafranca have one need above all: to be listened 
to”, says Riccardo Bergamin. In Cascina Roccafranca calls are 
launched to fund and support micro-projecting and working 
groups. Riccardo Bergamini notices that “in these years we 
have realised that the management of Cascina Roccafranca, in 
terms of schedules, deadlines, communication, is a complex and 
necessary job, nevertheless we have realised that it is much more 
necessary to have a greater capacity to listen to the ideas and 
interests of people, and to enhance skills that are already present. 
Acknowledging the role and the skills of others, especially when 
they are non-professional, is a difficult but necessary step”.
Building formal and informal networks: •	 The Cascina Rocca-
franca staff try to promote formal and informal networks based 
on common interests, maintaining them open to new people 
who want to join and bring new ideas.
In this very de-structured and open approach, the encounter between 
different age groups is left to the freedom of people getting together in 
this space and building formal or informal networks, based on common 
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interests and projects. The aim is therefore to build the setting where in-
tergenerational solidarity can be developed. Services and activities consis-
tently delivered at Cascina Roccafranca are:
Info Point: 1. information on all activities in the centre and 
the district.
Counselling Services: 2. legal advice, trade union services, 
information on the wellbeing of the over-sixties, support 
for foster and adoptive families, counselling for parents, 
help for victims of violence, information and counselling 
for those who are ill and their right to be assisted, infor-
mation for owners of animals; all of these counselling 
services are run in collaboration with voluntary associa-
tions or groups.
Restaurant La Piola dell’Incontro 3. and Café ¿Algomas?: 
organic and fair trade products and products from local 
micro-breweries.
Centre for families “The Enchanted Fortress”:4.  with 
play activities and parental counselling.
The Ecomuseum: 5. with a large section dedicated to the 
history and development of Mirafiori District.
Play, Move, Become Friends:6.  dedicated to children and 
families, run by Agape Foundation, on Saturday morn-
ings and Sundays.
Critical Consumers’ Shop: 7. organised by the group of 
150 families that have associated in the Cascina Rocca-
franca Solidal Purchasing Group. The Project is meant to 
spread new lifestyles and pays special attention to the 
quality of life. The group also gives attention to the issue 
of responsible tourism and has opened an info point on 
it, inside the shop.
Women’s Space: 8. run by an informal group of women, fo-
cusing on the following themes: generational solidarity, 
work, health, history of women, culture and arts.
Wellbeing Space: 9. run by a group of associations already 
interested in the theme; gym courses and conferences 
are organised. 
Cascina Together:10.  a project dedicated to people who 
have free time during the day (e.g. pensioners, stay-at-
home mums, unemployed people, etc.). Activities and 
self-run courses are organised. 
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Incubator of Ideas:11.  an activity in which proposals for 
new projects are gathered together, examined and pro-
moted. A number of projects have been developed as a 
result – time bank, a social platform based on the inter-
net4, Roccafranca Film (cineforum), free software devel-
oping projects and organisation of a Linux Day, activities 
based on intercultural exchange with Arab migrants.
Cultural Events;12.  each month, cultural events are organised.
This list shows that there is “room for every generation”. Nevertheless there is 
a missing age group: adolescents. This is partly due, according to Bergamin, 
to the fact that a centre for young people has just opened near Cascina Roc-
cafranca. But it is also due to the specific age group, and the “impossibility” 
of adolescents participating in such a context. The presence of young adults’ 
(20-35 years old) should be strengthened as well: this age is taking part in 
very specific projects (e.g. the creation of open source software), while a 
daily, more integrated and plural experience is still missing. The presence of 
families is massive, and this is of course a “natural place” in which intergen-
erational relations can be built. 
Nevertheless, 30 per cent of the regulars going to Cascina Roccafranca are 
aged 60 or over. They represent the majority of the one hundred volunteers 
working there, with different levels of involvement and participation. There 
are almost forty volunteers permanently associated with the management of 
Cascina Roccafranca (scheduling, gardening, co-ordinating groups, manag-
ing activities) and they are involved in co-ordination and periodic meetings. 
Moreover, there are sixty volunteers linked to specific projects and activities, 
belonging to associations or informal networks. “The over-sixties,” says Ric-
cardo Bergamin, “are a great asset in our work. They have two precious char-
acteristics: they have time, and they have skills. They have time, because they 
no longer have to work and don’t have to look after elderly parents or small 
children (or, if they do, it’s not a full-time and daily activity), and they have 
strong skills, acquired at work or indeed over their whole lives. They are proud 
and willing to share their skills, and we try to emphasise and enhance this at-
titude: for example a judge, now retired, is running a course in the history of 
music, open to anyone who is interested in this subject”.
In three years of activity Cascina Roccafranca has therefore become an 
open space, respected by all the people in the district: since opening, the 
building has never been vandalised, and there have been no thefts. In this 
open laboratory, policies to build intergenerational solidarity have been put 
4 See http://www.laperquisa.it.
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to the test and singles, as well as families, have been “got off the ground” 
with the explicit intention of revitalising the district. The mix of public and 
private actors is intended to stress shared responsibility and participation, 
but also to enhance the fact that this project has to be economically sustain-
able. Projects and activities must be self-financed for 30 per cent of the total 
cost. The evaluation of the first two years of activity has been done. Single 
activities have been evaluated according to two parameters: effectiveness 
of the project itself, and effectiveness in relation to the strategic objectives 
of Cascina Roccafranca.
Conclusions
Turin and Manchester have developed two very different projects as 
regards the target, the approach and the methodology followed. Man-
chester has developed an explicit and coherent set of policies on inter-
generational practice, while the Municipality of Turin has developed 
micro-projects based on participation and solidarity. These two experi-
ences can be considered complementary in showing how the local and 
the micro-level can be seen to be fundamental in building intergenera-
tional solidarity policies, as each urban reality is distinctive in terms of 
the age composition of inhabitants. 
Both projects show the great importance of re-thinking and re-
building social policies, as well as urban contexts, from an intergenera-
tional point of view: where the pact among generations is recognised 
and enabled, and spaces are planned and built from an intergenera-
tional and participatory point of view, the wellbeing of families and 
communities is reinforced. In addition, thanks to this approach, fami-
lies can be greatly helped in recognising their inner - intergeneration-
al (in essence) - structure. Working at local level means also facing a 
transformation of the welfare system and being more in touch with the 
“living spaces” of families. This leads us to a further consideration: in-
tergenerational solidarity can be generated and promoted in the fam-
ily when the family is considered the basic and prominent cell of the 
society, and is therefore supported and promoted as such. This also 
means that the alliance between family and society is built in contexts 
in which mutual recognition and acknowledgment between genera-
tions is promoted and recognised.
Re-thinking social policies and urban development starting from 
the intergenerational approach with an open point of view will there-
fore be an interesting, and necessary, challenge for the future of social 
policies. As demonstrated in Existential Field 4b of the FAMILYPLAT-
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FORM Report on Major Trends Local Politics – Programmes and Best Prac-
tice Models5 with regard to family policies, local policies and the man-
agement of community development can be great opportunities for 
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2.6  Solidarity in Large European Families
Raul Sanchez
Institut d’Estudis Superiors de la Família
Solidarity between generations is a reality experienced by many European 
large families on a daily basis. But the European social model that we are 
building does not seem to be well adapted to this reality. Two true stories 
from Spain, my country, can be used as examples.
The first is about a young couple who got a “mini apartment” from the 
City Council in a populous neighbourhood far from the city centre. It was the 
only affordable housing they could get to start their family life. They were 
between temporary contracts and casual jobs, and these prevented them 
from obtaining a simple mortgage. After a year they had a beautiful baby 
and the following year, twins! Thirty-five square meters, a couple and three 
children. They asked the City Council to provide them with another house. It 
was impossible: they had had the contract for eight years and could not sell 
or rent out the tiny apartment. They had to wait six more years. Of course, 
they were outraged and, above all, desperate, because in addition - as they 
are a bit revolutionary - they would like to have another child. 
The second example is the story of a large family which recently moved 
from Belgium to Spain. The father is Belgian, the mother is from Spain. 
They have six children. The Belgian government transferred 1,200 Euros 
to the parents every month without any means test. This is a universal 
child benefit in that country. But after a while they had to adjust to the 
Spanish social system. Result: zero Euros - yes, nothing! - from the Spanish 
Social Security and 175 Euros per month from the regional government: 
1,025 Euros less per month than before. The mother had to leave her job to 
take care of their children and, of course, they are already looking for new 
employment in the south of France, a country far more generous to large 
families than Spain. 
These are two real examples of an emerging social model which ignores, 
or even rejects families that wish to have and bring up something as human, 
intimate and necessary as children. Despite small steps in recent years, all 
experts agree - and experience shows - that the distance to a family-friendly 
society is still very great. 
The overall European framework for family issues has been characterised 
for many years by a very low birth rate, always below replacement levels; by 
the progressive incorporation of women working outside the home, with 
related social and economic changes, and by a labour market oblivious to 
this phenomenon and not well adjusted to the family aspect of workers’ lives. 
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A globalised and competitive market leads to longer years of study, and also 
generates highly volatile employment among young people, and greater 
geographical mobility for everybody, separating them from their closest 
family network. Furthermore, housing is very expensive. For these reasons 
people are delaying the age at which they marry and have their first child. 
We are experiencing a rapid increase in divorce and in the number of births 
outside marriage and abortions. In addition, there are very large differences 
in measures of public family support among the member countries of the 
European Union.
From this quick survey it seems clear that the family has become one of 
the most overlooked social structures in Europe, and we are beginning to 
suffer the consequences. We have forgotten that the family is the largest 
NGO, the one that takes the best care of the sick, the elderly, and the un-
employed, especially in times of crisis. When the family network is missing, 
social costs increase significantly. We have ignored the supportive role that 
families with children play in maintaining the celebrated European welfare 
system, and as a provider of human capital. That is why the focus is now 
on how to reduce pensions, on how to extend working life, and on how to 
introduce co-payments in health, social or educational services. In short, we 
are now reducing the quality of life of a system which has been kept up till 
now thanks to the brave men and women who have chosen to have kids in 
a society that is taking them less and less into consideration.
With all of this in mind, it seems increasingly difficult to have children, 
and especially difficult to have several of them. How have we been able to 
ignore such an important factor for the maintenance of the envied Euro-
pean social model? 
Each survey held in European countries shows that women want to have 
more children than they are currently having1. As women’s’ responses in 
these surveys show, it would be enough to help families to carry out their 
own functions; supporting them so they can have as many children as they 
want, and giving them the opportunities and the necessary time to care and 
educate the children well.
To achieve this goal it is vital to avoid all kinds of social and economic 
penalties or discriminations due to family size, and support them with a se-
ries of allowances, either monetary or in services. This should be supported 
by governments at all levels, especially with a “courageous budget”, devot-
ing considerable resources to the long term, and viewing them as an invest-
ment, not an expenditure, since the future benefits are obvious to everyone. 
1 See Eurobarometer 2006 on fertility and childbearing preferences: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/
archives/ebs/ebs_253_en.pdf.
112
Spotlights on Contemporary Family Life - Chapter 2: Solidarities in Contemporary Families
It is not enough to invest money. A new mentality is required, to promote a 
social contract for the family - and for the children as a social good - in every 
country and at the European level, involving not only politicians but also 
the economic, educational, cultural and mass media world. This could be 
the beginning of a real family-friendly society, and the beginning of a truly 
European intergenerational solidarity.
Without families and children there is no welfare, there is no future, there 
will be no Europe. It seems natural for us to ask: “If we have already got eco-
nomic, monetary and labour market unity, why can’t we have social conver-
gence on this issue?” Families of Europe hope that their cause will be listened 
to and promoted as a matter of priority on the European Agenda.
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Chapter 3: Demographic Change and the Family in Europe 
Editorial
Veronika Herche 
Demographic Research Institute, Hungary
We live in a rapidly changing society. Marriages and families are splitting 
up and new ones are forming. Forms of family life have changed and di-
versified over recent decades; alternative family structures and partner-
ships have become increasingly commonplace. Europe’s youth today has a 
broader choice of acceptable family structures than their grandparents did. 
There is a trend towards family formation at later ages: studies show consid-
erable postponement of first childbirth and first marriage since the 1970s in 
all European countries. Low propensities to marry are accompanied by the 
increasing instability of partnerships. Consequently, the number of children 
growing up in married-couple families has declined; single, step- or same-
sex parents are no longer exceptional. 
Gender roles have become less stereotyped and rigid. The rights and sta-
tus of women have greatly improved during the last one hundred years. 
Access to education and training has increased for girls at all levels. Over 
the last few decades, women have gained access to managerial and other 
highly paid jobs long reserved for men. Parallel to the emergence of women 
in the labour market, men’s choices, both at work and in the family, have 
also widened. Today’s fathers play a more active and hands-on role in their 
children’s and families’ lives, although the division between breadwinner 
and carer roles still exists, and acts as a constraint that limits the choices of 
men and women.
One of the major changes of this century is that women have fewer chil-
dren, and later in the life course, if at all. Having children has become a more 
conscious decision, amongst other reasons due to the availability of effective 
contraceptive methods. ‘Childfreeness’ is often a chosen lifestyle, for both 
married and cohabiting couples. Fertility rates have declined below replace-
ment rate of 2.1 children per woman in every European country. At the same 
time, we are witnessing the “greying” of Europe: with rising life expectancy 
and declining birth rates, the age pyramid is turning into a mushroom.
According to the 2008 revision of the official United Nations population 
estimates and projections, the population of the 47 countries which make 
up Europe (according to the UN definition) is expected to decline slightly, 
from 732 million in 2009 to 691 million in 2050. Projections show signifi-
cant changes in the distribution of the population of Europe by age group. 
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While the number of people aged 60 to 80 will increase by 46 per cent, the 
number of the oldest old will double in the next 50 years. The age group of 
people over 60 years will account for 44 per cent of the European popula-
tion in 2050. By contrast, the number of young people aged 15 to 24 and 
the number of people in the main working ages (aged 25 to 59) will de-
crease (from 459 million in 2010 to 351 million in 2050) together with the 
number of children under age 15, which will decrease from 113 to 104 mil-
lion. The implications of population ageing, mainly resulting from declin-
ing fertility, cannot be dismissed. According to United Nations population 
estimates, in the medium variant, fertility remains at 1.5 children per wom-
an in 2045-2050, which is significantly below the replacement level of 2.1 
children per woman. 
Increasing longevity also contributes to population ageing. Life expec-
tancy at birth is estimated to rise from 75.1 years in 2005-2010 to 81.5 years 
in 2045-2050 in Europe. Besides fertility (births) and mortality (deaths), net 
migration is the third driver of population change in the European Union. In 
2005-2010, net migration exceeded or totally counterbalanced the excess 
of deaths over births in several European countries. However, the effects of 
immigration on population decline and demographic ageing are limited.
Demographic change poses significant challenges to society, policy mak-
ers, individuals and their families. The growing imbalance between the gen-
erations undermines the long-term financial sustainability of social systems. 
Is it possible to halt demographic ageing? Are incentives to increase fertility 
rates the answer? How far can immigration contribute to the rejuvenation of 
Europe’s population? Then again, what do citizens want, what are people’s 
attitudes and expectations regarding these issues?
This third chapter of Spotlights on Contemporary Family Life focuses on recent 
demographic developments and their implications for families in Europe. 
In the first interview, Paul Demeny (Distinguished Scholar at the Popula-
tion Council since 1989 and founder of the East-West Population Institute in 
Honolulu) discusses key facets of twentieth-century demographic develop-
ments in Europe, and raises some concerns about current discussions on 
the demographic future of Europe. One of the major topics discussed is the 
effectiveness of public policies enacted to solve problems arising from de-
mographic changes.
In the second interview, Professor Herwig Birg gives his views on recent 
demographic trends in Europe with a focus on Germany, a country with a 
tradition of high welfare outlays and low fertility rates. He talks about future 
population and society developments in Germany, and gives some recom-
mendations on how to manage the challenges facing policy makers and 
families arising from demographic changes. 
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The two interviews are followed by an article by Zsolt Spéder (Director at 
the Demographic Research Institute, Hungary). He concentrates on family 
changes in the new EU member states and addresses two main topics con-
cerning family life: first, recent changes in partnership formation in the new 
member countries are discussed, with a focus on the relationship between 
non-marital and marital cohabitation; secondly, changes in the develop-
ment of fertility behaviour in the region, highlighting some of the complex 
issues involved.
A number of recent studies have emphasised the importance of gen-
der equality for fertility development. In the interview which follows, Livia 
Sz. Oláh (Associate Professor in Demography at the Stockholm University) 
brings us to Sweden, a country where family policies have been influenced 
by gender equality for decades and have made it easier for women to com-
bine work and family life. She talks about the relationships between female 
labour-market attachment, policy context and fertility decisions, and under-
lines the complexity of mechanisms which govern the interplay between 
gender relations, the institutional context and individual/couple decision-
making on childbearing.
The journal ends with the thoughts of Zsuzsanna Kormosné-Debreceni 
(Social Policy Officer at the National Association of Large Families in Hunga-
ry, Vice-President of the European network FEFAF (Fédération Européenne 
de Femmes Actives au Foyer)) and mother of 5 children, who emphasises 
the importance of having real choices and options, both for women and 
men. As a representative of a large family organisation, she discusses the 
challenges of reconciling work, family and private life in Hungary and shows 
how initiatives of a local NGO can support the wellbeing of families.
It is very difficult to cover the broad array of subjects and contradictory 
views of demographic changes in Europe in the few pages available in this 
chapter. But we still hope that the points of views of academic experts sup-
plemented by the testimony of a representative of a family association will 
help us to understand the trends and processes behind which lie the chang-
ing faces of European families, and we very much welcome your feedback, 
either by e-mail or via the relevant page on the FAMILYPLATFORM website.  
Spotlights on Contemporary Family Life - Chapter 3: Demographic Change and the Family in Europe 
116
3.1 Demographic Changes and Challenges in Europe  
Interview with Paul Demeny
Interviewed by Veronika Herche 
Demographic Research Institute, Hungary
  In 1922, the historian Oswald Spengler foresaw “an appalling 
depopulation” as one of the manifestations of the “Decline of the 
West”. Has there been continuity in population development since 
the early twentieth century in Europe? Could you please give us an 
overview of the most important demographic shifts and trends of this 
region during the last century? 
To adequately describe twentieth-century demographic developments in Europe 
would of course take a whole book. Differences from country to country and be-
tween various social strata are just too great. Yet the key facets of the overall pro-
cess can be easily summarised. Demographic change is driven by mortality, fertil-
ity, and migration. As to mortality, life expectancy at birth nearly doubled over a 
century: by 2000 it was slightly over 73 years for males and females combined. 
The trend was steadily upward, albeit with two sharp set-backs: the first 
due to World War I and the influenza epidemic that closely followed it; the 
second, equally devastating, due to World War II: all in all, an extraordinarily 
positive achievement. Fertility was mainly in decline; by the 1930s some 
country populations and many subpopulations exhibited below-replace-
ment levels. The post-World War II baby boom, although more moderate 
than in Europe’s overseas offshoots - most notably in the US, was a signifi-
cant but temporary reversal in the trend. In the last quarter of the century 
rapid fertility decline resumed and became near-universal, bringing below-
replacement fertility, and often fertility deeply below replacement, in all 
countries of Europe by the turn of the millennium. With respect to inter-
continental migration, massive European outmigration was brought to an 
abrupt halt by World War I. Net migratory balances in the following 40 years 
were very modest. But in the last decades of the century substantial immi-
grant flows from outside Europe have materialised, adding extra numbers 
mostly to the populations of the economically more dynamic countries. 
Through the combined effects of these forces, as measured by any his-
torical standard, Europe’s population grew rapidly during the century: from 
some 390 million in 1900 to some 730 million by the year 2000. A little over 
half of this increase occurred in the second half of the century. The year 1900 
actually provides a very arbitrary demarcation of the beginning of an epoch. 
That dominant trend of improving survival can be traced back to well before 
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1900. Fertility decline, too, had started earlier: in the case of France as far 
back as the second part of the eighteenth century. 
For many other European countries the downward slide of fertility began 
in the 1880s or 1890s. The turn of the millennium, in contrast, is not a bad 
marker of the completion of the process of demographic transition: a transi-
tion from a combination of high mortality and high fertility to a combination 
of low mortality and low fertility. Europe pioneered that enormously signifi-
cant historical process, setting an example for the rest of the world. The lagged 
response of fertility to mortality change meant that the process generated a 
major increase in population size. But by 2000, natural population increase - 
change apart from migration - came to an end for the continent as a whole. 
In this, too, Europe’s performance prefigures what will happen - and needs to 
happen - elsewhere in the world. Demographic expansion cannot continue 
indefinitely. At some point stasis, or even modest correction through negative 
growth, is both inevitable and desirable. Europe is at that point now.
 Europe’s share of world population is in decline. Is this something to 
worry about? 
Normally one should not worry about things that are inevitable. Europe’s 
loss of relative share within the world’s total population has been of course 
steady during the past century and has been accelerating. This shift is bound 
to continue as far as demographers’ eyes can see. In 1950, Europe’s share 
within the global population was some 22 per cent. Today, in 2010, it may 
be estimated as slightly short of 11 per cent. 
What will the future bring? Population projections are a risky business, 
but the UN’s medium estimate for that share in 2050 is 7.5 per cent. That 
estimate assumes substantial recovery of European fertility from its current 
very low levels and also assumes continuing historically high net immigra-
tion – roughly 1 million persons per year. On those assumptions, Europe’s 
2050 population would be some 690 million (or about 40 million less than in 
2010). The relative share is mostly dictated by what happens outside Europe. 
Europe’s main concern should be how that 690 million - a very respectable 
number - will prosper, and how adequately it will be reproducing itself.
 Europe is worried about its demographic future. Public awareness 
of demographic change is growing. What are the key drivers behind 
population ageing in today’s Europe? 
The key drivers are those three factors I have just mentioned. Since popula-
tion growth cannot go on forever, the convenient reference point is a popu-
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lation in which births and deaths roughly balance out: a stationary popula-
tion or one whose underlying fertility and mortality characteristics make it 
headed in that direction. When just about everyone survives at least up to 
age 50, stationarity requires an average of very slightly more than 2 children 
over women’s life time. When fertility falls short of that level, the base of the 
population pyramid narrows, thereby making the population older. And of 
course in modern times survival into high old age is increasingly and gratify-
ingly common, making an important contribution to population ageing.
 The above mentioned Oswald Spengler quoted Shaw, who said the 
following in the section of the “The quintessence of Ibsenism” titled 
“The Womanly Woman” (1891): ”...unless Woman repudiates her 
womanliness, her duty to her husband, to her children, to society, to 
the law, and to everyone but herself, she cannot emancipate herself”. 
He continued as follows: “The primary woman, the peasant woman, 
is mother. The whole vocation towards which she has yearned from 
childhood is included in that one word. But now emerges the Ibsen 
woman, the comrade, the heroine of a whole megalopolitan literature 
from Northern drama to Parisian novel. Instead of children, she has 
soul-conflicts; marriage is a craft-art for the achievement of ‘mutual 
understanding’. It is all the same whether the case against children 
is the American lady’s who would not miss a season for anything, or 
the Parisienne’s who fears that her lover would leave her, or an Ibsen 
heroine’s who ‘belongs to herself’ - they all belong to themselves 
and they are all unfruitful”. What was the attitude of Europe towards 
population changes and their significance at the earlier 20th century?
Such arguments, whether voiced a hundred years ago or at any time since, 
are little short of bizarre. Take the irrelevant contrast between the “primary 
woman” and the modern emancipated woman. Collective survival under 
conditions of high mortality of course required high fertility, an average of, 
say, six children per woman or even more, while today it requires two chil-
dren: we are talking about completely different demographic regimes. 
Shaw, a brilliant playwright, was deeply interested in social analysis and 
policy and wrote many penetrating pages on the subject of population. The 
sentence quoted by Spengler is one of those pronouncements where its au-
thor could not resist the temptation to exaggerate and to shock in the service 
of a good cause. No emancipation of women without repudiating womanli-
ness and duty to children? An absurd idea. And amplifying on Shaw’s false 
proposition, Spengler goes into an even deeper end. It is bad sociology, bad 
economics, and bad social psychology. Bad demography, too. 
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Nearly a century after his book appeared, we find that an overwhelming 
majority of European women - typically 80 to 90 per cent - still become 
mothers, and do so by choice. Do they bemoan the loss of the supposed 
pleasures recited by Spengler? If a large percentage of these mothers do not 
have a second or third child, the causes for that failure should be found in 
problems more real than “missing a season” and similar calamities.
 In 2007, the European Commission formulated and commissioned 
the report on “The demographic future of Europe—from challenge 
to opportunity” (European Commission 2006)1. The paper has 
initiated a debate. In your article: “A clouded view of Europe’s 
demographic future” (2007)2, you pointed out that the “challenges 
and opportunities” identified in the report largely miss their target. 
What do you regard as the most important failings of the document?
The report was of course a consensus document. Not surprisingly, it had 
a tendency to adopt a language and formulations that were calculated to 
smooth over differences of opinion on difficult issues or to treat major rel-
evant subjects perfunctorily, if at all. 
Does Europe need more people and if so, why? What demographic con-
figurations justify policy interventions and what forms should they take? 
Why should immigration be encouraged and from what sources and in 
what characteristics and in what volume? Are there alternatives to garden-
variety welfare state policies and what effects might such alternative ap-
proaches have on demographic behaviour? And, not least, what is the Eu-
ropean framework in which such questions should be addressed? What are 
the desirable boundaries of the report’s Europe – conceived at that time as 
the EU25 but with the prospect of enlargement? Is Europe more than a glo-
rified customs union and is its population more than simply the sum total 
of the population of the member states? Or does the label “the people [in 
the singular] of the European Union” have a special meaning, now or in an 
anticipated future? 
 You have emphasised the obliviousness of the Commission to the issue 
of population size and growth. Why is it important to consider these 
issues when discussing Europe’s demographic future?
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2023&langId=en. 
2 See http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/13644549/417755521/name/Paul+Demeny+on+Europe%27s+Demogr
aphic+Future.pdf. 
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The Commission did touch on these issues by its comforting reference to 
a projected very modest decline in the size of the EU25 population: an ap-
proximate 2 per cent loss by 2050. It turns out, however, that the prospect 
of such near-stasis was achieved by assuming a net immigrant flow of some 
40 million (plus their descendants), “conservatively estimated”, as the report 
put it. But the size of net immigration (unlike the number of births, where 
grass-roots parental decisions rule, and unlike the number of deaths, where 
the aim of private efforts and public policies converge in the intent to keep 
them at a minimum) is a policy variable par excellence. How is the 40 mil-
lion immigrant figure determined? It would be natural to start with popula-
tion projections in the absence of immigration and address the question 
to what extent, if at all, the results of such projections may be problematic. 
Can society and the economy adjust to population decline and how? What 
are the disadvantages and advantages of a smaller and older population? If 
correction is needed, what should be the main thrust of policy intervention? 
These are the key questions that should have been the Commission’s task to 
pose and answer. 
 One of the failings of the above-mentioned report you named is the 
cluelessness about fertility policy. European policy makers have not 
yet decided whether they should make the level of fertility rate an 
explicit object of government policies. What is the reason for the 
helplessness of governments when facing the issue of population 
change? Do you regard pronatalist policies as justified?
The Commission’s report carefully avoids reference to the politically incor-
rect term of pronatalism. It speaks, instead, of “demographic renewal”, an 
anodyne expression signalling, it would seem, more or less the same intent. 
More recently, there has been some shift in terminology and explicitness. 
This is reflected in a hefty (almost 500 pages) United Nations report World 
Population Policies, 2009, that has just appeared. It characterises member 
state population policies and government attitudes in lapidary phrases. 
There is of course no EU policy on population matters; what EU members 
think or do is reflected in 27 country summaries, with two pages allotted 
to each country. Uniformity is complete with respect to “Level and concern 
about population age structure”. For the last available year (2009) EU gov-
ernments all declare that “Size of the working-age population” and “Ageing 
of the population” both represent “Major concerns”. On “Population size 
and growth” and on “Fertility” there is a degree of dissonance, apparently 
reflecting a mixture of prevailing political and ideological positions and the 
most recent birth statistics. Still, not surprisingly, the majority of EU member 
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governments view population growth as “Too low” and characterise their 
policy intent on population growth as “Raise”. Similarly, the majority view 
the fertility level as “Too low” and declare that their policy on fertility is 
to “Raise” it. (On immigration, once again, uniformity rules: governments 
blandly pronounce it as “Satisfactory” and their attitude to immigration pol-
icy is to “Maintain”.)
Intent and deed, however, do not easily go hand-in-hand. Policies are 
formulated in a political arena that seeks to weigh costs and benefits of spe-
cific measures as determined under the prevailing rules of the game. When 
fertility is in the neighbourhood of replacement level - neighbourhood be-
ing fairly broadly interpreted as perhaps down to a period TFR (total fertility 
rate) of 1.6 or 1.7 - it is difficult to argue that costly intervention (costly in 
terms of either public expenditure or political onus) to raise fertility is justi-
fied. Various pro-family social policies, adopted and supported for reasons 
other than raising the birth rate, are then presented as also being pronatal-
ist, since they possibly have that beneficial by-product. When fertility is be-
low replacement level by a wide margin, arguments for explicit pronatalist 
measures are able to command greater political support. The problem is the 
paucity of effective measures that have the desired effect. The main recipe 
is increasing socialisation of child-rearing costs and institutional arrange-
ments that create a more child-friendly social environment and make moth-
erhood and women’s participation in the formal labour force more compat-
ible. The record of these approaches thus far is not encouraging.
 Some European countries like France, Britain or the Scandinavian 
countries have relatively high fertility levels, others, like most of the 
Eastern European countries, have lower fertility levels. What should 
governments of countries with very low fertility consider when 
contemplating what to do?
They can certainly study apparent success stories and consider policy po-
tentially promising approaches. But the task is not easy, since the lessons 
are far from obvious. It is less than clear to what extent better fertility per-
formance in the countries mentioned are policy-related. Current fertility 
levels in France and in the UK, for example, are very similar, yet their social 
policies related to fertility are quite different. And not long ago, in the 1980s 
and earlier, Scandinavian countries were very much in the lower segment of 
European countries when ranked by level of fertility, even though their fer-
tility-relevant social policies were regarded as the most “progressive”. Recov-
ery of fertility (or rather just some movement edging closer to replacement 
level) is not necessarily explainable by further reinforcement of such policies. 
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There are no hard-and-fast economic, social, or psychological rules gov-
erning fertility behaviour. Just a few years ago, fertility in the former East 
Germany was far below the level prevailing in West Germany. Today, East 
Germany’s fertility seems to have caught up entirely with West Germany. 
Welcome surprises may well be in store in Eastern and Southern Europe, 
too, in the coming decade. Such recoveries, however natural and spontane-
ous, will no doubt be attributed to wise policies after the fact. Such claims 
will rest on weak foundations.
 Many of the articles related to demographic change and policy 
issues contain interesting ideas but lack practical suggestions for 
implementing them. You suggested a couple of years ago that pension 
entitlements should be re-linked positively to the number of offspring 
produced (Demeny, 1987)? What is the main idea behind this?
Historically, intergenerational financial exchanges and other support ar-
rangements took place within the family. Modern industrial societies made 
old-age support predominantly state-organised, relying on taxing the ac-
tive labour force and distributing pensions to the retired. This severs an im-
portant link between willingness to raise children and material security in 
old age. Re-establishing an at least partial yet significant linkage between 
child-rearing and entitlement to old-age support would be a potential stim-
ulus to fertility, especially in an ageing society where government-promised 
pension rights come to be regarded as increasingly tenuous. 
 The idea of “Demeny voting” has recently been much discussed in 
Japan, another country with very low fertility rates. Can you explain 
what this voting rule means? How would its implementation affect 
families with children?
In all countries, the very young - such as those under age 18 or even 20 - rep-
resent a disenfranchised population. Yet their stake in wise long-term pub-
lic policies is very high (extending approximately one hundred years into 
the future), in contrast to the old-age population, whose relative numerical 
weight within the electorate is increasingly heavy, yet whose self-interest-
ed time horizon is far shorter. The young could be given electoral weight 
through representation by their natural or custodial parents. For example, 
votes for under-age girls could be exercised by their mother and for boys by 
their father. Other assignments of voting rights could also be contemplated. 
A radical version, for example, could weight all votes (including children’s 
votes exercised by parents) by the average life expectancy at the voter’s age. 
123
Spotlights on Contemporary Family Life - Chapter 3: Demographic Change and the Family in Europe 
Technically this (or a less discriminatory, but still age-related vote-weighting 
scheme) could be easily accomplished. 
The constitutional and political obstacles to such a reform are of course 
enormous. But active advocacy of it and the ensuing debates would have 
a potentially strong policy-influencing effect in highlighting the inherent 
time-horizon bias affecting current policy decisions. I don’t think of the 
proposal as a fertility-stimulating measure, although the recognition of the 
parental contribution to collective social survival would have merit and per-
haps some demographic effect. The shift in the composition of representa-
tive political bodies should, however, contribute to saner policies reflecting 
less myopic time horizons than is common in present-day policy-making. 
 Last but not least, let me ask you a question concerning the 
FAMILYPLATFORM project. We are now at the final stage of the 
platform and the main goal is to develop a research agenda that 
encompasses fundamental research issues as well as key policy 
questions in order to provide an input into the EU’s Socio-Economic 
and Humanities Research Agenda on Family Research and Family 
Policies. Could you name some important research needs related to 
demographic change, the analysis of which might help to increase the 
wellbeing of families across Europe?
It would be easy to offer a long list of what ought to be researched and what 
policies should be contemplated. Reading the scientific output of the by 
now very large and very active demographic community, whether in Eu-
rope or in North America, gives a good sense of what demographers do and 
what policy ideas they have. Unfortunately it also gives us a sense of frustra-
tion and lack of progress: much rehashing of familiar ideas and decorating 
them with formal analytic virtuosity. 
Instead of elaborating on this complaint, it would be wiser of me to men-
tion just one idea which would challenge researchers in demography and 
also stimulate policy makers. Social policies, including attempts to deal with 
population issues today, originated more than a century ago from attempts 
to deal with issues of poverty affecting a substantial segment of the popu-
lation. As advanced economies developed and incomes rose, the share of 
the poor within the population shrank, and material standards - nutrition, 
health, housing, education, spatial mobility, and leisure - improved across 
the board. Yet the main direction of social policies ran counter to that uplift-
ing trend. Arrangements originally designed for the downtrodden became 
generalised and extended to all. Indeed, much of the redistributive function 
of the modern welfare state, now involving more than a third of national 
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income, consists of taking money from the comfortably-off to reward the 
comfortably-off. The realistic perspective for the future, current economic 
set-backs notwithstanding, is further steady material improvement. Yet there 
is a strong likelihood that gravitation toward ever greater government-engi-
neered redistribution of incomes will continue in the name of good causes 
and programmes, including programmes supposedly justified by adverse 
demographic developments. Does this system growing out from uplifting 
the downtrodden make sense in an affluent society? Is it not possible to 
ensure that the estimated 10 per cent of the population experiencing hard 
times (through no fault of their own) are properly taken care of, whilst at the 
same time avoiding treating the rest as if they are incapable of taking care of 
themselves? Demographers are well-placed to pose such unorthodox ques-
tions, since the arrangements of the modern welfare state are not exempt 
from the well-founded suspicion of being responsible for some untoward 
characteristics of contemporary society, including disorganisation of the 
family system and sub-replacement fertility. The prospect of fundamental 
social reform may seem utopian today. But the matter deserves to be con-
sidered, options need to be analysed, and radical policy alternatives need to 
be contemplated. 
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3.2  Are Babies Making a Comeback?  
Interview with Professor Herwig Birg
Interviewed by and translated from the original German version  
by Veronika Herche
Demographic Research Institute, Hungary
 The widespread decline in period fertility to extremely low levels 
is over, claim the authors of “The end of ‘lowest-low’ fertility?” 
(published in the January 2010 issue of the quarterly “Demographische 
Forschung aus erster Hand” (First Hand Demographic Research)). 
In their analysis of recent fertility trends, Goldstein, Sobotka and 
Jasilioniene (2009) find a turn-around in so-called “lowest-low” 
fertility countries. According to their findings, Moldova was the only 
remaining European country with fertility rates below the 1.3 threshold 
in 2008, compared to 16 lowest-low fertility countries in 2002. Fears of 
population implosion based on continuation of fertility rates from the 
1990s are no longer justified, claim the authors. Are there signs of a 
turnaround in population trends in Europe? 
Even before the article by Goldstein, Sobotka and Jasilioniene (2009) was re-
leased, Hans-Peter Kohler and Mikko Myrskylä of Penn’s Populations Studies 
Center and Francesco C. Billari of the Università Bocconi published a study 
entitled “Advances in development reverse fertility declines” in the journal 
Nature. In the same issue of Nature (August 6, 2009), Shripad Tuljapurkar 
from the Stanford Center for Population Research published a supplemen-
tary contribution entitled “Babies make a comeback”, in which he claims that 
in many industrialised nations including Germany, Italy and Spain, fertility 
levels might move back again towards the replacement level. Therefore, 
world population projections should be adjusted accordingly. 
My critical review of the articles in Nature was published in the February 
2010 issue of the journal “Bevölkerungsforschung Aktuell”. Using the example 
of Germany first, I revealed the non-existence of the claimed rise in fertility 
rates in Germany. Secondly, I showed that the arguments on which the non-
existing fertility rise relies are untenable. Last but not least, I also pointed 
out the severe weaknesses of the methods of analysis used in the study.
There is a further example of such a glaring mistake in the history of fertility 
research. According to the demographic transition theory, which is, in fact, not re-
ally a theory, but rather a description of demographic tendencies, birth rates can-
not sink below death rates over the long term. Since a permanent disequilibrium 
is excluded from this model, shrinking population can at best be temporary.
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However, Germany has had a below replacement-level birth rate for al-
most half a century and the number of deaths has been below the number 
of births since 1972. The deficit of births has been increasing from year to 
year. In recent years, almost all industrialised countries, and increasingly 
more emerging and developing countries, have taken the same path: they 
have birth rates below the replacement level. The authors do not question 
these trends, and they even point out that their assumptions apply only to 
a few countries. If this is indeed the case, and the assumptions cannot be 
applied to the majority of countries, the question arises whether publishing 
these articles makes any sense at all.
Nothing indicates that the fertility rate will increase toward the replace-
ment rate in the coming decades. Nor can this be forecast, since the factors 
outlined in my biographic theory of fertility (“A biography approach to theoret-
ical demography”, Birg 1987, 1991) which have led to decline in fertility rates 
will operate in the future as well. Finally, to conclude on the articles published 
in Nature: these are entirely descriptive statistical studies with no explanatory 
theory behind them. This is like hiking in the woods without a compass: there 
is a danger of getting lost and disappearing in the undergrowth.
 There are several explanations for the decline of fertility in Europe. 
What do you regard as being the most important causes of the 
declining fertility rate?
You will find one thing that all European countries have in common: the 
explosion of biographical life course alternatives since industrialisation. This 
is the consequence of social and cultural liberalisation on the one hand, and 
economic dynamism and increased welfare on the other. The biographic 
universe has expanded as never before in the history of mankind. In our 
constantly changing social, economical and cultural environment the risk of 
long-lasting biographic decisions increases.
Long-term biographic commitments, like choice of a long-term part-
ner or assuming parenting responsibility are important familial virtues, 
but they are diametrically opposed to virtues specific to economic life, 
like flexibility, mobility and the constant willingness to adapt to the 
changing needs of the labour market. In order to avoid the risks of ir-
reversible biographic decisions, childbirth has been postponed and is 
then often given up entirely. Its consequence is a decline in fertility rates; 
not only in Europe but all over the world. It has been faster, however, in 
the most dynamically growing economies. For the world population as 
a whole, the number of children born per woman has halved in the last 
fifty years.
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 Studies show that European couples want more children than they 
actually have. How can we encourage future parents to achieve their 
desired number of children?
Couples do desire everything possible, not just children. Having goals is bet-
ter than cultivating desires. The idea that the birth rate would increase if 
obstacles hindering the realisation of fertility desires could be removed is 
not really hitting the nail on the head.
There is a Europe-wide survey of the ideal number of children, in which 
people are asked what their desired number of children would be, if the state 
gave them all the support they wanted. On average, women and men want 
to have more than two children in most European countries. Nevertheless, 
the ideal number of children was below two in Germany and Austria. Re-
moving obstacles and encouragement will naturally have no effect on people 
who do not believe that having children is self-evident and worthwhile.
 Regarding birth rates, Europe is divided into two parts: a small group 
with comparatively high birth rates and a larger group with low 
fertility levels. The birth rate is exceptionally low in Germany, among 
the lowest in Europe. What are the main reasons for this?
An often neglected, common denominator of the diverse reasons for the 
low birth rate in Germany is the historical fact that in one single century, the 
people of Germany have witnessed two World Wars, the hyperinflation of the 
1920s, the world economic crisis of the 1930s, two dictatorships, and the 40-
year-long division of the country. Furthermore, they had to cope with the so-
cial and economic transformation in the former GDR. Could you imagine that 
such experiences would not shake people’s confidence in the future? Forma-
tion of families no longer goes without saying: it becomes a risky project.
However, it is not only negative historical experiences that have con-
tributed to the decrease in fertility. Even positive experiences of dynamic 
economic growth, such as during the period of the economic boom, para-
doxically had a negative impact on birth rates, mainly due to the increased 
parallel economic and biographical opportunity costs of having children. 
Therefore instead of rising, the birth rate fell to 0.7 live births per woman 
in Eastern Germany after reunification. I have introduced the term “demo-
graphic-economic paradox” for the negative relationship between economic 
prosperity (production) and demographic reproduction – a paradox that 
can only be explained by the biographical theory of fertility.
Another important historical foundation is the establishment of the uni-
versal social security system by Bismarck in the 1890s. Since then, there has 
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been a kind of illusion of stability: people believe that they do not need to 
have children of their own to ensure that they will be looked after in old age 
or when facing severe illness. Paradoxically, only a few know that the realisa-
tion of this belief is impossible in the case of a pension system operating on 
the “pay-as-you-go” principle. And those who know it ignore it.
 What can be expected in the next 50 years regarding population 
development in Germany? Consequently, how will the German  
society change?
We are dealing with a simultaneously growing and shrinking population. 
The number of people aged 60 and over will increase by about 10 million to 
28 million from the end of the twentieth century to 2050, and will decrease 
again to the initial 18 million by the end of the twenty-first century. The num-
ber of people in the 20 to 60 age group, which is the key age group for the 
economy, will shrink continuously up to the end of the twenty-first century; 
by 16 million by 2050, and then by another 10 million by the end of the twen-
ty-first century. These estimates even take immigration effects into account. 
The impact of these developments will transform Germany into a per-
manent social and economic construction site. The country might not be 
recognisable anymore. Such a development of course involves enormous 
political risks. The twenty-first century will be a very uncomfortable one 
anyway, even without any further wars. This could be unbearable for the 
German disposition (“Gemüt”). Nevertheless, it should be noted that immi-
grants with a different mentality will become the majority of the population 
in the younger age groups.
 How could Germany manage the challenges of demographic change?
Policy should pursue two strategies in parallel. First, an adaptation strategy, 
which would help all sectors of the economy and society to optimally adapt 
to the process of irreversible population ageing and decline, and to inter-
nationalisation caused by immigration. Secondly, a cause-oriented policy 
promoting the long-term recovery of demographic stability by achieving 
replacement level fertility.
Currently there is no political force in Germany that is interested in a 
cause-oriented strategy with long-term targets. Up until now, political 
parties have sold demographic problems to the voters as “opportunities 
of population decline” and “opportunities of population ageing”. A shift 
has become impossible, the first party initiating a change would be voted 
down first. Demographic issues were not considered as important in the last 
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Bundestag elections. Politics seems to be bent upon continuing until reach-
ing the end of the blind alley.
 Let’s talk about the sensitive issue of immigration: as the German 
population ages and shrinks due to a persistently low birth rate, many 
voices demand considering admitting more immigrants. However, 
there are also many concerns about immigration. Is there a way to 
resolve this contradiction?
For a long time now, Germany has been replacing non-existent German children 
with immigrants from abroad. The annual number of immigrants has exceeded 
the number of births for decades. This is still so, although figures suggest that the 
number of emigrants temporarily exceeded the number of immigrants in 2008.
Some say that immigration problems will be defused if more people are 
leaving the country than are entering it. But this is not true. Even if the migra-
tion balance is zero or negative, 700,000 people or more move into the country 
from abroad every single year. Since they have an average length of stay of 10 
years, 700,000 people need to be integrated from year to year. Simultaneous 
emigration does not help to solve this problem. Like in a hotel: even though the 
number of guests checking in and checking out is equal and the migration bal-
ance is zero, the hotel still does need a kitchen and a catering staff.
Despite the recently negative migration balance, Germany is still char-
acterised by a policy of compensatory migration. This is, however, a dead 
end; the annual deficit of births will rise to 800,000 by the middle of the 
century. This deficit can hardly be compensated for by immigration. What 
really counts is the negative economic balance-sheet of immigration, not 
to mention the consequences for democracy if the majority of immigrants 
come from cultures with human rights problems.
 What are the consequences and challenges of the current 
demographic trends for families? What challenges will arise for 
families as result of demographic changes?
The Federal Constitutional Court declared German long-term care insur-
ance unconstitutional, because in favouring childless citizens it violates the 
general principle of equality, the supreme principle of democracy. The court 
based its verdict on the demographic fact that long-term care insurance can 
only perform its task if people act in two areas: first, financial contributions 
must be paid, and secondly, children must also be born, raised and educat-
ed, in order to help preserve pay-as-you-go funding of the social insurance 
system with their contributions.
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People who only pay a monetary contribution and still acquire the same rights 
to care as people who make a material, i.e. “generative” contribution, in the form of 
raising children, are privileged according to the court verdict. The same argumen-
tation is applied by the court to the pension and health insurance system. The 
entire German social security system is therefore unconstitutional.
The result is not only a conflict of interest between contributors and ben-
eficiaries - that means between the old and young generations, but also a 
conflict between the group of people with and without children within each 
generation. The biggest challenge for families is to bear the growing injus-
tice resulting from privileging members of society without children, and to 
put up with the fact that this injustice is ignored by policy makers. In Ger-
many those who do not have children benefit the most from this situation.
 Considering current family policy practice, what are your main 
recommendations for Germany? How could family policy become 
more effective?
In Germany, family policy focuses on people who already have children. At 
the same time, the proportion of people who remain childless throughout 
their lives within each generation is already one-quarter to one-third, and 
these figures are much higher among highly educated people. There should 
be a new policy approach for the group of childless people, so that parent-
hood becomes a natural element of life planning again.
Apart from that, Germany should pursue a family policy which allows 
both men and women to achieve their career goals and to start families si-
multaneously, taking France as an exemplar. So far, these two life orientations 
are almost mutually exclusive in Germany. Germany would probably need 
bipartisan coalitions to achieve the political majority needed to create and 
sustain effective family policies. This is still a utopian demand, but in twenty 
years, when demographic problems become more apparent, it might come 
to coalition-forming in favour of families. It might even become possible to 
change the constitution or the electoral law, so that parents could exercise 
votes for their underage children. Something similar is already included in 
the property rights system: children can have property rights regardless of 
their age, exercised by a parent until they have legal capacity.
 What can and what should the economy do in order to improve living 
conditions for families?
The economy is the key factor for both family formation and birth rates. It 
is even more important than formally responsible family policy actors such 
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as the German Ministry of Family Affairs. In Germany, every fourth position 
is refilled each year. Companies should –voluntarily consider the following 
principle when filling vacancies, without being bound by law: where appli-
cants have the same qualifications, priority should be given to those candi-
dates who have family or care-giver responsibilities.
This measure would meet the important goal of creating a very dynamic 
economy. Since every employer has the right to define vacancy requirements 
in a way that only a very specific applicant profile matches them, the principle 
cannot be enforced legally; it could be implemented voluntarily. However, 
this should not be an argument against the proposal. Since all really impor-
tant and valuable behaviour patterns are voluntary and are based on insight.
 What societal changes being driven by demographic change should 
we be prepared for in tomorrow’s Europe?
Demographic development will lead to accentuation of conflict in several 
areas, without being driven by specific forces or groups responsible for it.
Since the number of elderly is growing, whereas the number of people 1. 
in the middle age groups is stagnating or shrinking significantly, as in 
Germany, the clash of interests between social security beneficiaries 
and taxpayers, between the old and new generation, will intensify. 
In addition, a conflict of interest will also emerge within each gener-2. 
ation between individuals with and without children, because child-
less people are favoured by the system, as long as they only make 
monetary contributions but make no material, i.e. “generative” con-
tribution to the funding of the social security system, but neverthe-
less acquire the same rights to care as people with children.
Due to the strong migration flows between communities and regions 3. 
(internal migrations), regional living spaces will be split into some for 
winners and some for losers. The economically stronger in-migration 
regions will prosper at the expense of out-migration areas, both eco-
nomically and demographically. Internal migration will lead to a kind of 
demographic colonialism, which continues the process of demographic 
colonialism caused by international migration, within the country.
At the national level, continuous immigration from abroad combined 4. 
with the birth surplus of the immigrant population will result in the 
following change: the current majority will become the minority in 
the younger population groups.
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3.3  Family Changes in the New EU Member States1 
Zsolt Spéder
Demographic Research Institute, Hungary
Two decades ago, profound changes took hold in the former socialist coun-
tries. In many respects, these changes can be regarded as having come to a 
close: regular free elections regulate the changes of governments, a charac-
teristic feature of liberal democracies; the (free) market integrates national 
economies; and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have joined 
the European Union. Regarding the family, several specific changes have 
also taken place. However, they did not commence at the same times, nor 
did they proceed at the same speeds. These changes in the family have so 
far not come to a close. We cannot confirm with any certainty that identical 
models will emerge in all of the former socialist countries. But based on empiri-
cal findings, in this contribution we highlight and compare selected aspects of 
family changes in the new member states of the European Union.
1. Introduction: questions and context
Several reasons underlie our intention to focus on family changes in the for-
mer Socialist countries among the new EU member states. On the one hand, 
everyday life in these countries was ruled by very similar, though not identi-
cal social forces. Since 1945 (earlier in the Baltic region), the populations of 
these states lived in a redistributive system that profoundly affected and 
constantly restructured everyday life. From 1989/90 onwards, these coun-
tries oriented themselves on the Western European model - taking over the 
entire political system, developing the conditions of a market economy and 
privatising state property - developments that culminated after the turn 
of the millennium in the accession of ten (8+2) countries to the European 
Union (Adamski et al., 2001). The transition to a market economy happened 
at a time when globalisation processes intensified in the West. Ultimately, 
the elimination of borders gave the green light for cultural integration. The 
structural circumstances in which people live and need to find their bearings 
appear at first glance to resemble each other and to show parallel develop-
ments in the long term. Perhaps we might assume that these countries have 
also undergone the very same changes with regard to the family?
Indeed, there are arguments that suggest distinct differences in fam-
ily changes between accession countries. First, the Baltic countries were 
1  This is a shortened, modified and updated version of the paper by Spéder (2009).
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integrated in the Soviet system more profoundly and over a longer period. 
The Church’s role in the new member states clearly varies to this day, and its 
influence on family life still makes itself felt; these and other processes may 
give rise to dissimilar family tendencies. Secondly, according to some analy-
ses (see King/Szelényi, 2005) the former communist countries chose differ-
ent paths for the (re-)introduction of capitalism, thus giving rise to different 
structures. Lastly, we assume that long-term cultural developments, as well 
as patterns and developments of the welfare state, affect family changes. 
John Hajnal (1965) identified the continuing differences between West and 
East by analysing long-term development tendencies for marital age. Re-
her (1998) emphasised North-South differences and Mayer (2001) pointed 
out that different welfare state systems have a crucial impact on familial cir-
cumstances. These arguments justify a comparison of tendencies in family 
changes in those former Socialist countries that acceded to the European 
Union a short while ago. They are simultaneously similar and dissimilar, and 
allow us to identify specific features.
The present paper is devoted to two main topics, with a closer look at a 
number of selected aspects of family life based on survey findings. These 
topics are as follows:
The interrelation between non-marital cohabitation (hereafter re-1. 
ferred to as “cohabitation”) and marital cohabitation (hereafter re-
ferred to as “marriage”).
Development of fertility, i.e. fertility rates, attitudes and social norms 2. 
towards childbearing.
Our analysis is based on several data sources and various types of data. The 
basic tendencies are shown by means of vital statistics. Two available sets of 
data - the data of the first wave of the “Generations and Gender Survey” (cf. 
Vikat et al., 2007), and the “Timing of the Life” module of the third wave of 
the “European Social Survey” (ESS) - allow us to conduct further analyses.
2. Forms of partnership: marriage and/or cohabitation 
2.1 General tendencies
The past two decades have brought profound changes in partnership for-
mation in the NMSs (New Member States): the popularity of marriage has di-
minished considerably; cohabitation has become a universal phenomenon; 
the locating of first partnership and marriage in the life-course has changed; 
the stability of partnerships has not remained unaffected either (see Bukodi, 
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2004; Spéder, 2005; Hoem et al., 2007; Sobotka/Toulemon, 2008). These 
changes resemble those that have taken place in the Western countries 
since the middle of the 1960s (Lesthaeghe, 1996; Kiernan, 2000a). However, 
we must ask ourselves whether such changes occurred in the same way in 
all of the countries mentioned. Another issue is the nature of the competi-
tion between marriage and cohabitation in the new member states.
The traditional indicator - total first marriage rates (TFMR) - reveals that 
the willingness to marry has declined considerably and that first marriage, 
even in the NMS, clearly takes place at a later time than before (cf. Billari, 
2005; Lesthaeghe/Moors, 2000). However, differences in total first marriage 
rates are found in the extent of changes and the initial and final levels. Rates 
decreased from 0.75 to 0.44 in Hungary, from 0.82 to 0.69 in Romania, and 
from 0.87 to 0.58 in Poland. 
The motives and causes of postponement of union formation concur 
with those commonly found in the Western countries. These are as follows: 
expansion of higher education, later entry into working life, growing eco-
nomic insecurity, changes of norms and values, increasing prevalence of 
cohabitation. 
Essential differences between Western and Eastern countries are also 
found in the explanations given for postponing first marriage (“subjective 
causes“). Whereas in Western countries people tend to name values and 
subjective orientations, such as striving for personal freedom, a declining 
appreciation of marriage and higher social acceptance of cohabitation, it is 
material factors – the housing shortage, low incomes, labour market prob-
lems - that play a crucial role in postponing marriage in the former Socialist 
countries (Pongrácz/Spéder, 2008).
2.2 Popularity of cohabitation as partnership form
It is not without reason that several researchers claim that cohabitations - 
even though in different ways and to different extents - have become an 
inevitable form of partnership and/or integral part of partnership careers 
(Toulemon, 1997; Kiernan, 2002b; Vaskovics, et al., 1997). What can we say 
about the actual popularity of cohabitation in the countries surveyed?
Since the statistics do not provide sufficient information, we need to ex-
tend our scrutiny to survey findings. According to the data of the third wave 
of the European Social Survey (ESS), fairly substantial proportions of young 
adults (aged 21-35) living in steady partnerships prefer cohabitation. Varia-
tions between NMSs are significant: while in Poland and Slovakia very few 
young couples cohabit, proportions are fairly large in Estonia and Slovenia. 
The wide variance in the prevalence of cohabitation is typical of both ‘old’ 
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and ‘new’ member states. In contrast, the proportions of people cohabiting 
are small in the Ukraine and Russia. Thus, it is not surprising that acceptance 
of cohabitation is very high, with only few people disapproving. This coin-
cides with the findings of previous surveys (see Spéder, 2006). 
Table 1: Partnership forms of young adults with a cohabiting partner 
(aged 21-35), 2006
     % living
   in a non-marital partnership    in a marriage
Western countries
Norway   57.1   43.9
France   50.0   50.0
Germany   37.3   62.7
Spain   33.2   66.8
NMS countries
Estonia   47.9   52.1
Poland   10.8   89.2
Slovakia   19.8   80.2
Hungary   33.7   66.3
Slovenia   56.3   43.7
Bulgaria   27.2   72.8
Eastern countries
Russia   12.7   87.3
Ukraine   2.3   97.7 
Source: own calculations based on the “European Social Survey”, 3rd wave (2006).
However, partnership practice and evaluation of partnership forms by the 
public do not coincide fully. Whereas half of the young adults living in a 
partnership in Estonia but a mere eighth in Russia are in an cohabitation, 
these two countries show hardly any differences in the preferences towards 
non-marital cohabitation.
2.3 Dissolution of partnerships: growing risk
Dissolution of marriage - the high and still growing readiness to divorce - 
is the most important source of partnership instability. While it is true that 
the readiness to divorce has increased in general, total divorce rates (TDR) 
barely changed between 1988 and 2003 in three NMS countries (Estonia, 
Lithuania and Romania). In Lithuania, TDR even fell by 0.13. The extent of in-
creases also differs among countries. Hungary is on top with 0.17, followed 
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by the Czech Republic. Accordingly, the within-country variance of TDR, the 
dissolution risk of a marriage is greater in 2003 than in 1988: the 2003 rates 
vary between 0.2 and 0.5. TDR figures reveal that marriages in the Czech 
Republic have a likelihood of ending in divorce of 0.48, whereas in Poland 
the corresponding probability is one-fifth (0.20). The findings show distinct 
differences between the new member states in certain areas of family life. 
Figure 1: Total divorce rates (TDR), 1988-2003
 
Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe (2004).
The diffusion of cohabitation does not decrease the instability in partner-
ships either. Since persons living in cohabitation tend to dissolve their part-
nership more easily than married people, and since cohabitation is spread-
ing inexorably, total rates of dissolved partnerships are increasing.
In summary: profound changes have occurred in the new member 
countries of the European Union, and they are still under way. Young adults 
choose the binding and institutionalised form of marriage less frequently 
and/or at a later time, preferring cohabitation as a pre-marital or alternative 
form of partnership. There can be no doubt that both marriage and cohabi-
tation are subject to a change of relevance – and most respondents have 
come to accept this fact. Marriage is a desired life goal for most people, but 
instead of being an exclusive institution, it has become an idealised form of 
partnership “re-charged” with specific values.
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2  A concise, detailed description and analysis of the trends was recently carried out by Sobotka (2008).
3. Tendencies in childbearing: facts and arguments
It is not possible to give a short yet precise description and final summary 
of changes in the development of fertility behaviours2. Researchers study-
ing fertility behaviour are confronted with an equally difficult but just as 
exciting challenge as the sociologists who investigated social transforma-
tion processes at the beginning of the 1990s. They would have had to un-
derstand and explain changing processes at a time when they were still in 
progress. We have no choice but to highlight some aspects of fertility be-
haviour and to try to understand them. The fundamental tendencies will be 
described below with the aid of the total fertility rates (TFR). Subsequently, 
we will deal with the postponement of the (first) birth to a later age. We will 
specify the underlying causes, describing and discussing some characteris-
tic attitudes and norms. We will then conclude with the recurring problem 
of reconciling job and family.
3.1 Fundamental tendencies and characteristics
Total fertility rates (TFR) reveal that the individual new member states have 
followed similar paths. We find a rapid decline in fertility in all new member 
states. According to Sobotka (2008), the extent and rate of decline were great-
er than in the West European countries, where these changes had occurred at 
an earlier time. If we were to characterise the changes by just this one indica-
tor - incidentally one of the most important indicators of fertility - we would 
find that the former Socialist countries now yield a somewhat more uniform 
picture than they did in the late Socialist period before transformation. 
Changes in the average age of mothers at first birth (MAFB) also reveal an 
identical trend: women are increasingly giving birth to their first child at a 
later age. And there is no sign as yet that this trend will come to a standstill. 
This is the most useful indicator for us to understand the nature of the 
change in fertility behaviour, as it shows postponement of the first birth. It is 
not an unfamiliar process, having first appeared in Western societies a long 
time ago. Yet we do not find it in Russia and Ukraine, which means that it is 
not necessarily linked to the transformation process, i.e. the transition from 
Socialism to a market economy (cf. Adveev, 2003; Perelli-Harris, 2005).
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Figure 2: Total fertility rates (TFR), 1988-2009
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 3: Average maternal age at first birth (MAFB), 1988-2003
Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe (2004).
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There is no doubt about some of the causes of postponement, first of all 
the expansion of schooling: the number of university students among 20 
year-olds is currently three times the number before political transforma-
tion. Labour market integration of young adults comes second, which im-
plies a delayed transition from schooling to the workplace. As shown by 
Mills and Blossfeld in their comprehensive studies (2005), globalisation has 
also played a key role, and we need to underscore that globalisation had it 
easier in the new member states than in the Western countries: shaping the 
weak market economies to suit globalisation concepts was fairly simple, but 
led to greater insecurity compared to Western countries. It is well known 
that this insecurity at transition from education and training to workplace 
delays all other events across an individual’s lifetime, including the decision 
to have a child. Finally the increasing prevalence of cohabitation and its 
characteristic features, i.e. its transitional character, the greater readiness of 
the partners to dissolve it, and the lower propensity to fertility, contribute to 
the postponement of first births, a delayed transition to adulthood, as well 
as other postponement tendencies.
Although the two indicators mentioned above yield important informa-
tion about trends in fertility behaviour, they provide only limited insight 
into this behaviour. They do not tell us how many children a woman or fam-
ily will have nor anything about the prevalence of childlessness, how often 
and how long children will live with a single parent, nor anything about the 
relevance of children in the lives of parents. In the following section, we will 
refer to the survey data to find answers to some of these questions.
3.2  Opinions, anticipations, deliberations and plans with 
regard to children
As a first question, let us ask whether children are still major life goals. In 
the Generations and Gender Survey, we asked whether having a child is es-
sential for a fulfilled life. We proceeded on the assumption that the replies 
would yield information on the significance of motherhood and fatherhood 
as human life goals. We expected gender-specific distributions, i.e. a higher 
relevance of children for female than for male identity, but found only slight 
differences between countries (with the exception of Germany, where child-
lessness is a relatively long tradition). 
What are the differences between countries in view of the ultimate fam-
ily size and intentional childlessness? A recovery in the birth rate is possible 
only in the case of sufficiently high ultimate family size. According to Gold-
stein and his associates, the German-speaking European countries did not 
only experience a “sub-replacement level of fertility” but an alignment of 
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the ultimate fertility goals to this level (Goldstein/Lutz/Testa, 2003). And 
these figures are far removed from the “magical two”. So we are left with the 
question of whether expectations in the new member countries are also 
oriented to actual fertility rates.
Eurobarometer data suggest that this is not yet the case. In eight out of 
ten countries, fertility fluctuates between 1.9 and 2.1. Only two countries, 
the Czech Republic and Romania, have rates below 1.9. Aside from this, it is 
a remarkable phenomenon that ultimate fertility goals in France and Nor-
way and Spain far exceed the 2.1 limit.
Table 2: Ultimate family size of young adults (aged 18-34) in various 
European countries, 2001
Countries    Ultimate family size 
NMS countries
Bulgaria     2.00
Estonia     2.03
Lithuania     2.09
Latvia     2.06
Poland     2.14
Czech Republic    1.82
Slovakia     1.97
Hungary     2.05
Slovenia     1.96
Romania     1.70
Western countries
Finland     2.41
France     2.48
Germany     1.64
Austria     1.73
Spain     1.97
Source: own calculations, Eurobarometer 59.2, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (2002).
Researchers can see childlessness as a special type of fertility goal. Put very 
simply, childlessness is the consequence of conscious thought and deci-
sions, a side-effect of postponing behaviour. Alternatively, it can also result 
from the early dissolution of a partnership, etc. Our question is how people 
rate childlessness, and whether it comes with open or covert sanctions, such 
as disparaging remarks, gossip or non-verbal reactions. In order to record 
and describe these sanctions, we will use data compiled by the European 
Social Survey (ESS). 
Spotlights on Contemporary Family Life - Chapter 3: Demographic Change and the Family in Europe 
142
The populations of the Western countries definitely have no negative views 
of childlessness. Since intentional childlessness is not widespread (except in 
Germany), this attitude might be a sign of tolerance rather than acceptance. 
In the NMS countries, the proportion of disapproval is much higher, but 
with considerable differences between these countries. While in Slovenia 40 
per cent of respondents see childlessness as a negative phenomenon, the 
rate is 80 per cent in Bulgaria. In the Western countries, more people expect 
negative sanctions than disapprove of childlessness themselves.
Consideration of anticipated benefits and drawbacks of having a child is 
an integral part of all theoretical deliberations that lend a kind of rationality 
to fertility behaviour3. The anticipated positive and negative consequences 
of a (potential) child are measured by means of the following set of ques-
tions: “If you were to have a/another child during the next three years, would 
it be better or worse…:
For your employment opportunities? -
For your spouse’s employment opportunities ? -
For your financial situation? -
For the joy and satisfaction that you get from life? -
For the possibility to do what you want?” -
The anticipation of positive consequences of a potential birth contributes 
to the emergence of the wish to have children, while anticipated negative 
consequences may prevent people from having a child. Anticipations are 
homogenously negative in regard to women’s employment opportunities, 
with hardly any country-specific differences: in all countries, people clearly 
and exclusively anticipate negative consequences. A more positive dimen-
sion is the expectation of positive changes in joy in the case of a birth. France 
and Georgia have the highest number of persons envisaging that the birth 
of a child will increase their joy and satisfaction, while Germany has the low-
est. In the NMS countries, anticipation of positive consequences is greatest 
in Hungary. Of course, there are distinct differences between childless per-
sons and families with children: childless persons tend to anticipate posi-
tive consequences, families with children tend to anticipate more negative 
consequences.
3 The GGS data set mentioned here is based on the theory of planned behaviour as developed by Ajzen 
(1988). On the advantages of Ajzen’s theory see Vikat et al. (2007).
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Figures 4a and 4b:
Women’s anticipations:    Women’s and men’s
Anticipated negative   anticipations:
consequences in the    Anticipated positive
labour market in the    changes in joy in the
case of a birth in the   case of a birth in the 
next three years   next three years   
Source: own calculations, “Generation and Gender Survey“, 1st wave (2001/2002).
In our analyses, we also tried to identify the impact of labour market status 
(Spéder/Kapitány, 2007). We wanted to reveal the influence of labour mar-
ket status on the emergence of the wish to have children as well as its reali-
sation. These analyses indicate that people with medium qualifications who 
can achieve only weak status in the labour market have the lowest chances 
of fulfilling their fertility goals. In Hungary, to remain childless forever is not 
a fate that threatens higher income groups, although having children comes 
at a high cost in terms of opportunities. By contrast, the extent of fulfilling 
fertility goals is lowest in the middle positions. Perhaps they are the ones 
who are most at risk of losing a great deal. Above-average earners can use 
their accumulated available capital to make up for sudden financial losses. 
For the lower classes in Hungary, social benefits can only complement or 
partly compensate for income losses. These findings direct our attention to 
the problems of reconciling job and family.
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3.3. Weak reconciliation of work and family in the post-
communist countries 
How can it be that reconciliation of employment and family becomes a 
problem in the former Socialist countries, where universal gainful employ-
ment of women characterised the labour market for half a century? Mostly 
because labour market conditions have undergone fundamental changes 
(cf. Spéder/Kamarás, 2008). We can give only a brief summary of these fun-
damental changes:
These countries were caught by globalisation in a situation of insuf-1. 
ficiently developed domestic markets (cf. Mills/Blossfeld, 2005). The 
working population, including women, were unable to defend their 
rights adequately. Having played merely a formal role during Social-
ism, trade unions were unable to position themselves afresh, and so 
they lacked clout. The state, too, proved too weak to promote the 
interests of employees.
Part-time employment rates in these countries are amongst the low-2. 
est in Europe. If both women and men work full-time (eight or more 
hours a day), fulfilling their familial tasks is difficult.
Although employers must re-employ their employees after mater-3. 
nity leave, practical implementation of this right is inadequate.
According to our studies, women with middle qualifications and 4. 
weak labour market positions are mostly affected by this problem, 
while university graduates and highly qualified experts are in a 
strong position in the labour market thanks to their skills and knowl-
edge. At the other end of the spectrum, persons with low qualifica-
tions have easier access to marginal positions in the labour market 
and receive the largest share of government benefits to compensate 
for most of their income losses. 
All items mentioned above illustrate the persisting problem of reconciling 
job and family.
3.4 Births out of wedlock
The varying distributions of cohabitation reveal distinct differences between 
the new member states in regard to births out of wedlock; in addition, eval-
uations of this situation in these countries are not homogenous. The largest 
differences regarding family tendencies can be found in this case. Not only 
is Estonia in the vanguard, but its rate - close to 60 per cent (58.2 per cent) 
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in 2006 - is also noteworthy compared to the rest of Europe. High rates (over 
40 per cent) are also found in Latvia, Slovenia and Bulgaria, three countries 
that differ in many respects. Poland is at the other end of the scale (together 
with Ukraine), with figures of around 20 per cent. These countries, seem-
ingly homogenous from the viewpoint of total fertility rates, showed large 
differences in regard to partnerships.
Of course not all non-marital children are born into a cohabiting situa-
tion and subsequently raised by two parents. The proportions of children 
born in single-parent families differ widely in Western Europe. In the United 
Kingdom this proportion is quite high. According to the censuses around 
the millennium, the proportion of children below age one living in a single-
parent household varies between 5 and 20 per cent in the NMS countries.
The rating of out-of-wedlock births by the respondents corresponds to 
the former’s prevalence, thus showing a distinct variance. Nevertheless, 
there are a few discrepancies: acceptance of cohabitation is highest in Hun-
gary rather than in Estonia. Although cohabitation prevalence in Hungary is 
only in the medium range, it is tolerated by almost all respondents.
It would be important to know more about the socio-structural embed-
ding of children born out of wedlock. All we know is that Hungary’s model is 
similar to that of the United Kingdom but differs from the model of Scandi-
navian countries. In these two countries, births out of wedlock tend to be a 
characteristic feature of specific social groups, i.e. the lower ranks of society. 
While cohabitations are found in all ranks of society, having a child within 
this type of partnership is more characteristic of the lower ranks.
If we summarise fertility tendencies, the NMS countries are quite similar. 
Postponement of first births is characteristic of them all, which implies total 
fertility rates around 1.3. This is indicative of the fact that societal transfor-
mation - institutional/structural changes - might play a pivotal role in fertil-
ity processes. These countries started from a nearly identical institutional/
structural position (the late Socialist period), set themselves identical goals 
(catching up with Western European societies) and tried to find their bear-
ings in the same circumstances (increasing globalisation). All of this helps 
explain the similarities. However, it would be premature to assume that 
people in these countries will behave identically in the future with regard to 
these issues (cf. Coleman, 2004). We must not forget that:
we are currently in the phase of the (second) demographic transi-a. 
tion, i.e. a phase that has not yet come to a close;
low total fertility rates are the result of transitional behaviour, be-b. 
cause people do not want children now: they cannot be seen as an 
indicator of a new and stable fertility behaviour;
Spotlights on Contemporary Family Life - Chapter 3: Demographic Change and the Family in Europe 
146
although all these countries became integrated in the globalised c. 
market economy, their family-related institutions show considerable 
differences: so far, we cannot say with any certainty towards which 
Western welfare system they are moving;
we must not underestimate the impact of cultural values and tradi-d. 
tions that persist despite growing European unification.
4. Summary
Our short summary of family changes in the new member countries shows 
that they are characterised by both homogeneity and lack of homogeneity. 
Whilst similarities are more likely to be found in fertility behaviour, there ap-
pear to be more differences regarding partnership behaviour. 
Whereas Western countries have taken quite divergent paths, with cur-
rently contrasting fertility behaviour (e.g. the differences between Scandina-
vian and Southern countries), the NMS countries surveyed appear to follow 
close if not identical transformative paths (Frejka/Sobotka, 2008). However, 
we cannot rule out the possibility that this pronounced uniformity is only 
due to the fact that these countries have not yet decided which new pat-
terns to choose, and that concurrence is found only in the “decision not to 
have children“. In Western Europe, the relationships between fertility, mar-
riage and partnership behaviour have changed: unlike previously, the inter-
relation between total fertility rates and total first marriage rates has turned 
negative (Billari, 2005; Sobotka/Toulemon, 2008). By contrast, the countries 
surveyed by us also have low marriage popularity levels, but the proportion 
of children born out of wedlock varies from country to country. The differ-
ences result from different partnership behaviour (form of first partnership, 
duration of partnership, divorce risk). 
It is obvious that these issues require additional research. The NMSs 
are not drifting unequivocally towards a Western European family pattern. 
Hence our assumptions are closer to those researchers who suggest there 
are several different patterns, rather than a single uniform European pattern 
(Billari/Wilson, 2001; Mayer, 2001; Reher, 1998). We cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that these countries, are “designing“ a specific family pattern which 
is new (in European terms). However, there are three statements that we 
can make with certainty. First, the change of political regime was followed 
by profound changes in familial circumstances. While social change is an 
integral part of modern societies, as invariably stressed by Zapf in his works 
(Zapf, 1996), these familial changes have been faster and more intensive 
than they would have been under normal conditions. Secondly, we can 
claim with certainty that this change has not come to a close, at least so far. 
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Thirdly, we can be sure that in spite of having adopted many West European 
institutions, the NMSs have increased European family diversity.
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3.4 Childbearing in a Gender-Equal Society
Interview with Livia Sz. Oláh
Interviewed by Veronika Herche 
Demographic Research Institute, Hungary
 Europe has experienced a strong increase in female labour force 
participation in the past decades, even in the main childrearing ages. 
How far are changes in female labour force participation related to 
recent fertility developments in Europe?
Women’s engagement in paid work has increased substantially across Europe, 
as seen in Figures 1 - 4. Currently, about 80 per cent of women in the main chil-
drearing ages participate in the labour market in Northern and Western Euro-
pean countries, around 70 per cent in Central-Eastern Europe and over 60 per 
cent in Southern Europe. In family research it has been argued that such high 
levels of female employment have become possible due to small family sizes, 
in that having relatively few children makes it possible for women to engage 
in other activities beside childrearing and housework, such as paid work. 
As the ideal of individualism has spread across modern societies, aspira-
tions of self-realisation beyond the home sphere have become more and 
more common among women as well. At the same time, the development 
of contraceptive technology has provided couples and women as individu-
als with highly efficient means of birth control (especially the pill). A con-
tested question is then whether women limit the number of children they 
choose to have in order to participate in the labour force, and whether and/
or to what extent the policy context matters for such decisions.
Figures 1-4: Female labour force participation rates at ages 25-49 years in 
selected European countries, 1983-2008
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Source: Eurostat [Employment and unemployment database (LFS)].
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 Economic theories have stated that low fertility is triggered by 
women’s increased economic independence (see Becker, 1991). What 
is the so called “positive turn” described by Castles (2003)?
Given the decline in birth rates and marriage rates, and a nearly simul-
taneous growth of female labour force participation in the developed 
world, women’s increasing economic independence has been seen as a 
main cause of low fertility in economic theorising. Indeed, in the 1960s 
and 1970s, countries with modest levels of female employment showed 
high fertility rates, while societies with high levels of female labour mar-
ket participation displayed low fertility. By the late 1980s however, the 
relationship between women’s paid work and fertility changed. Since 
then, countries with high female employment rates have been the ones 
with fertility relatively close to the replacement level, while societ-
ies with women’s more modest engagement in paid work have exhib-
ited low fertility rates, often below the critical level of 1.5 children per 
woman. This is the so-called ‘positive turn’, underpinned by the decline 
in men’s hourly wages and labour-force activity in the light of growing 
labour-market uncertainties and young people’s difficulties in finding a 
stable job. Hence, women’s employment has become almost necessary 
for couples starting a family. 
 Could you explain why, in some countries, like Sweden, fertility 
declined only moderately even though women engaged in paid work 
(70.2 per cent in 2009), while fertility rates below the critical level have 
been seen in other societies, like in Hungary, along with relatively low 
levels of female employment rate (49.9 per cent in 2009)?
The gender equity theory (McDonald, 2000) in combination with risk aver-
sion theory (Beck, 1999) provides us with insights into the rationale for this 
development. As pointed out by both theories, women and men in modern 
societies enjoy, for the most part, equal access to education at all levels and 
work for pay as individuals, irrespective of gender. The relatively high level 
of gender equity attained in these individual-oriented social institutions 
has not been matched in families in which women continue to perform the 
lion’s share of household and childcare work. This in turn constrains their 
opportunities in other spheres, including the labour market, even if they 
are the main earner in the family, which is a less unlikely event in times of 
high unemployment and growing economic uncertainty. Having only one 
or two children, or maybe none at all, has thus become a strategy followed 
by women who wish to keep their options open, and/or to ensure a reason-
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able living standard for their families and for themselves in any case. Also, 
they can rely on modern, efficient contraceptives. Thus in societies where 
a large proportion of women see no other way than severely limiting their 
family sizes, fertility has fallen below the critical level. 
 In contrast to the mid-twentieth century, labour-force participation 
remains important for women even after they enter into a partnership 
or marriage and have children. How could you explain this change?
High youth unemployment rates over an extended period in a number of Eu-
ropean countries, combined with high economic aspirations and a reluctance 
to accept, if only temporarily, a lower living standard than in one’s parental 
home, and the growing instability of couple relationships have strengthened 
the sense of being able to support oneself, irrespective of gender, among 
young people. Moreover, women are increasingly aware of the gender-un-
equal outcomes of partnership dissolution, which often leave women, much 
more so than men, to cope with economic hardship, especially if they have 
children. Hence young people, especially young women in modern societies, 
seek to minimise the risk of economic insecurity first and foremost by invest-
ing in their human capital, both in terms of educational attainment and em-
ployment experience. Irreversible decisions such as childbearing are carefully 
considered with respect to the timing and number of children one will have. 
The realisation of these plans is greatly influenced by the institutional context 
being perceived as supportive to - or a constraint on - the combination of 
parenthood and gainful employment. In the latter case, fertility can be locked 
below the critical level indefinitely. 
 The decline of fertility rates in Europe has been accompanied by a 
rising mean age of first time mothers. From an economic point of view, 
first parenthood at higher ages has many advantages for women. 
What are the risks of the postponement of first birth?
The deferment of first birth is a high-risk strategy from the demograph-
ic and medical points of view. Fecundity declines with age, raising the 
need for assisted reproduction, which is costly and is associated with 
health risks for both the mother and the child (Gustafsson, 2001). It is 
also likely to lead to increasing levels of childlessness in a society, given 
both the biological thresholds and the socially accepted age limit for 
becoming a mother, but also the fact that people get accustomed to 
a childless lifestyle and may be increasingly unwilling to give up other 
priorities for the sake of parenthood. Rising childlessness levels increase 
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the dependency burden over cohorts unless they are counterbalanced 
by larger family sizes among families with children, which is unlikely to 
occur in modern Europe. As smaller and smaller generations will have to 
support much larger parental generations, the need to reduce pensions 
as well as the quality and availability of public health care and elderly 
care will arise, making fertility a highly relevant issue for the future of 
the welfare state.
 High levels of voluntary childlessness are a relatively new social 
phenomenon in Europe. In terms of the women who end up 
involuntarily childless, what are kinds of numbers are we talking 
about in Europe?
It is of course difficult to be certain about how many of the childless 
in a country have never become parents by choice or due to medical 
reasons. In addition, involuntary childlessness may be seen by the indi-
vidual herself to also include lack of (institutional or policy) support to 
reconcile parenthood and paid work, leading to the decision never to 
have a child. 
On average, 3-6 per cent of a cohort is likely to have no children due 
to (reproductive) health problems. The proportion childless among 
younger cohorts is, however, much higher than that in most European 
countries. Among women born in the mid-1960s, nearly one-third in 
(West) Germany, one-fifth in Austria, Italy, the UK and (somewhat sur-
prisingly) Finland, ended their reproductive years without ever having a 
child (Figure 5), while less than 13 per cent remained childless in France 
and in most Scandinavian countries, where achieving work-life balance 
is less of a problem than elsewhere. Central-Eastern European countries 
also displayed low levels of childlessness, given their pattern of early 
childbearing before the mid-1990s, which applied to those born up until 
the early to mid-1960s but has changed since then. Thus, a substantial 
increase in childlessness among women born after 1970 can also be ex-
pected in these societies, due to the difficulties of combining paid work 
and parenthood in the new market economies.
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Figure 5: Proportion childless for female birth cohorts in 19 European 
countries
 
Source: OECD Family database; Sardon/Robertson (2004).
 Since childlessness is not the main cause of declining fertility rates, 
it requires a separate explanation. Is there any evidence of factors 
that might explain the differences across countries by the proportion 
of women and men who end their reproductive years without ever 
having a child?
 
Little is known about the level of childlessness among men. Based on data 
from countries where such information is available (e.g. Scandinavian soci-
eties), we may assume that the level of childlessness is even higher among 
men than among women. With respect to ideal family size, the latest Euro-
barometer data addressing this topic (2006) showed that the share of wom-
en who prefer to have no children at all is rather small (slightly above 10 
per cent, with the highest level seen in Austria). The discrepancy between 
preferred and realised number of children seems to be related to difficulties 
in reconciling employment and childrearing responsibilities (OECD, 2007). 
Indeed, combining information from Figure 5 with that on benefit and ser-
vice provision to families in OECD countries, we find that childlessness is 
lowest in countries where high-quality public childcare is provided, with 
generous opening hours facilitating parents’ labour market participation, to 
substantial proportions of children below age three, namely most Nordic 
countries and France1. But policy support is not the only factor that matters. 
Workplace cultures, in which long working hours and frequent overtime 
1 As already mentioned, we need to disregard the former socialist states due to their early childbearing 
patterns until quite recently, suppressing childlessness levels for the cohorts displayed.
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hours are necessary conditions of career advancement - quite common in 
German- speaking countries and the UK especially - also appear to severely 
constrain women (and most probably men) in realising their childbearing 
aspirations.
 Gender equality is often mentioned as a driver for slowing population 
growth. Fertility rates typically decrease as women acquire more 
control over decisions that affect their lives. What do demographic 
findings show? Does gender equality matter for fertility?
The example of Sweden and other Nordic countries, where the principle of 
gender equality has influenced family policies (and public policies in gener-
al) for decades, and where fertility rates have never declined below the criti-
cal level despite high female employment rates, shows that gender equality 
does not suppress fertility, rather it can contribute to keeping it relatively 
close to the replacement level. 
Indeed, empirical research has shown that the propensity to have a sec-
ond or even successive children is higher in couples where the partners en-
gage more equally in both earning and caring tasks than for other couples 
not only in Scandinavia, but also in Australia, New Zealand, USA, Spain, Italy 
and Hungary2. Hence, facilitating the combination of paid work and family 
responsibilities for both women and men can contribute to increase and/or 
keep fertility above the critical level. 
 It is controversially discussed whether governments should push 
for more gender equality in order to raise fertility. Family advocates 
plead for more focus on family policies and less on gender-equality 
policies. What are your main thoughts on the gender equality fertility 
proposals?
Family policies and gender equality policies are not necessarily two sepa-
rate entities, but can be closely interwoven and constructed to mutually 
support each other, as in Sweden. In fact, Swedish family policy does not 
aim to encourage childbearing, or to keep fertility at a certain level. It is the 
stated goal of Swedish gender equality policy to enable women and men to 
combine paid work with parenthood. 
The main principle of social security is that every adult is responsible 
for his or her maintenance through own earnings unless incapable of 
paid work. In-line with this, labour force participation is encouraged, in-
2   See Goldsheider et al. (2010) for an overview of studies.
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dependently of gender and marital status, by individual taxation and lack 
of spousal alimony at divorce. Yet the level of child poverty in Sweden is 
amongst the lowest, and the level of maternal employment is amongst 
the highest seen in OECD countries. At the same time policy measures 
such as the income-related parental leave program and subsidised, high-
quality public childcare facilitate the reconciliation of paid work and fam-
ily tasks for both women and men, and men are actively encouraged to 
take part in childrearing and household duties. Besides specific features 
in the parental leave scheme, its flexibility and the high benefit level (cur-
rently covering 80 per cent, but before 1995 90 per cent of the previous 
income for the parent on leave), fathers’ engagement in their children has 
also been strengthened by couples retaining joint custody for children af-
ter divorce or separation (since the early 1980s). 
Such support for women’s and men’s equal engagement in paid work 
and family responsibilities has resulted in a feeling of security in their roles 
as earners and carers, which has contributed to Sweden exhibiting both 
high fertility rates and high employment rates among both women and 
men. Hence, this seems to be a successful strategy, worthy of consideration 
also by other countries.
 Sweden was the first country in the world to convert maternity leave 
into a gender-neutral parental leave, in 1974. How has the take-up 
rate among fathers developed? What are the most important lessons 
the Swedish experience can teach other countries that experience low 
fertility levels?
Indeed, Sweden was the first country in the world acknowledging fathers 
as caring parents on a par with mothers, in 1974. Fathers’ role as care-
providers has been further strengthened over time. Since 1980, fathers 
have been entitled to ten days’ additional leave around a birth (so-called 
“daddy days”), paid at the same level as parental leave. In 1995, this was 
supplemented by a father’s quota, which was introduced in the parental 
leave scheme and one month was reserved for the father (and another 
month for the mother), not transferable to the other parent. The quota 
was extended to two months in 2002, when the length of income-related 
parental leave was also increased by another month (to 13 months, plus 
3 months covered with a low flat-rate benefit). Since June 2008, the pro-
gram has also included a gender equality bonus to promote a more equal 
share of parental leave among mothers and fathers. As a result of this con-
sequent policy development, fathers in Sweden increasingly engage in 
active parenting (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Uptake of parental leave among fathers in Sweden, 1986-2009
 
Source: National Social Insurance Board (Sweden).
Fathers’ share amongst parental leave users has risen substantially since the 
mid-1980s, from about 25 to 45 per cent. The father’s quota intensified the 
increase, even with respect to fathers’ share of parental leave days, which 
increased from 10 to over 20 per cent over the last ten years. This also has a 
positive effect on fertility. Research in Sweden and Norway has shown that 
the propensity to have a second and third child is higher if the father took 
some parental leave with the previous child than in families where he used 
no parental leave at all (Oláh, 2003; Duvander et al., 2010). This suggests that 
parents’ more equal engagement in the care of their children is likely to con-
tribute to the positive development of fertility in a country. 
 Recently, more and more demographic studies are focusing on the 
role of social policies and institutions in shaping fertility. In the article 
entitled “Birthstrikes? Agency and capabilities in the reconciliation of 
employment and family” (Hobson/Oláh, 2006) you pointed out the 
disjuncture between norms/values and practices and between policies 
and women’s’ capabilities of exercising them. What was the purpose of 
using the concept of birthstriking?
In this article we sought to create a bridge across demographic and welfare 
state research, considering individual-level fertility behaviour in various in-
stitutional contexts. By using the concept of birthstriking, inspired by Ama-
rtya Sen’s ideas on agency and capabilities shaping individuals’ real freedom 
to choose, we studied the impact of different educational levels on women 
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being able to combine employment with childbearing in four policy con-
figuration models. Linking the individual level, i.e. women’s resources and 
aspirations, with societal and institutional levels, based on data from the 
1990s - a decade with fertility rates at unprecedentedly low levels in cer-
tain countries of Europe inspiring the concept of “lowest low fertility”, when 
ideologies and policies for male breadwinning were also on the wane - we 
aimed to illuminate which individuals and families are unable to achieve 
what is increasingly considered a norm, i.e. combining paid work and par-
enthood, and are therefore delaying and/or not having children. 
 Could you tell us more about the results?
Our results suggest that institutional settings seem to matter for child-
bearing decisions: societies with weak reconciliation policies and weak 
protection for workers are also societies where family formation is greatly 
constrained. Southern European countries, where unemployment rates, es-
pecially among women, have been very high and policy support for women 
to reconcile paid work and family responsibilities has been quite limited, are 
clear examples. Also societies with dramatic changes in the ability to achieve 
work-life (or work-family) balance and increasing economic uncertainties, 
as in Central-Eastern Europe, provide fertile ground for birthstriking.
 According to the studies and research you carried out, could you 
identify some priorities for future research, which appear promising 
and could help us to better understand the mechanisms in the 
interplay between gender relations, the institutional context and 
individual/couple decision-making on childbearing?
Indeed, a better understanding of the mechanisms in the interplay between 
gender relations, the institutional context and individual/couple decision-
making on childbearing is of high policy relevance, as demographic sustain-
ability is one of the key challenges Europe is facing. As the issues to be ad-
dressed are rather complex, research needs to be based on a comprehensive 
approach linking the individual, workplace, societal, and institutional levels. 
An example of such an approach is the agency and capabilities approach, 
focusing on individuals’ real freedom to choose. It offers a framework for 
addressing how diverse institutional contexts (including family policies, la-
bour market structures and workplace culture) influence gendered capa-
bilities and family formation, both intentions and their realisation, through 
facilitating the combination of labour force participation and childrearing 
for women and men, and by mitigating the costs of children for families. 
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In addition, we need to have better insight into the ways gender attitudes 
influence family career choices during the two stages of gender role change, 
i.e. female employment rates approaching those of men in the first phase, 
and male participation in home responsibilities becoming substantial in the 
second stage. This may require us to develop separate measures of public 
sphere gender equality and private sphere gender equality, to be taken into 
account in future large- scale surveys. 
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 3.5  “To be or not to be and how to fill empty cradles?  
That is the question” 
Zsuzsanna Kormosné-Debreceni 
National Association of Large Families, Hungary
Hungary is one of the European countries that has been most affected by 
the demographic winter. This is due to the seemingly unstoppable decrease 
in birth rates, which started in the 1960s, and due to negative population 
growth since 1981. It is clear that all actors in society must co-operate not 
only to help slow this process but also to turn the corner and move towards 
a growth trajectory. The alternative is the wrecking of our systems of social 
security, education, and health care.
Hamlet’s question is more pertinent than ever: the long lines of empty 
cradles throughout Europe and Hungary make us think of the possible an-
swers to this eternal question and seek suitable responses. 
As a representative of a family NGO, I do not seek to repeat research data 
and to reproduce the reasoning of academic experts. Instead I intend to 
show how we see this issue and how civil organisations can act. In addition, 
studies analysing the role, the possibilities, the experiences and the results 
of NGOs in supporting families should be interesting and useful to readers.
To be or not to be… untroubled? Can we ignore the fact that the Hungar-
ian fertility rate is about 1.3, and most of European countries share the same 
or a similarly low rate? 
Demographic experts say that about 80 per cent of Hungarian young 
people declare marriage, family and children as their main source of hap-
piness and that they express a wish to have a number of children which 
would allow for some growth in the population. In reality, however, young 
people do not marry, or do so only very late. They have children later and 
later, and as a consequence have only one child or a maximum of two – a 
figure which is too low to maintain the size of population and thus society. 
The causes of this gap between desires (considered by some researchers 
only as formal responses to the supposed moral expectations of society) 
and reality have to be investigated more deeply. Several pieces of research 
by the Demographic Research Institute of the Hungarian Central Statisti-
cal Office and of the Institute of Behavioural Sciences of the Semmelweis 
University have studied possible causes, which have ranged from family 
values, traditions and models, to mental and spiritual obstacles, and from 
social and family policies and career and employment issues, to questions 
relating to the educational level of couples. A main causal factor identified 
by both European and Hungarian researchers is the tension between work 
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career and private (family) life. In this article I will touch on some aspects of 
this element in the long list of causes. 
Not only researchers, but the everyday experiences of families with chil-
dren show that work-family tension is a real difficulty to be resolved. The 
problem is even harder in the case of families with several children, because 
employers avoid hiring these parents on the assumption that they will not 
be sufficiently reliable, because of problems caused by their large families. 
This is why the National Association of Large Families (NALF) in Hungary 
began to work in the field of reconciling work and family in 1999 and to co-
operate with governments, participating in European and domestic forums, 
supporting the family-friendly workplace movement, talking to experts and 
promoting the issue in every possible way. 
What have been the main areas of activity of NALF in this field during the 
past ten years? From 1999, as a member of different consultative bodies, we 
have been constantly repeating the fact that the problem of inequality in 
the labour market is much deeper in the case of parents (mainly mothers) 
with children than that of men and women in a general sense. We were part 
of the team defining the criteria of the ‘Family-friendly Workplace Prize’1 and 
of the expert group working on the adaptation of a related audit system2. 
Every year, we also award a special prize to an employer whose treatment of 
employees fits most closely with our values – for example by giving bonuses 
or provided support to employees with large families. After some years of 
regression of the movement due to a lack of a real political will, the new 
government seems to have the intention of reviving the movement and 
encouraging and motivating employers in different ways (e.g. by reducing 
their tax burden when employing parents part-time, through job-sharing, 
or by giving them preference in tenders, renewing contracts, etc.).
The year 2004, when Hungary became a full member of the EU, was very 
interesting. In March, the European Parliament accepted a Resolution named 
Work, the family and private life (P5_TA(2004)0152)3 based on a petition signed 
by 63 family NGOs from 14 countries (among them our association). The Reso-
lution pointed out that “family policy should create conditions which enable par-
ents to spend more time with their children and that in many cases a more equal 
division of parents’ time between paid work and caring for their children would 
lead to better contact between parents and children and also have a positive effect 
on family formation and family stability and considers that a general reduction of 
daily working time is the best way of combining work and family life” (point 3). 
 
1 “Családbarát Munkahely Díj” (http://palyazatok.org/csaladbarat-munkahely-2010-dij/).
2 Both the Movement and the Audit were taken over from Germany. For further information (in Hungar-
ian) see http://www.fiona.org.hu/downloads/ferfibeszed_zarotanulmany.doc.
3 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P5-TA-20040152&language=EN. 
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At the end of the same year a peer review of the work-family issue was or-
ganised in Berlin, and a delegate of NALF was invited to the meeting as an 
independent national expert. At this meeting, Germany presented its new 
initiative: the Local Alliances for Family (Lokale Bündnisse für Familie) as a 
new way of creating work-life balance and improving the wellbeing of fami-
lies with children and, as a result, encouraging couples to have children and 
thus increase the fertility rate. This initiative met the aims and strivings of 
NALF and therefore we began to work on implementing this in Hungary. We 
have organised international conferences, published a booklet presenting 
the model and highlighting some Hungarian examples of family-friendly 
municipalities. In 2005 we launched the Family-friendly Municipality Prize and 
since then we have seen a slow but steady expansion of family-friendly mea-
sures in local government. In Germany the number of Local Alliances exceeds 
600. In Hungary we are still at the beginning, with fewer than 10 officially cre-
ated Alliances, but we do have 23 winners of the Family-friendly Municipality 
Prize. We are convinced that - besides a firm political will and different state 
measures and support pushing forward the issue of work-life balance - act-
ing locally and involving all possible local actors is one of the most important 
tools for creating the basis of a better work-family balance, better family life, 
and thus for encouraging young couples to give birth to children. 
One of the key points of the Local Alliances for Families is the co-oper-
ation of local employers, companies and entrepreneurs. We need to make 
them understand that being family-friendly is not a loss for them, but that 
they may even profit from employing parents who are usually loyal and 
grateful employees. In addition, co-operating with other local actors gives 
a very positive image to businesses – and this is also a good position to be 
in. They should be aware of the new skills which mothers acquire during the 
childcare period. Mothers’ ability to divide listening, to keep to a budget, to 
work in a team, to discuss issues in such a way as to get to a win-win posi-
tion, to communicate with persons of very different ages, educational levels 
and background, to negotiate with institutions and authorities, to organise 
events, etc., are skills which can also be useful in their work. The absence of 
employers and companies as stakeholders at the Lisbon FAMILYPLATFORM 
conference (despite some representatives being invited) and the lack of 
studies focussing on the employers’ perspective give us the feeling of in-
completeness. Without knowing their success or difficulties and their views 
related to the employment of parents we cannot find suitable solutions for 
balancing labour and family duties.
A report of the American Sloan Work-family Policy Network (Integrating 
Work and Family Life – a Holistic Approach, published in 2001) says that “…
jobs are still designed as if workers have no family responsibilities. The culture 
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and organization of paid work, domestic care work, and community organi-
zations remain predicated on the breadwinner-homemaker model. Thus, jobs, 
schools, medical services, and many other aspects of contemporary life operate 
on the assumption that someone (a wife) is available during the typical work-
day to care for children after school, during the summer, or on snow days, to 
take family members to the doctor or the dog to the vet, or to have the refrig-
erator fixed. And increasingly, the sisters, mothers, grandmothers, friends, and 
neighbors that working women (married or single mothers) relied on in the past, 
are themselves now in the labour force and, in the case of relatives, frequently 
live in another city. The new global economy, with its focus on 24/7 availability 
and long work hours, only worsens the problems generated by the lag in the 
organization of paid work, as if workers where without personal interests or do-
mestic care concerns” (p1-2). As a solution, the Report calls different actors to 
action (just as the model of Local Alliances does) saying: “Employers, unions, 
professional associations and advocacy groups, government, and communities 
all have roles to play in integrating work and family life, but none of them can 
solve this problem acting alone” (p2). 
To be or not to be… a working mother leaving small children in insti-
tutions or in the care of persons who are not family members? There is a 
constant debate about the effects that a mother’s early return to work has 
on her children. Experts’ convictions are contradictory: some of them claim 
to prove that institutional care is far from being acceptable in the case of 
children under the age of 3 or even 6 years, while others encourage young 
mothers and fathers to return to the labour market as soon as possible, and 
urge governments to provide childcare institutions to help parents to go to 
work. In the case of children under the age of 3, the Barcelona target is for 
33 per cent to be placed in crèches and other childcare institutions . If it is 
true that institutional care is detrimental for children of this age, how can 
one insist on placing one-third of our small children in childcare institutions 
instead of giving them the possibility of staying at home with their mothers 
or fathers (disregarding here cases where there is an absolute need to go 
to work early, such as during financial difficulties or unexpected job oppor-
tunities) One can argue that crèches are not the same as institutional care 
for orphans or abandoned children, or for those taken out of their families 
for child protection purposes, and the evenings and weekends are enough 
for filling the “emotional tank” of children and assuring the affection and at-
tachment necessary for the healthy development of the child. But we need 
to ask: why do we have so many children with behavioural, mental and 
learning difficulties? The number of children “with special needs” seems to 
be growing, and education professionals and teachers think hard about the 
causes and the ways of helping these children overcome their difficulties. 
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The other aspect of the issue is the frustration and stress affecting mothers 
due to the double burden, the permanent pricks of their conscience, inten-
sified by comments of people outside the family saying they neglect their 
children, and the fear of the child becoming ill, and they then losing their 
jobs. Do mothers and children really need these burdens? Is it really worth 
it for society to force women to return to work too early? Is it not better 
for all of us to give a choice to the mothers (and fathers) and give children 
a chance to grow up in an emotionally and physically secure environment 
with their own parents (and siblings), and avoid the negative consequences 
and the stress of being uprooted day after day from their home, delivered 
like packages to strangers and unfamiliar circumstances in a place which is 
foreign to them? 
The situation is even more complicated in the case of mothers of several 
children. The management of such families often requires double full-time 
work at home, so the ability to balance outside work and family is rather 
restricted (despite their creativity and good organising skills). It is impor-
tant to find out how parents of large families organise their family lives, and 
how care systems meet their special needs. At the Lisbon FAMILYPLATFORM 
conference it was revealed that a majority of researchers and studies do not 
consider this type of family, and there are only very few analyses examining 
the real values in these families, their positive effects on children and par-
ents and on society, and their special difficulties and needs. As a large fam-
ily organisation we call the attention of researchers and decision-makers to 
this group of families. In Hungary the proportion of large families is about 
14 per cent of households with children, but 28 per cent of all children live 
in these families. The physical and mental wellbeing of a major part of the 
future generation should not be neglected. 
The World Movement of Mothers (MMM) report “Realities of Mothers in 
Europe” (based also on the opinion of 580 Hungarian mothers) states: “The 
economic dimension of family life, while essential, may not be as influential on 
the life of the child as closeness or connection that the child feels to the par-
ents”  (p14). In the same report we find diagrams showing that 25 per cent of 
mothers prefer to take full-time care of their family and another 64 per cent 
prefer some combination of part-time work and family-care duties (p23, Fig. 
3.2). Eighty per cent of them wish to take care of children under the age 
of three at home. In large families the need to care for children at home is 
even stronger. NGOs like NALF or MMM have an obligation to amplify such 
voices and to make politicians and decision-makers change their thinking 
and consider that 32 per cent of the mothers’ messages to politicians men-
tion the work-life balance as their main concern, but not necessarily in the 
way politicians speak about it. Mothers (and fathers) would like to make the 
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choice themselves, without any outside pressure. NALF intends to dissemi-
nate the results of the MMM study during the Hungarian Presidency of the 
EU in the first half of 2011. 
In the draft of the EU initiative “Roadmap for Reconciliation between 
Work, Family and Private Life”, planned for adoption in 2012, it is pointed out 
that “Civil society organisations (social NGOs, family organisations) have also 
been consulted generally on the reconciliation package, but a more targeted 
consultation of such stakeholders (other than social partners) will be part of 
the studies”. We hope this consultation will not only be conducted, but also 
that the opinion of family NGOs based on the experiences and needs of the 
families and their background will be considered and used to build relevant 
European and national policy responses. 
I began my train of thought with the famous but depressing words of 
Hamlet, Prince of Denmark. At the end of this article let me cite from the 
last passage of a famous Hungarian dramatic poem, the Tragedy of Man by 
Imre Madách. The main characters are Adam, Eve, Lucifer, and the Lord. After 
Lucifer shows Adam over the history of mankind in a dream, Adam seems to 
lose all hope, fights with the Lord and wants to die. But suddenly Eve whis-
pers something to him:
“I know
How happy you will be, so hear,
I’ll whisper low, oh come, come near
I carry your baby, Adam dear.”
And this is the point at which Adam’s thinking changes. From this point on 
he won’t struggle with the Lord or listen to Lucifer who tries to destroy him. 
He finds his peace, the future of mankind is in this little new life. The last 
words of the poem are spoken by the Lord: 
“Man, I have spoken: strive on, trust, have faith!
That is also the answer to our question…”
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Chapter 4: Volunteering in Families
Editorial
Anne-Claire de Liedekerke, Joan Stevens and Julie de Bergeyck
MMM Europe (Mouvement Mondial des Mères – Europe)
This final chapter of the Spotlights on Contemporary Family Life is dedicated 
to volunteering and family. Not only has the European Commission an-
nounced 2011 as being the European Year of Volunteering, but the United 
Nations has also marked 2011 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the “In-
ternational Year of Volunteers” in order to find new areas where volunteer-
ing can make a difference. 
As representatives of mothers across Europe and the world, Mouvement 
Mondial des Mères (MMM) has operated since 1948 thanks to unpaid vol-
unteers, like thousands of other non-governmental organisations in Europe 
and across the globe. From a recent survey1 of mothers launched by MMM 
across Europe, more than half (or 56 per cent) of the 11,000 respondents 
reported that they volunteer (mainly for non-profit associations, schools 
and faith-based institutions). Surprisingly, the age of the mothers is not the 
major differentiating factor – instead, it is the number of children they have. 
Indeed, the more children they have, the more they tend to volunteer: 39 
per cent of the responding mothers with one child volunteer, 48 per cent 
of mothers with two children, 59 per cent of mothers with three children, 
72 per cent of mothers with four children, 77 per cent of mothers with five 
children. Can we deny how mothers (and fathers) play an important role for 
their children in modelling the example of helping and volunteering? In a 
talk given in April 2007, an MMM affiliate in Lebanon recalled how mothers 
living in refugee centres during the recent armed conflict there dealt with 
everyday power conflicts to maintain peace and security: “Mothers model the 
example of service in the family…Just after the cease-fire, my daughter came 
with me to the South. Following that event, my daughter said in a TV interview: 
‘When I was very small, I observed that even if we lacked nearly everything, we 
always had enough to share with the neighbours’”.
The objective of this chapter is not only to pay tribute to the nearly 100 
million Europeans who volunteer their time and talent to a cause and to 
families who instil values of volunteering in their children, but also to give 
voice to six contributors (from different professional backgrounds and dif-
1 The European Survey of Mothers (Mouvement Mondial des Mères, 2011).  
See http://www.mmmeurope.org/en/results-european-survey-mothers.
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ferent countries) who have accepted the invitation to write an article on this 
important topic. These authors walk us through different definitions and 
concepts of volunteering, and shed light on the national differences and 
public policies (or lack thereof ) in the European Union Member States. Two 
articles are dedicated to explaining the origins, aims, programmes, activities 
and future of the 2011 European Year of Volunteering from two different 
perspectives, the European Commission and Civil Society. Christiane Dienel 
explains how demographic change impacts on volunteer work, and Fran-
cesco Belletii and Lorenza Rebuzzini focus on how families educate to take 
voluntary action in Italy. Finally, we have the pleasure of including an article 
on volunteering in the US by Barb Quaintance.
All these articles demonstrate that families are a main source of volun-
tary help and assistance, and how volunteering has an impact on the lives 
of families in Europe. These articles also illuminate the need to strengthen 
institutional frameworks that support volunteerism, and highlight essential 
research gaps and questions.
To close with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s message on Dec 5, 
2010: “Let us honour volunteering as an expression of our common humanity 
and a way to promote mutual respect, solidarity and reciprocity. It is a power-
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4.1 Volunteering in the European Union: An Overview of 
National Differences in the EU Member States 
Birgit Sittermann 
Observatory for Sociopolitical Developments in Europe  
(Institute for Social Work and Social Education, Frankfurt)
The coach of the boys’ football team in the local sports club, the women visit-
ing patients in the hospital, or the pensioner who explains the history of a city’s 
church to visitors – all have something in common: they are volunteers. We find 
them everywhere: in London and Lisbon, in Athens and Amsterdam. The Euro-
pean Year of Volunteering for the Promotion of Active Citizenship 2011 brings 
these volunteers into the limelight. According to a recent Eurobarometer sur-
vey, 30 per cent of all Europeans declare that they volunteer in an organisation 
or are participating actively in an organisation (European Commission, 2010: 
171). A closer look at the data classified by country reveals great differences: 
in the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark more than 50 per cent declare that 
they are engaged in volunteer activities; in contrast, less than 20 per cent of the 
Portuguese and the Bulgarians identified themselves as volunteers. 
But national differences go beyond ‘raw numbers’ of volunteers: in the 
European Union, different traditions and different definitions of volunteer-
ing can be identified. As a result we find different approaches in national 
policies on volunteering. Furthermore, this article highlights the relation-
ship between volunteering and families. But before taking a closer look at 
these aspects, we have to clarify what we mean by “volunteering”. 
1. Different definitions and understandings of volunteering
This question is easier to ask than to answer. Apart from the English word 
‘volunteering’, other languages use different terms for voluntary activities 
with different connotations. The Germans speak of ehrenamtliches Engage-
ment: this describes for instance volunteering as the chairperson of the local 
sports club or being a member of the city council. Another common Ger-
man term is bürgerschaftliches Engagement (civic engagement) which high-
lights the idea of volunteers as active citizens but refers at the same time to 
all kinds of voluntary activities. In French, two different terms are known: 
bénévolat and volontariat. In France, volontariat refers to voluntary services; 
bénévolat describes individual voluntary activities for the benefit of the so-
ciety (and not for family and friends) (GHK, 2010: 52). In Belgium, both terms 
are synonymous, but the 2005 law on volunteering uses only the word vo-
lontariat (GHK, 2010: 51).
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Besides the use of the different terms with their special connotations, one 
must consider the different kinds of activities that can be subsumed under 
‘volunteering’: is donating money volunteering? What about watering the 
plants of your holidaying neighbour or shopping for your grandmother? 
Does being a member of an association qualify you as a volunteer? Does 
volunteering only take place in the framework of an organisation or project 
(i.e. formal voluntary activities) or do spontaneous or unorganised voluntary 
activities (i.e. informal or non-formal voluntary activities) count as well? 
Neither academics nor practitioners have one clear-cut answer: a variety 
of definitions exist, suited to different (national) contexts and purposes. The 
Study on Volunteering in the European Union (GHK, 2010: 49ff.) provides a good 
overview of the different definitions used by international organisations and 
in the different European Member States1. A current definition of volunteer-
ing can be found in the Decision of the European Council Decision on the 
European Year of Voluntary Activities Promoting Active Citizenship 20112:
“(…) the term ‘voluntary activities’ refers to all types of voluntary 
activity, whether formal, non-formal or informal which are un-
dertaken of a person’s own free will, choice and motivation, and 
is without concern for financial gain. They benefit the individual 
volunteer, communities and society as a whole”3.
To agree on one concrete definition might not be necessary for every discus-
sion, as the term ‘voluntary activities’ can refer to a broad range of activities. 
National differences have to be taken into account, however, especially in 
an international or European context. In Germany and France for example, 
informal volunteering is not included in the general understanding of vol-
unteering. In contrast, in Austria informal volunteering, for example neigh-
bourly help, is perceived as volunteering. The Swiss additionally include 
monetary and non-monetary donations in their concept of voluntary activi-
ties (Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth 
(2009)). The term volunteering in the Netherlands also refers to political 
participation and caring for young children and (elderly) relatives (Vogelwi-
esche/Sporket, 2008: 11). 
1 Funded by the European Commission, this study provides a good overview of the situation of volun-
teering in the European Union. It consists of country reports for every EU member state, a comparative 
summary of all results, and special reports on volunteering in the field of sport in the European Union. 
The study is available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/news/news1015_en.htm.
 2 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:017:0043:0049:EN:PDF.
 3 The decision does not make clear why both non-formal or informal voluntary activities are mentioned 
or what the difference is between these two terms. It is more common to use non-formal and informal 
voluntary activities as synonyms.
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Special circumstances have to be considered for the post-communist EU 
Member States in Central and Eastern Europe. New voluntary associations 
had to be founded after democratisation. The citizens of these countries 
had to develop a new attitude towards volunteering because during Com-
munist rule membership in youth organisations or participation in political 
festivities or demonstrations was mandatory rather than really voluntary 
(Zimmer/Priller, 2004; GHK, 2010: 48).
2. How many volunteers are there and what do they do?
The Study on Volunteering in the EU (GHK, 2010) pooled national studies on 
volunteering to analyse how many people volunteer in the EU. However, due 
to different methods and definitions of volunteering applied in the national 
surveys it is not possible to arrive at a precise number. The authors of the study 
concluded that 92 to 94 million adults in the EU are volunteers. That means that 
22-23 per cent of all EU citizens aged over 15 are involved in voluntary work4. 
According to the Study on Volunteering in the EU, countries with a very 
high level of volunteering are Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. 
In contrast, less than 10 per cent of adults volunteer in Bulgaria, Greece and 
Lithuania (GHK, 2010: 5ff.)5. In order to assess these different levels of vol-
unteering it should be taken into account that in some countries, such as 
Greece, it is more common to dedicate one’s free time to helping families 
or friends rather than to be a formal volunteer within an organisation. But 
most surveys on volunteering focus on formal volunteering in the frame-
work of an organisation or a project (Angermann/ Sittermann, 2010: 10).
The most common fields European volunteers are engaged in are “sport/
recreation/leisure”, “culture and arts”, “education and research”, “social activi-
ties/social services”, and “health”. Again there are national differences, for 
example in Lithuania over half of the voluntary organisations (55 per cent) 
are active in the social service and healthcare sector. In Bulgaria, Ireland, 
Spain and Portugal, social services also account for the majority of volun-
teers. Sport is the sector with most volunteers in Belgium, Germany, Finland, 
France, the Netherlands and Latvia (GHK, 2010: 280ff.). What do volunteers 
do? The study identified six main fields of activity: “administrative and sup-
porting tasks”, “helping or working directly with people”, “preparing and 
supporting voluntary activities”, “managerial and coordination tasks”, “cam-
paigning and lobbying” and “organisation of events” (GHK 2010: 89).
 4  The discrepancy in relation to the Eurobarometer survey mentioned above can possibly be explained 
by the fact that the Eurobarometer study question asks about both volunteering and participation in 
an organisation. It would be desirable to conduct a comprehensive study on volunteering in the EU to 
finally have exact data on the level of volunteering in the EU.
 5 For a full overview of the situation in all EU countries, see GHK (2010: 60ff).
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3. Volunteering by and for families
The activities of many volunteers revolve around families and children. Re-
search on volunteering has rarely paid special attention to families who 
benefit from the voluntary work of others but at the same time are active 
as volunteers themselves. A German report published in 2009 looked more 
closely at volunteering by and for families. The authors analysed different 
studies and data available for the situation in Germany (Wissenschaftszen-
trum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 2009). 
According to their data, 40 per cent of all volunteer work is dedicated to 
families or children and young people. Most volunteers working with chil-
dren and families are active in the sports sector. Here, every other volunteer 
from the sports sector declared that he or she is engaged in working with 
families and young people. Other sectors in Germany characterised by vol-
unteers working for families are “church/religion” (33.4 per cent of all volun-
teers in this field), “recreation and leisure” (29 per cent, e.g. accompanying 
children and youth travel tours) and “culture and music” (20.8 per cent, e.g. 
conducting a youth choir) (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 
2009: 100).
Besides benefiting from formal volunteering within organisation, fami-
lies also benefit from informal volunteering. The extent of this support has 
not yet been quantified, according to the authors of the study. However, 
unpaid support by family members, neighbours and friends is a relevant 
resource for families, especially in terms of child-minding. Data from 2005 
suggests that 13 per cent of working mothers and fathers rely on relatives, 
friends, and neighbours to mind their children. The results of the German 
Volunteer Survey (2005) demonstrate the extent of family networks: 78 per 
cent of all households with children aged up to seven can count on the sup-
port of relatives, 52 per cent on the support of friends, and 34 per cent on 
the support of neighbours. (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 
2009: 110).
Naturally, families contribute to these informal networks as well. But 
besides this informal engagement, they are also volunteers in more formal 
settings. In fact, figures from Germany show that the level of volunteering 
among adults living with children is significantly higher than the average 
level of volunteering, though this does not apply to single parents (Wis-
senschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 2009: 102). The voluntary ac-
tivities of these parents are to a high degree linked to their own children: 
three-quarters of all volunteering women state that their volunteering is 
directly connected to their own children (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung, 2009: 103). Their activities revolve around child care facili-
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ties, their children’s schools or leisure time activities, such as sports clubs. 
Parents volunteer as members of the parents’ council, or they organise fes-
tivities or contribute their handcraft skills (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung, 2009: 118). In Germany, more women than men volunteer 
in the fields relevant for families and children (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
für Sozialforschung, 2009: 144).
As volunteers, parents can become role models for their children. Though 
not yet well researched, the few existing sources on this suggest that chil-
dren imitate their parents’ attitude towards volunteering and eventually 
become volunteers themselves (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforsc-
hung, 2009: 102).
4. Public policies on volunteering
Different national traditions are reflected in the way public policies on vol-
unteering have developed. Volunteering is an established, though not al-
ways prominent field of policy in many countries. Spain and Belgium have, 
for example, laws that define volunteering; France, Sweden and England, on 
the other hand, intentionally have no special legal framework for volunteer-
ing. Responsibility for volunteering lies not just at the national level but at 
sub-national level as well, in Germany, Belgium and Spain, where all autono-
mous regions have their own laws on volunteering. In the United Kingdom, 
the governments of Wales and Scotland are in charge of volunteering, but 
there is no policy for the whole of the UK (Angermann/Sittermann, 2010; 
GHK, 2010: 10). In England, the responsibility for volunteering lies with the 
Office for Civil Society (part of the British Cabinet Office). England is an in-
teresting example for public policy on volunteering, as the change of gov-
ernment in 2010 led to a change in the policy on volunteering. Whereas 
the former Labour government focused on the promotion of volunteering 
by engaging with existing large voluntary organisations, the new coali-
tion government emphasises the promotion of grassroots movements at 
local level. Their stated aim is to enable communities to initiate their own 
volunteer groups and projects. Another new programme in England is the 
National Citizen Service, which will start in summer 2011. This will be a (non-
mandatory) voluntary service for 16-year-olds, who will use their summer 
holidays to develop a social project in their local community and put it into 
practice (Sittermann, 2011).
Some countries in the European Union have developed special strate-
gies for their policies on volunteering. In Germany for instance, the govern-
ment adopted a national strategy on volunteering in October 2010, which is 
the basis for the further development of the national policy on volunteering 
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(Angermann/Sittermann, 2010: 2). In Spain, the Fourth State Plan on Vol-
unteering was to be implemented in 2010. The Spanish state’s plans bring 
together different actors such as policy makers, representatives of voluntary 
organisations and experts on volunteering who work for the further promo-
tion of volunteering (Sittermann, 2011).
The aim of public policies on volunteering is in general the promotion 
and facilitation of volunteering. One issue for volunteering policy is to make 
sure that volunteers have health, accident and liability insurance. Despite 
national differences on volunteering, one aspect is of relevance to all coun-
tries: acknowledgment and recognition of volunteers and their work. One 
common means of doing this is issuing volunteers with bonus cards which 
give them certain benefits, such as free access to museums. Additionally, 
several awards have been created to acknowledge voluntary activities. Ex-
amples are the Europe for Citizens Programme Golden Star Awards or the 
British Queen’s Award for Voluntary Service. These awards place volunteers 
in the limelight, but general acknowledgement of voluntary work should 
exist beyond these brief moments and beyond the European Year of Volun-
teering 2011. This cannot be achieved by public policies alone, but requires 
an effort from everyone: when was the last time you thanked a volunteer 
- maybe the volunteer who issues the books in your local library or the vol-
untary firemen and women in your home town?
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4.2 Volunteers in the EU Spotlight:  
The European Year of Volunteering 2011
John MacDonald and Sara Lesina 
European Commission
The year 2011 has been designated the European Year of Volunteering (EYV) 
to highlight the contribution made by volunteers from all walks of life to our 
economy and society. Volunteering has moved into the limelight in recent 
years, and the EYV will be an occasion to celebrate the importance of vol-
unteering in creating a more democratic, caring and responsible society. To 
highlight volunteers’ work and to encourage others to join in and address 
the challenges they face, the 2011 European Year of Volunteering was con-
ceived with four main objectives in mind.
To foster an enabling environment for volunteering in the EU. The Year 1. 
will help bring to light existing legal, administrative or other obstacles 
to volunteering in the Member States. By fostering an exchange of 
good practice between the Member States, the Year will help to imple-
ment appropriate measures to remove the barriers that are identified.
To empower volunteer organisations and improve the quality of vol-2. 
unteering. The European Year will provide input for further policy 
development on volunteering issues within Member States, and 
will initiate a dialogue between the EU Member States and Europe’s 
developing world partners on volunteering issues. The aim is to en-
courage co-operation, exchange and synergies between volunteer 
organisations and other sectors, such as the government and corpo-
rate sectors, at European, national and regional levels.
To reward and recognise volunteering activities. The Year will im-3. 
prove the validation and recognition of skills and competences that 
can be gained through volunteering.
To raise awareness of the value and importance of volunteering. The 4. 
Year will ensure that there is heightened awareness both within Eu-
rope and in partner countries of the value of volunteering and its 
contribution to the economy, society and the individual. 
 
1. Background: volunteering and EU policies, programmes  
and activities
There have been a number of political developments in the area of volunteer-
ing since 1997, when an intergovernmental conference adopted ‘Declaration 
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38 on Volunteering’1. The Declaration, which was attached to the final act of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, recognised the importance of the contribution of 
voluntary activities to developing social solidarity. The Declaration stated that 
a European dimension of voluntary organisations would be encouraged, with 
a particular emphasis on the exchange of information and experiences. 
Following Declaration 38, other EU-level documents emphasised the role 
of volunteering and committed to supporting volunteers across Europe. With 
the ‘Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
July 2001 on mobility within the Community for students, volunteers, and 
teachers’2, the European Parliament intended to give more opportunities for 
studying, training and volunteering across Europe by dealing with barriers to 
mobility. The European Parliament also encouraged Member States to ensure 
that the specific nature of voluntary activity is taken into account in national 
legal and administrative measures, to promote recognition of voluntary ac-
tivities through certificates, and to take measures to ensure that recognised 
voluntary activities are not treated as formal employment.
Over the last few years, the issue of the social and economic value of 
volunteering became a central focus of EU-level documents. In March 2008, 
the European Parliament adopted a report on the ‘Role of volunteering in 
contributing to economic and social cohesion’3 which encouraged Mem-
ber States and regional and local authorities to recognise the value of vol-
unteering in promoting social and economic cohesion. In this document the 
European Parliament called on Member States to produce regular satellite ac-
counts4 as a complement to their usual National Accounts so that the value of 
Volunteering and Not-for-Profit Institutions (NPIs) could be measured.
In July 2008 the European Parliament adopted a written Declaration calling for 
a European Year of Volunteering in 20115. The proposal for a Council Decision on the 
European Year (2011) was subsequently adopted on 3 June 20096, with the for-
mal legislative base for the Year adopted by the Council on 27 November 20097. 
Launching the European Year, the European Commission intended to raise aware-
ness of volunteer engagement in Europe and to enhance volunteer activities. 
1 Declaration 38 on voluntary service activities, http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html.
2   Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 July 2001 on mobility within the 
Community for students, persons undergoing training, volunteers, teachers and trainers (2001/613/EC).
3  European Parliament resolution of 22 April 2008 on the role of volunteering in contributing to eco-
nomic and social cohesion (2007/2149(INI))  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//
EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2008-0070+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
4   Satellite accounts provide a framework linked to the central accounts and which enable attention to 
be focussed on a certain field or aspect of economic and social life in the context of national accounts; 
common examples are satellite accounts for the environment, or tourism, or unpaid household work.
5   Written Declaration 0030/2008 of 15 July 2008.
6   Brussels, 3.6.2009 COM(2009) 254 final 2009/0072 (CNS) Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the Euro-
pean Year of Volunteering (2011) {SEC(2009)725}http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/doc828_en.pdf.
7  Council Decision 2010/37/EC on the European Year of Voluntary Activities Promoting Active Citizenship 
(2011). See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:017:0043:0049:EN:PDF. 
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2. Doing better by doing good: the added value of volunteering
Almost 100 million Europeans engage in voluntary activities and through 
them make a difference to our society. Volunteering plays an important role in 
sectors as varied and diverse as education, youth, culture, sport, environment, 
health, social care, consumer protection, humanitarian aid, development poli-
cy, research, equal opportunities and external relations. Volunteering matters 
because volunteers translate fundamental European values on promoting so-
cial cohesion, solidarity, and active participation into action every day.
Volunteering contributes to building a European identity that is rooted 
in these values. Volunteers gain mutual understanding of people; it is indis-
pensable in a wide range of EU policy areas, such as social inclusion, life-
long learning opportunities for all, policies affecting young people, inter-
generational dialogue, active ageing, integration of migrants, intercultural 
dialogue, civil protection, humanitarian aid, sustainable development and 
environmental protection, human rights, social service delivery, increasing 
employability, the promotion of an active European citizenship, fighting the 
“digital gap”, and as an expression of corporate social responsibility. 
Volunteering is economically important too: the voluntary sector is esti-
mated to contribute up to 5 per cent of GDP to some Member States’ econo-
mies. So, the European Year of Volunteering should be a celebration of the 
valuable contribution that these millions of citizens make every day to our 
economy and society. Volunteering is freely given, but it is not cost free – it 
needs and deserves targeted support from all stakeholders: volunteering 
organisations, government at all levels, businesses, and an enabling policy 
environment and volunteering infrastructure.
3. The volunteering landscape in Europe8 
The European volunteering landscape is extremely varied because of differ-
ent historical, political and cultural attitudes towards volunteering in each 
country. The figures below give a more precise idea of the situation of vol-
unteering in the EU. 
The total number of EU volunteers is estimated to be around 94 million 
adults, which corresponds to 23 per cent of all Europeans over 15 years of 
age. The statistics do suggest that there are big differences in the level of 
volunteering between the EU’s member countries. Whilst certain EU Mem-
ber States have longstanding traditions of volunteering and well developed 
voluntary sectors (such as Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK), in others the 
8  Source: European Commission-DG EAC, 2010. Volunteering in the European Union. Final report. London: GHK.
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voluntary sector is still emerging or poorly developed (for instance in Bulgaria, 
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania). National studies on volunteering 
show that the level of volunteering is: very high in Austria, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK, with over 40 per cent of adults in these countries in-
volved in carrying out voluntary activities; high in Denmark, Finland, Germany 
and Luxembourg where 30-39 per cent of adults are involved in volunteering; 
medium-high in Estonia, France and Latvia, where 20-29 per cent of adults 
are engaged in voluntary activities; relatively low in Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia and 
Spain, where 10-19 per cent of adults carry out voluntary activities; and low 
in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Lithuania, where the statistics suggest that less 
than 10 per cent of adults are involved in voluntary activities.
However, any such apparent differences need to be treated with caution, 
because there is a lack of internationally comparable data on volunteering. 
Each country has a different definition of volunteering, and different ways 
to measure it, so it is extremely difficult to make international comparisons. 
That said, over the past ten years, there has been a perceptible increase in 
the number of active volunteers and voluntary organisations in the EU. 
Survey data from the EU-wide Eurobarometer survey (see Figure 1 below) 
carried out in 2006 suggests that the percentage of citizens who declare that 
they actively participate in - or do voluntary work for - an organisation var-
ied from 60 per cent in Austria (the highest level of participation) to 10 per 
cent in Bulgaria (the lowest) in 2006. Overall, it would appear that the coun-
tries with highest percentages of volunteers are western European countries 
(and Slovenia) with well developed and established voluntary sectors. 
Figure 1: Extent of active participation or voluntary work in the EU (%), 
2006, according to the Eurobarometer survey (European Social Reality) 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_273_en.pdf and GHK Consulting on the 
basis of Eurobarometer survey data (2009).
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Moreover, in many countries a gender dimension is more apparent in specific 
sectors (e.g. sport, health, social and rescue services) and voluntary roles 
(e.g. managerial and operational roles) than in overall participation rates in 
volunteering. In general, most countries tend to have either more male than 
female volunteers (eleven countries) or an equal level of engagement (nine 
countries); this slight dominance of male volunteers overall can be explained 
by the fact the sports sector attracts the highest number of volunteers, and 
more men than women tend to volunteer in sport. For example, in Denmark 
there are important statistical variations between the participation of men 
and women in different areas of the voluntary sector. Men are considerably 
more involved in sports clubs and local community activities compared to 
women. At the same time women are significantly more involved in health 
and social service-related work than men. 
Voluntary activities take place in many different sectors. According to the 
2010 Eurobarometer survey, in over half of the EU countries most volunteers 
are active in the field of sports, exercise and outdoor activities (34%). Volun-
teers in sport represent an important share of total volunteers in Denmark 
(31.5%), France (25%) and Malta (84%). Other popular areas are social wel-
fare and health (8%), charity and religious organisations (17%), cultural or-
ganisations, recreation and leisure, educational organisations, training and 
research (22%). 
As for the landscape of voluntary organisations, there have been big 
increases in the number of voluntary organisations over the past decade: 
some countries have seen a two- or even fourfold increase in the number 
of registered voluntary organisations in the last decade, with individual an-
nual increases reaching 15 per cent in some cases. These include countries 
where organised volunteering is an established tradition (like France and 
Germany), as well as countries where formal volunteering is a more recent 
phenomenon (such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Romania). However, it is im-
portant to remember that the level of detail on the number and sector of 
voluntary organisations depends on whether the country has a registry of 
voluntary organisations and whether such organisations are either encour-
aged or obliged to register. Even in countries which have such registries, it 
is difficult to provide accurate data on the number of active voluntary or-
ganisations, because in many cases the registries include both active and 
inactive organisations.
4. What goes wrong: obstacles and challenges in volunteering
Volunteering mirrors the diversity of European society: young and old, 
women and men, employees and unemployed, different ethnic groups and 
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beliefs – all are involved in volunteering. However, seven in ten people do 
not volunteer, and in many cases this is because of real or perceived barri-
ers to volunteering. These barriers take many different forms, such as a lack 
of information on how to become involved, time pressure, scarce econom-
ic resources, and the feeling of not being able to “afford” to volunteer. In 
some of the former communist countries, there is even a negative image 
of volunteering stemming from times when volunteering was compulso-
rily imposed. The challenges for volunteering vary from country to country 
depending on the national context. However, a number of common chal-
lenges across Europe can be highlighted. 
There is a lack of homogeneous data on - and monitoring of - voluntary 
activities in EU Member States. As mentioned earlier, internationally compa-
rable information and data relating to volunteering is rare and often unstruc-
tured and non-standardised, even at a national level. This clearly represents 
a major challenge in terms of accurately understanding volunteering within 
countries, in particular the impact of governmental support on volunteering 
in different European countries. This happens because of the absence of inter-
nationally comparable statistics and agreed methods of measurement, which 
could result in an unfair distribution of EU funds if different organisations in 
different countries measure voluntary contributions in different ways.
It is rare for there to be a national volunteering strategy: in total only five 
Member States have national strategies in place for volunteering – Austria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Spain. In countries that do not have a national 
strategy, the policy aims and objectives for volunteering are implicit within 
a wide range of broad policy discourses.
In many countries, there is a lack of a dedicated legal framework for volun-
teering to cover the rights and obligations of volunteers, such as the social 
insurance coverage of volunteers, and their training, entitlement to holidays, 
accommodation or ‘pocket money’. Due to the many laws and regulations 
that non-profit organisations may have to follow, many NGOs are not aware 
of certain advantageous provisions. A clearer legal framework would clarify 
the position of paid and voluntary staff in voluntary organisations. 
Moreover, there is an increase in the professionalisation of the volunteer-
ing sector, which is causing a growing mismatch between the needs of vol-
unteering organisations and the aspirations of volunteers. Younger volun-
teers, for example, are less willing to commit to longer-term volunteering 
periods, even though this is increasingly requested by many volunteering 
organisations. The increasingly professional nature of personnel employed 
in the not-for-profit sector is also a challenge that voluntary organisations 
have to address: volunteers find themselves working side-by-side with new-
ly employed paid professionals, recruited on the basis of specific skills. 
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Coupled with this is the problem of a lack of recognition of skills and com-
petences gained through volunteering activities. Several European re-
ports, such as the European Volunteer Centre’s Manifesto for Volunteering 
in Europe9 , have highlighted the lack of national systems promoting rec-
ognition in volunteering. Not enough research on the value of volunteer-
ing has been collected, and there is therefore insufficient recognition of its 
importance and insufficient ‘evidence’ on which to base or defend policy. 
In addition, there is little pan-European use of validation mechanisms for 
the skills and competences acquired through volunteering. Such mecha-
nisms as do exist tend to be specific to one organisation (e.g. Red Cross) 
or programme (e.g. the European Voluntary Service), but there are increas-
ing calls for more general validation or recognition mechanisms (such as a 
‘volunteer skills passport’).
Sustainable funding is an increasingly pressing problem for volunteering 
organisations: there has been a big increase in volunteering organisations 
in recent years, and there is more competition amongst them for a shrink-
ing pot of funds. The current austerity measures adopted by many govern-
ments have led to significant cutbacks in funding for volunteering NGOs. In 
addition, over the last few years there has also been a change in the way the 
public sector disburses public funds – away from grants and subsidies, and 
towards contracts awarded through public calls for tenders and a competi-
tive bidding process. NGOs report greater difficulties in accessing funding 
through the latter channel.
5. “Volunteer – Make a difference!” – Touring Europe with 
a clear message: the EU would not be the same without 
volunteers
In dedicating the European Year 2011 to volunteering, the European Union 
is acknowledging the importance of volunteering in creating a more demo-
cratic, caring and responsible society. The European Year will raise aware-
ness of the contributions of, and the challenges faced by millions of volun-
teers across the EU, whose efforts help to create a more democratic, caring 
and responsible society. 
A good way to bring the European Year closer to the general public is through 
the interactive EYV 2011 ‘Tour’. The Tour will travel throughout 2011 to visit every 
Member State’s capital city for a period of up to 14 days. It will provide volunteers 
and volunteering organisations with an opportunity to showcase their achieve-
ments, meet one another and discuss key issues for the future of volunteers.
9  See http://www.cev.be/64-cev_manifesto_for_volunteering_in_europe-en.html.
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Citizens and volunteers will also be able to find out about aspects of volun-
teering in other Member States and learn about the European dimension of 
volunteering. The Tour will provide a platform for understanding the world 
of volunteering and also add visibility to communication initiatives taken 
at the national, regional and local levels, attracting the media and public 
attention to the campaign. 
The European Tour of Volunteering 2011 will feature an ‘EU Corner’, 
highlighting the European dimensions of volunteering, stories showcas-
ing the experiences of volunteers, debates with policy makers, volun-
teers and citizens, meetings with volunteers, entertainment with family 
activities and intergenerational dialogue. The route started on 3 De-
cember 2010 in Brussels and will travel though all 27 EU Member States 
during 2011.
The EYV Relay
The EYV Tour will be accompanied by the EYV ‘Relay’. The EYV Relay team is 
composed of 27 volunteer reporters, whose task is to report on the extraor-
dinary stories of volunteers across the EU. The Relay Reporters, each coming 
from a different EU country, will depart from their home country to report 
for two weeks on the volunteers in another EU country. They will capture 
their experiences in film, sound and written articles. 
The EYV EU-level thematic conferences
In order to push forward policy debate on volunteering issues at the EU 
level, the European Commission will organise a series of EU-level thematic 
conferences during 2011. Four conferences have been planned, each of 
them focusing on a different theme and target group, such as policy mak-
ers, volunteering organisations and the volunteers themselves. The con-
ferences will promote a rich exchange and debate on important issues 
in volunteering between policy makers, businesses and volunteers, while 
attracting media interest. The first conference took place in Budapest on 8 
January 2011, with the topic “Recognising the contribution of volunteering 
to economy, society and the individual – where are we now, and where do we 
want to go?”.
Information about the Tour, the Relay and the EYV campaign in general 
will be provided on the official EYV 2011 website: http://www.europa.eu/
volunteering. Materials about every step of the campaign will be uploaded. 
It will contain various sections giving information about the campaign and 
regular updates of its progress in the course of the year.
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6. The year after: what will the legacy of EYV be?
The European Year of Volunteering 2011 is meant to help volunteering or-
ganisations and the volunteers themselves. The European Year will provide 
a much-needed impulse to set in motion the necessary changes, mainly at 
national level, that will make it easier for volunteering organisations and 
volunteers to do their work, and to do it better than ever before. Through 
a number of flagship initiatives, concrete measures will be taken to ensure 
people are better skilled and better prepared to face the challenges of the 
new economy. Therefore, the European Year of is not a ‘one-off’ year: it is the 
start of a process that will go well beyond 2011. 
During the Year, and in the years thereafter, awareness will be raised 
about where change needs to occur, and these changes will be different 
in each country. The Year is a platform for broadening and deepening both 
the outreach and the quality of volunteering. The European Commission is 
working to ensure that volunteers all over Europe have been enabled - and 
continue to be so - to meet and learn what is done best in each European 
country. The awareness campaign of the EYV 2011 will help civil society and 
governments face these challenges, and start the work for necessary, ben-
eficial change. Countries will examine where it may be necessary to revise 
laws or enact separate legislation in order to promote volunteering, protect 
volunteers and remove superfluous legal impediments. 
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4.3 Demographic Change and Its Impact on Voluntary Work 
Christiane Dienel 
Nexus Institute for Cooperation Management and Interdisciplinary Research
Demographic change is often discussed and presented as though it threat-
ens social cohesion and the stability of the welfare state. How will the pres-
ent level of welfare be maintained, when fewer children are born to be future 
contributors to welfare security systems and when longevity gives more years 
to nearly everybody? Under such circumstances, volunteer activity seems to 
offer an escape. Why couldn’t all these active and healthy senior citizens help 
care for older members of society, often struggling with dementia? Couldn’t 
civil society thrive, not in spite of, but because of demographic change?
The following article will give some background to this assumption and 
is mostly based on German data and a study done for the German Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung (Dienel, 2010)1. 
European societies are ageing quickly. We will be “fewer, older and more colour-
ful”, but there is no consensus on whether this change will lead to a better society 
or to more problems. No doubt, dealing with demographic change is an enormous 
task, because it means providing service for the large number of “baby-boomers” 
born in the 1950s and 1960s who will retire from 2015 onwards. The base of contrib-
utors paying their pensions is narrowing. These processes, however, are developing 
rather slowly and leave us time to adapt. Regions in former socialist countries will 
face dramatic changes, though, because the significant fall in the birth rate there 
since 1989. But already the constant ageing of society diminishes the potential 
for volunteering, because the generation aged over 60 is less willing or able to 
participate than the younger members of the population. The graph shows the 
willingness for voluntary work (mid-grey) and the rate of actual engagement 
(dark grey) for the age groups 14-24, 25-59 and 60+ years in Germany.
1. Young people and volunteer activity
The participation of young people in voluntary activity seems essential 
in an ageing society. It is considered useful and instructive, it prevents 
violence and xenophobia, and helps to develop social skills. This kind of 
utilitarian argument is not very suitable for convincing young people to 
invest their time if they don’t have fun while doing so. For young people, 
the key to motivation is not usefulness but the possibility of being in-
dependent, of developing their own ways of doing things, and of hav-
1 See http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/kug/07290.pdf.
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ing an impact on society. Self-determination of young people will not fit 
very easily into schemes made for them by those concerned about the 
future of the welfare state. Young people’s civil engagement is often ir-
ritating and shocking, and seems destructive or disrespectful. It will not 
just fill the gaps left by the welfare state. More than two-thirds of Ger-
man youth agree with the statement “I believe that politicians don’t take 
young people seriously” and this feeling will be reinforced if they are 
only offered pseudo-participation arenas like youth parliaments without 
a budget.
Figure 1: Willingness to undertake voluntary work in diff erent age 
groups, Germany
Still, many young people are very active in diff erent forms of voluntary activ-
ity or civil associations. Sport is number one, followed by church and social 
activities. However, fewer young people are able to participate in time-con-
suming activities that require their presence once a week or more. Educa-
tional demands and preparation for professional careers often exert enor-
mous stress, and simply don’t leave enough spare time to invest in regular 
volunteer activity. Voluntary engagement is strongly correlated with level of 
education. But those young people who are successful in secondary educa-
tion and who might be the group most interested in volunteering are also 
those who share the performance goals of their teachers and parents and 
will sacrifi ce other activities, if necessary, to achieve better grades.
In conclusion, it is no longer sufficient to develop attractive forms 
of volunteering for the participation of young people today. It is also 
indispensable to balance these offers with school schedules, work mar-
ket pressure and biographical stresses. Demographic change not only 
means that there will be fewer children and young people to participate 
Source: Gensicke/Picot/Geiss (2005: 213).
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in voluntary activities, but also that those who are there have to face 
aspirations of parents and society and have less spare time than their 
mothers and fathers had. A solution would be to integrate voluntary ac-
tivities into the school syllabus, to give certificates for certain types of 
engagement and, above all, to leave some free time and space to the 
younger generation.
2. The middle generation and voluntary work
People aged 30-59 carry not only the largest part of responsibil-
ity in politics and business, but are also the most active age group in 
terms of voluntary activity. Demographic change will have an im-
pact here. First because the status of “full” adulthood is achieved sig-
nificantly later than in former times. Young people often stay with 
their parents well into their twenties, or at least remain financially 
dependent on them. Subsequently, stable partnership, marriage and 
starting a family will occur later in their biography than before. Up to the 
age of 30 or 35, people remain in a sort of intermediate phase of their 
lives, a prolonged youth.
Volunteer activity, though, needs reliable and long-term commit-
ment. Most often, people will only be able to make such a commitment 
when they have established themselves professionally and started a fam-
ily. Therefore, the growth of so-called “atypical” employment (short-time 
employment, part-time employment, internships, freelance work) direct-
ly reduces the potential for voluntary work, because it hinders long-term 
relations, both in family and in civil society. This leads to the hypothesis 
that project- or subject-related short-term forms of civil engagement may 
become more popular than traditional long-term commitments.
Secondly, demographic change means that more and more people, if 
they ever become parents, will do so later in their lives. This reduces the 
potential for volunteer activity in our society. It has often been shown in 
empirical research that the birth of children triggers community activities 
and is perhaps the strongest stimulus for volunteer work. With the birth of 
a child, the feeling of personal responsibility for the future of society grows, 
and also the will to shape this future. Figure 2 demonstrates that childless 
people are clearly less active as volunteers than people who have responsi-
bility for a family. [Translation: couples with pre-school and school age chil-
dren up to 14 years of age; couples with school age children up to 14 years of 
age; 3-generation families; couples with children over 15; couples with pre-
school children; couples without children, aged 50 and over; all those inter-
viewed; single persons under 50, couples under 50 without children].
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For women, the combination of professional, family and voluntary work 
forms a considerable challenge and is one of the reasons why they abstain 
from very time-consuming voluntary responsibilities like local politics. Prob-
ably about 20-25 per cent of women and even more men living in Germany 
today will remain childless all their lives. Most of them live in cities.
Figure 2: Percentage of population engaged in volunteer work 
differentiated by living-situation (in Germany)
Source: Bericht zur Lage und zu den Perspektiven des bürgerschaftlichen Engagements, S.100 (2009)
.
Childlessness means that nearly one-third of the adult generation will not au-
tomatically have intergenerational relations and links fostering solidarity with 
young people. This will have different consequences for voluntary work: par-
ticipation in childcare and school contexts is not relevant for these people, but 
they might have more time for voluntary work in the evenings and at weekends 
for trade unions, political parties, and citizens’ associations. Furthermore, civil 
engagement may be an important means of bridging periods of unemploy-
ment, and to gain additional qualifications which may lead to a new job.
To conclude, growth of childlessness and late transition to parenthood do 
not automatically lead to more free time for voluntary work. In all probability, 
these trends will postpone the biographical phase of intense civil involvement 
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to a later stage in life, thus shortening it. Therefore, to foster civil engagement 
for adults, it is also necessary to study the labour market and to provide well-
paid, stable jobs. This stability is necessary for high levels of volunteer work, 
whereas unemployment diminishes participation rates. For women, good 
childcare is also a prerequisite for voluntarism, because otherwise there will 
just be no time and energy left for activity other than job and family.
3. The older generation and voluntary work
The over-sixties are the only age group that is growing at present, and will 
soon make up for over 50 per cent of the population. At the same time, the 
number of healthy and active years of life is increasing. In the near future, a 
large proportion of people aged 60-85 will no longer be involved in profes-
sional activities, but will still be highly productive and powerful. In addition, 
they will have fewer grandchildren to care for. 
Many of those currently aged between 50 and 65 had a new type of par-
ticipation experience around the reform years of 1968; they are better-off 
than the cohorts before and after them. The women among them have had 
the opportunity to emancipate themselves from older role models: they 
have a driving licence, professional qualifications and varied conceptions of 
a woman’s life. Most of all, the new seniors, “digital immigrants” that they are, 
have access to the new network and interaction tools of the internet.
We are currently witnessing the emergence of new cultural models for 
this stage of life. Care for family members, whether the elderly or grand-
children, may still seem dominant in older women’s lives, but the outlines 
of a new picture of old age are already being seen: more leisure-oriented, 
focused on personal wellbeing, friends, travel, culture and sports. But in 
times of demographic change, it is a central task of society to develop a 
third concept, centred on voluntary work in structures outside of family, 
friendship and neighbourhood. Given that the potential for voluntarism in 
the younger and the middle age group is actually decreasing, it will be im-
portant to activate the potential of voluntary engagement in the third gen-
eration. But this will not be an automatic process: the differences between 
rich and poor, well educated and less well educated seniors are increasing. 
Voluntary work cannot be seen as an obligation for the elderly, but must 
remain a free choice alongside other life decisions. The increase in healthy, 
active years does not automatically mean that seniors in large numbers will 
stream towards voluntary work agencies.
What we need is rather a different approach. Work is still the main mech-
anism for integrating people into society. A truly inclusive society cannot 
tolerate people being excluded from this main integration mechanism 
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just because of their age of retirement. There is an urgent need for other 
powerful integration mechanisms. Family can be one of these, but is not 
for everybody. Voluntary work, on the other hand, could be a major way of 
integrating the elderly (and other excluded groups). It creates participation 
and gives meaning to life. But this will only happen if we see volunteer work 
not as a panacea for a shaky welfare state, but as a pillar of social cohesion, 
as important as public activity and private business.
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4.4  Family and Education Towards Voluntary Action 
Francesco Belletii and Lorenza Rebuzzini 
 Forum delle Associazioni Familiari
Does the family educate people to develop a pro-social attitude, on which 
voluntary action is based? In what ways does the family pass on this atti-
tude? What are the factors that thwart this educational dynamic? In 2008 
CISF (Centro Internazionale Studi Famiglia/International Centre of Studies 
on Family) and CSV (Centro Servizi Volontariato/Center for Promoting Vol-
unteering) of Bari, Italy, conducted research on Family and Volunteering, in 
an attempt to shed light on the connection between family and education 
for volunteer activity (in Italian, La famiglia nell’educazione al volontariato/
Family and Education for Voluntary Action).
The research was conducted at local level in the Bari District, in south-
ern Italy. Bari (including the Barletta-Andria-Trani District) is the fifth most 
populated district in Italy, with almost 1,650,000 inhabitants. According 
to a previous analysis conducted by CSV Bari, there are over 600 volun-
tary associations in this district: in most cases they are small associations 
strongly linked to the territory, that is, the municipality, social services or the 
local church. 
One of the most interesting aspects of this research is the local approach. 
The family, as well as the voluntary action itself, seem be to strongly deter-
mined by the social and economic circumstances of the place in which they 
are situated. This holds true especially in Italy – a very complex and differ-
entiated country. Living in a wealthy and well organised context seems to 
lead to different opportunities, as opposed to living in a disaggregated or 
poor territory. The awareness of the importance of the environment clearly 
emerges in the research. The second interesting aspect of this research con-
sists in giving voice to those who are volunteering and/or are constantly in 
touch with families and volunteers: social workers, educators, teachers, mem-
bers of associations and members of the local government and church. Forty-
seven people, aged 30-50, were interviewed or took part in focus groups with 
a semi-structured interview between February and June 2008. This research is 
accordingly focused on and enhances the experience-based approach.
1. Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework in which the research was conducted is based 
on the most recent socio-economic literature on wellbeing. Wellbeing is de-
fined as a condition determined by a complex interrelationship between 
Spotlights on Contemporary Family Life - Chapter 4: Volunteering in Families
192
different factors – to cite the most important ones: wealth, environmental 
sustainability, social cohesion, and individual freedom. In this context, the 
concept of social capital is of strategic importance. While we acknowledge 
the vast debate on the definition of social capital developed in different 
disciplines such as economics, political science and sociology, in research 
a “simple” and “common” definition has been used: social capital. Social 
capital is the social relationships and social networks that are not based on 
economic or political interest, but that have value for the development of 
society and economy, and affect the productivity of individuals and groups 
(Putnam, 2000). Family and volunteering action are environments produc-
ing relationships and networks not based on economic or political inter-
ests: for this reason, they need to be both recognised as “producers of social 
capital” and, therefore, as producers of social wellbeing. How can society 
achieve this?
Family and voluntary action share one fundamental aspect required to 
build social capital: relationships, in the family as well as in the voluntary 
action, are not based on the economic model of negotiation but offer an 
alternative model that can be defined as a ‘trustee model’. While the ne-
gotiation model is based on maximizing benefit and personal profit, and 
interaction between individuals is aimed at coming to an agreement, the 
symbolic codes regulating both family and voluntary actions can be out-
lined as follows:
Gift: •	 the giving of gifts indicates an interest in the recipient of the 
gift, and often demonstrates expectation of feedback. At the same 
time it gives freedom of choice about whether to give feedback or 
not. The freedom to accept or refuse is instilled in both voluntary ac-
tion and in family relationships.
Reciprocity: •	 reciprocal actions or relations and mutual exchanges 
are fundamental social norms and generate innovative human rela-
tions. Reciprocity connects past actions with the present, and the 
present to the future, in its dynamic of receiving and giving back.
Trust:•	  a relationship based on sharing and on satisfied expectations 
embodies its own reasonableness, even though it may not be per-
fectly rational. In other words, trust is a reasonable, but not rational, 
form of behaviour. Nonetheless, economic and social systems are 
based primarily on trust.
In this framework, families’ responsibility to society is not described as a 
moral obligation and as something added to family from the outside, but 
as the natural inner dynamic of family life. Family does pro-social action in 
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just “doing family”, that is the point. This approach does not seek to be non-
judgmental: of course there are families unable to take on this kind of re-
sponsibility towards children and society. Nonetheless this dynamic of fam-
ily life has to be kept in mind when the issue of the relationship between 
family and society, as well as family and voluntary action is approached.
2. Research in the Bari District
Research in the Bari District highlights a multi-faceted situation. The inter-
viewees claim that their family of origin is a place of positive relationships, 
where they have learnt and experienced solidarity, care, help and attention 
to others. They say that they try to build the same positive relationships in 
their current families, but they find it difficult to do so. As a matter of fact, 
the Bari District, as a territory, has many problems: unemployment, low sala-
ries, lack of public services (in 2008, the average income in Italy was 18,870 
Euros, while in the Bari District, it was 14,830 Euros). Therefore, in the re-
search, family is considered at two different levels:
pro-social families, the families that enhance and promote volun- -
teering (subject of volunteering);
vulnerable families, the families that need to be helped (object of  -
volunteering).
3. Difficulties
An in-depth analysis has been conducted on the stress factors thwarting 
the transmission of pro-social behaviours in today’s families in the Bari Dis-
trict – even if it seems that the analysis can be applied to the whole Italian 
territory, as well as to other countries. Interviewees detected three main 
points of vulnerability:
Social isolation.  - Social relations are less frequent and strong, and 
families are left alone. Therefore, the relationship of mutual trust 
between families has faded. Moreover, family members are under 
stress due to the many tasks they have to accomplish: care for chil-
dren, work, care for themselves, care for other people in the family. 
Individualism is permeating not only social relations between fami-
lies, but also relationships within the family.
Hedonistic and materialistic values -  that are at the forefront of 
our society push people into constantly looking to “have more”, in 
competition with each other. People need to work to earn more and 
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more, thus having no time left for others. Media, and especially TV, 
is seen as the big megaphone through which these values are in-
stilled in people.
Adults’ vulnerability.  - Today’s adult generation is seen as being very 
vulnerable, particularly with regard to the ability to build meaningful 
relationships and educate and define rules for children.
4. Attitudes to volunteering: an analysis
Interviewees agree that they have learned their attitude to voluntary action 
in their families of origin, even though debate is open on the ways in which 
this attitude is transmitted. Nonetheless, they underlined some factors that 
help families to be pro-social and to instil attitudes leading to voluntary action:
Stable relationships.  - Interviewees agree that stable relation-
ships are the basis of pro-social action: a stable relationship 
means openness to others’ needs, capacity for dialogue, respect, 
commitment, support (all these terms have been extracted from 
the interviews).
Dialogue and Rules.  - According to interviewees, dialogue is es-
sential “in transmitting rules and values and instilling trust in your 
children, in your relatives, in persons near you. With dialogue, rules 
can be set and values can be transmitted peacefully”, says a woman 
involved in volunteering.
Lifestyles based on different values. -  The pro-social family lives 
and promotes values based on solidarity; these values are promoted 
through an “alternative” lifestyle that rejects consumerism.
Economic security.  - Many interviewees stress that economic secu-
rity, which means a stable job with a decent salary, is necessary. They 
claim that only when people have developed a good level of self-
confidence can they commit to helping others.
Stable policies.  - One of the most interesting outcomes of the re-
search is that it shows the need for stable political support for volun-
teering projects. Often a good project is not undertaken, due to po-
litical choices and the way funds are allocated: this leads, of course, 
to the loss of potentially beneficial outcomes.
5. Conclusions
The research carried out in the Bari District has not produced definite con-
clusions, but opens up new research questions. In other words, we cannot 
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measure “how much” voluntary action a family can generate, but we can 
conclude that it is necessary to work on the interrelation and the synergy 
between family and volunteering. Enforcing the alliance between pro-social 
families and pro-social action can become a realistic approach to social in-
novation in the Third and Fourth Sectors1. Family associations, which have 
a self-help and pro-social approach, are a reality that can be reinforced and 
can help in enhancing pro-social action and in transmitting pro-social val-
ues, but further investigation is needed. This can be achieved if the logic of 
empowerment is applied both to pro-social families and vulnerable fami-
lies: vulnerable families need not be defined by their needs and their lack 
of capabilities, but rather by their capacity to “start over again”. At the same 
time, pro-social families need to be supported: many families still feel alone 
in a society that nowadays seems governed by consumerist and hedonistic 
values, and they feel challenged in their ability to be real drivers of change.
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4.5 Towards the European Policy Agenda on Volunteering: 
Taking Into Account the Needs of Families 
Edited by Gabriella Civico  
European Project Manager EYV 2011 Alliance
The European Year of Volunteering (EYV) 2011 Alliance is an informal, open 
and growing group of 35 European networks active in volunteering. The EYV 
2011 Alliance was formed in December 2007 with the purpose of starting a 
common campaign towards establishing the European Year of Volunteer-
ing in 2011. Three years later at the start of EYV 2011 this accomplishment 
stands as a shining example of what can be achieved when Civil Society 
works together. 
Thanks to the financial support offered by the European Commission in 
the form of a project grant in the Citizenship Programme, and additional 
co-funding offered by Robert Bosch Stiftung, Fundacion Telefonica and 
Alliance Steering Group members, the EYV 2011 Alliance has been able 
to establish a project work programme supported by two full-time staff 
in its secretariat at the European Volunteer Centre (CEV) in Brussels. As a 
critical contact point and driving force for the facilitation of the joint effort 
to lobby for the Year, it was agreed by EYV 2011 Alliance members that 
CEV should be the grant holder for the EYV 2011 Alliance Project and also 
therefore host the Secretariat.
Following the White Paper on Youth, the Member States in 2002 recog-
nised volunteering as a key element of youth policy, and a lot of research, 
exchanges of experiences and discussions have taken place since then. This 
work has shown its impact over the years and should be enlarged to all age 
ranges, since only then can policies which take into account all aspects of all 
generations of families become a real possibility. Whereas various EU activi-
ties, programmes and policies tackle volunteering at a European level, these 
initiatives have so far not taken into account the variety of volunteering in 
Europe and its horizontal nature. Actions in the field of volunteering at the 
EU level are restricted to certain age groups and policy areas, and neglect 
the horizontal nature of volunteering and the relevance of volunteering in 
solving a variety of political, social and economic challenges that the EU 
faces today:
Volunteers are an example of •	 active civic participation. They 
engage in their communities, without financial motivation, for the 
benefit of other individuals and society as a whole. Volunteering, as 
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an expression of Active European Citizenship, was recognised by the 
European institutions in a number of areas, especially through the 
Europe for Citizens’ Programme1. 
Volunteers •	 put into practice European values of solidarity and 
diversity. They are the expression of the EU slogan ‘United in Diver-
sity’ as these are people of all ages, women and men, employed and 
unemployed, people from different ethnic backgrounds and belief 
groups and, finally, citizens of all nationalities. However, those in-
volved do not necessarily make the link between their engagement 
and European values. People become involved because they feel 
that they can make a positive contribution to society and because 
they benefit themselves. It does not occur to them that all over Eu-
rope, people engage in volunteering for the same underlying values 
and motivations. At a time when the EU lacks a link with its citizens 
and wants to create more ownership of the European project based 
on solidarity and mutual understanding, it can no longer afford not 
to contribute to creating the logical link between voluntary engage-
ment at a local level and implementation of European values.
The Resolution of the European Parliament [A6-0070/2008]•	 2 recog-
nises the contribution that volunteering makes to the economic 
and social cohesion of the European Union. The report says that vol-
unteering makes an important contribution to social integration at 
the local level, and that it contributes to partnerships which are key 
for making full use of the European regional and structural funds. 
Volunteers are the •	 main agents when it comes to social inclusion, 
through their engagement with the socially excluded or those at risk 
of social exclusion. Volunteering is a tool for the empowerment of 
all, and especially of those that are socially excluded, because it is a 
means by which citizens can be and feel useful and re-connect with 
society. This is highlighted in the Youth Pact3, the White Paper on 
Youth4, and in the Bureau of European Policy Advisers’ (BEPA) report 
“Investing in Youth: From Childhood to Adulthood”5, but it applies equally 
1  See https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Europe_for_Citizens.
2  See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2008-
0070+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
3  See http://europa.eu/youth/news/index_1794_en.html.
4  See http://ec.europa.eu/youth/glossary/word366_en.htm.
5  See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/publications/docs/Investing_in_Youth_25_April_fin.pdf.
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to all age groups. The World Organization of the Scout Movement6 and 
its national organisations have carried out a number of projects across 
Europe on involving and reaching out to minorities and other disad-
vantaged children (including children with different religious back-
grounds, disabilities, Roma, etc.).
This applies in particular to the •	 integration of migrants into our so-
cieties. Integration - as a two-way process of mutual accommodation 
between migrants and the host society - needs tools and instruments 
that bring people together and which enable them to work on com-
mon projects. The many volunteer initiatives and projects in Europe 
demonstrate the added value that active participation brings in this 
area. They also demonstrate volunteering as a factor in - and indica-
tor of - the integration of migrants in host communities7. Volunteers 
are also involved in programmes for the integration of migrants (la-
bour orientation, training, etc.).
Social services of general interest •	 in Europe depend largely on 
the contribution of volunteers. Actions of voluntary organisations 
implemented in Member States show that volunteers contribute 
significantly to the services provided in the health and social care 
sector through visiting services for socially isolated people and day 
centres for older people, people with Alzheimer’s disease and homes 
for children in need of special care, coaching activities which sup-
port and empower people to take charge of their own lives again 
(for example, so-called friendship courses), organising holidays for 
people with disabilities and/or chronic disease, assistance to drug 
users and prisoners, assistance to people living with HIV/Aids (care, 
hotlines, counselling, information), and assistance to women threat-
ened by domestic and/or gender-related violence.
Volunteering is a means of encouraging •	 active ageing. Volunteers 
not only provide complementary home care for older people (psy-
cho-social support), and organise recreational and sports activities 
for seniors, but older people themselves who become volunteers 
stay healthy and active for longer and have opportunities to share 
their life experience with younger generations. The recent Flash Eu-
robarometer 247 survey conducted in September 20088 shows that 
6 See http://www.scout.org/en/information_events/resource_centre/library/reaching_out.
7 See for example CEV INVOLVE project, http://www.involve-europe.eu (2006).
8 See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_247_sum_en.pdf.
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73 per cent of older respondents indicated that they would con-
sider participating in community and volunteer work after retire-
ment. Forty-four per cent of persons also said that they have already 
planned or plan to get involved in volunteer work. Volunteering of-
fers great potential for the EU when it comes to active ageing and 
demographic change. This issue was first raised during the confer-
ence on Intergenerational Solidarity for Cohesive and Sustainable 
Societies during the Slovenian Presidency (27-29 April 2008)9 as one 
of the main topics, and later as one of the main topics of the 2nd Eu-
ropean Demography Forum held in Brussels in November 200810.
Volunteering plays an important role in •	 maintaining and restoring 
family links. This helps people to find family members they have 
lost because of wars, conflict and disasters, and supports people 
who have a missing family member or friend. Volunteers contribute 
significantly to the enhanced satisfaction of family life and proper 
work-life balance, as they often engage in areas such as childcare 
and care of older generations, which are perceived by many Europe-
ans as the main difficulties in family life (Flash Eurobarometer 247, 
‘Difficulties in daily life faced by families’).
Volunteering contributes to •	 tolerance, peace building, conflict 
resolution and reconciliation of divided societies. The CEV proj-
ect on this topic (V::I::P/200811), as well as many other projects and 
activities of the members of the Alliance, have shown that voluntary 
activities exercised together by the local inhabitants for the benefit 
of their communities increase people’s tolerance and intercultural 
skills, reduce racism and prejudice, contribute to intercultural and 
inter-religious dialogue, empower people to be active in the recov-
ery of their communities and connect them with the societies in 
which they live.
Voluntary activities are part of •	 informal and non-formal learning 
for people of all ages and at all stages of their lives. Volunteering con-
tributes to personal development and to learning skills and compe-
tences, thus enhancing employability. Volunteering is accordingly 
part of the Lisbon strategy towards a more competitive European 
9 See http://www.eu2008.si/en/Meetings_Calendar/Dates/April/0427_EPSCO.html?tkSuche=ajax&globalDa
tum=01.02.&multiDatum=29.05.&veranstaltungsart=&globalPolitikbereich=&visiblePath=/htdocs/fr&.
10 See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=88&langId=en&eventsId=121. 
11 See http://www.cev.be/data/File/VIP_Report_2008.pdf.
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labour market, providing life-long learning opportunities that 
arise when people volunteer. This was confirmed by the Commission 
Communication ‘Making a European Area of Lifelong Learning a Re-
ality12, Resolution of the Council on the recognition of the value of 
non-formal and informal learning within the European youth field 
[2006/C 168/01]13 and a number of the European Youth Forum’s re-
ports and projects, etc. 
The sports sector•	  involves the largest numbers of volunteers and 
participants, and this makes it the largest voluntary, non-governmen-
tal organisation activity in Europe. Volunteers are the most important 
and indispensable resource of sports clubs. According to the European 
Non-Governmental Sports Organisation (ENGSO), the “labour force” of 
sports clubs consists of 86 per cent volunteers and only 14 per cent 
paid staff. The impact of volunteering in sport on EU policies is mani-
fold, and this was recognised in the White Paper on Sport [COM (2007) 
391 final]14 and in the Commission Action Plan “Pierre de Coubertin” 
SEC(2007) 934, Brussels, 11.7.200715 which calls for promoting vol-
unteering and active citizenship through sport, and recognises that 
volunteering reinforces active citizenship and provides many oppor-
tunities for non-formal education which need to be recognised and 
enhanced. Sports NGOs and networks such as ENGSO underline that 
the EU still needs to work on issues such as taxation (maintain a special 
tax regime for not-for-profit sports organisations, create additional 
tax incentives for volunteers, i.e. deductibility of tax from donations), 
education (design European modules to train volunteers), EU funding 
programmes (make programmes more accessible for volunteers), and 
employment (enhanced recognition of voluntary work in sport), etc.
Volunteers are the•	  backbone of Europe’s civil protection force. Red 
Cross and Johanniter International experiences show that volunteers 
are indispensable for disaster response and preparation activities, for 
first aid services, and education, as well as in relief exercises i.e. ambu-
lances, first aid, psycho-social support and emergency responses.
Development policies•	  are practically impossible to implement with-
out the contributions of volunteers. Volunteers engage in humanitarian 
12  See http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/pdf/MitteilungEng.pdf.
13  See http://www.europass-ro.ro/doc/resolution.pdf.
14  See http://ec.europa.eu/sport/white-paper/doc/wp_on_sport_en.pdf.
15  See http://ec.europa.eu/sport/white-paper/doc/sec934_en.pdf. 
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missions and provide assistance to refugees (including humanitarian as-
sistance, reception centres including legal counselling, health services, 
mental health care, etc.). More than 6,000 volunteers engage every year 
with United Nations missions alone. Furthermore, Article 188 of the Lis-
bon Treaty decrees that the EU ‘establish a framework for joint contribu-
tions from young Europeans to the humanitarian aid operations of the 
Union’ in the shape of a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps.
Corporate (employee) volunteering •	 schemes are increasingly 
seen by European companies as a means of connecting to society, 
investing time and resources in their communities and giving con-
crete meaning to their CSR policies. Thousands of individuals across 
Europe are already benefiting from the help and support offered 
by employee volunteers. The European Parliament Resolution of 13 
March 2007 on ‘Corporate social responsibility: a new partnership’ 
(2006/2133(INI)) underlines the importance of projects involving 
employee community engagement and calls on the Commission to 
fulfil its commitment to developing policies that encourage the staff 
of EU institutions to undertake voluntary community engagement. 
In the Communication from the Commission on Implementing the 
Partnership For Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole of Excellence 
on Corporate Social Responsibility COM (2006) 136 final16, the Euro-
pean Commission commits to step up its policy of promoting the 
voluntary and innovative efforts of companies on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). This still seems to be unfulfilled. The business 
platform ENGAGE, in its publication CSR Laboratories: Bringing the 
European Alliance on CSR to Life17, demonstrates the effectiveness 
of employee community engagement in improving the skills essen-
tial for employment amongst disadvantaged and socially excluded 
groups of people within the EU. It urged the European Commission 
to support and encourage employee volunteering by announcing 
the European Year of Volunteering 2011. 
Finally, volunteering is economically important. •	 The research of 
the Institute for Volunteering Research, ‘Volunteering Works - Volun-
teering and social policy’18, shows that for every Euro that organisa-
16 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0136:FIN:en:PDF.
17  See http://www.pr.org.rs/upload/documents/ENGAGE per cent20Skills per cent20for per cent20Employ-
ability per cent20Report.pdf. 
18  See http://www.ivr.org.uk/evidence-bank/evidence-pages/Volunteering+Works+-
Volunteering+and+social+policy.
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tions spend on supporting volunteers, they receive an average re-
turn of between three and eight Euros. Moreover, the Comparative 
Non-Profit Sector project at Johns Hopkins University (USA) revealed 
that the voluntary sector contributes an estimated 2 to 7 per cent 
to the GDP of our national economies. In the UK in 2007 volunteer-
ing contributed 48 billion pounds sterling to the national economy 
(according to the Volunteering England’s figures). We do not have 
the necessary data and instruments in place to properly analyse the 
economic value nor to raise policy-makers’ or funders’ awareness of 
the contribution that volunteers make to our economies.
Since 2007 EYV 2011 Alliance members have been working together to 
lobby for the EYV 2011, working with other stakeholders and policy mak-
ers across the EU. The experience of civil society organisations showed that 
there was a need at all levels - EU, national, regional and local - to increase 
volunteering and the awareness of the added value it brings to European 
society, to celebrate volunteering, involve more volunteers, and to improve 
the policy framework on volunteering including that related to volunteering 
and families. There is no Europe without volunteers: they contribute both to 
its growth, and to its social character. EYV 2011 Alliance members thought 
that EYV 2011 would increase recognition of this and increase the capacity 
of volunteering organisations to deliver their missions. 
The EYV 2011 Alliance Project Work Plan addresses several critical issues, 
especially those which are to be discussed within the policy dialogue to 
take place during the Year. These will draw upon the widespread expertise 
gathered together in the 100 members of the EYV 2011 Alliance Working 
Groups, many of whom are volunteers themselves.
Working groups have been established on six different themes (Quality of 
Volunteering, Legal Framework of Volunteering, Volunteering Infrastructure, 
Recognising Volunteering, the Value of Volunteering & Employee Volunteer-
ing). The groups met for the first time on 7 and 8 January 2011 in Budapest. 
The working group members have been nominated by EYV 2011 Alliance 
member organisations and will meet at least five times during 2011, including 
during the Kick-Off Conference (already held in Budapest) and three further 
Working Group meetings to be held in Brussels in March, May and September 
2011. The EYV 2011 Alliance Working Group closing conference in Poland (De-
cember 2011) will approve the “EYV 2011 Alliance European Policy Agenda on 
Volunteering”, which will then be presented to policy makers at the general EC 
EYV 2011 closing conference, to be held in Poland later in December 2011. 
Working towards the European Policy Agenda on Volunteering the EYV 
2011 Alliance will address:
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Quality
Work towards a common understanding of “quality volunteering”.•	
Clarify the roles and responsibilities of the organisers of volunteer-•	
ing in ensuring quality volunteering experiences.
Identify and disseminate good practice in the field of quality assur-•	
ance and quality assessment tools used by volunteer organisations.
Legal framework
Map research on the legal status of volunteers in Europe.•	
Collect concerns in terms of legal barriers and bottlenecks caused by le-•	
gal provisions at any level that result in limiting volunteering in Europe. 
Advocate recommendations for improvement of the legal status of vol-•	
unteers and a clear legal status for volunteers everywhere in Europe.
Volunteering infrastructure
Extract good practice indicators of an enabling volunteering infra-•	
structure at different levels, feeding into a European framework rec-
ommendation that allows for the national diversity of volunteering 
to be respected. 
Identify key legal features for volunteer organisations, so as to pro-•	
vide an enabling infrastructure.
Recognition
Map the existing tools for recognition of volunteers - extract good •	
practice examples. 
Map tools of how to recognise the contribution of volunteer organisations.•	
Formulate recommendations for better recognition of volunteering •	
in different areas and by different tools. 
Devise a strategy for implementation of the recommendations.•	
Value
Identification of tools and ways to identify, measure and express the •	
value of volunteering. 
Valuing volunteering as an important creator of human and social •	
capital, cohesion and wellbeing, encompassing the provision of ser-
vices and effective interventions where other policies may fail.
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Valuing the contribution of volunteering in positively shaping the •	
European society.
Valuing volunteering as an expression of solidarity, a value which is •	
not only in great need in the current economic and social climate, 
but also one upon which the EU has been built.
Recognising the contributions of volunteers as match-funding in all •	
European and national project funding.
Employee volunteering
Increase understanding of the concept of Employee Volunteering as •	
a key element of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).
Achieve recognition of Employee Volunteering as a means and key •	
component of putting CSR concept into practice.
Contribute to making Employee Volunteering accessible for all, in all •	
sectors (private, public and non-profit). 
All in all, EYV 2011 will contribute to helping the wider public understand 
why volunteering is a critical issue across the EU, and this will include how it 
impacts on families and family life. 
Volunteering is freely given, but is certainly not cost-free, and the EYV 
2011 Alliance members believe that volunteering and volunteering organi-
sations need and deserve targeted support from all stakeholders – volun-
teer organisations, government at all levels and businesses. The EYV 2011 
Alliance Working groups will spend EYV 2011 working towards this vision of 
an enabling volunteering environment including a volunteering infrastruc-
ture that takes the realities and needs of families across the EU into account. 
EYV 2011 Alliance members are committed to engaging with the EYV 2011 
together with key EU stakeholders, especially the European Commission. 
They wish to demonstrate and showcase what good policymaker-civil soci-
ety partnerships can achieve, in particular through presentation of the Eu-
ropean Policy Agenda on Volunteering, which will be delivered before the 
end of 2011. 
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4.6  Volunteering and Service in the United States 
Barb Quaintance 
AARP, USA
The United States has a strong tradition of volunteering and service. Of 
course, families, neighbours and co-workers support one another in times 
of need. An unprecedented number of Americans, however, also work to 
help strangers. And today, both kinds of service are stronger than ever.
Many non-profit organisations engage volunteers in service – often to 
help youth get a good education, assist with economic needs, improve the 
environment, support health and ageing services, and assist with disaster 
preparedness/relief. Some of the larger faith-based domestic charities in-
clude Catholic Charities USA, Lutheran Social Services, and Volunteers of 
America. Some of the larger secular volunteer organisations include Red 
Cross, AARP, Points of Light Institute, HandsOn Network, and United Way.
Even with this strong history, today is a new day for volunteering and 
service in the United States. More people are volunteering, service is now 
seen as a solution to key challenges, and individuals and families are enjoy-
ing clearer benefits – whether as volunteers, as beneficiaries or both. 
Why is service in America on the rise today? National leadership, greater 
opportunity, and a clearer effort to weave service into our schools, work-
places, and national calendar of holidays and anniversaries are critical fac-
tors. Today, volunteer work is seen as a critical strategy to solve some of the 
toughest challenges experienced by individuals and families. Below, we 
take a closer look at each of these factors – and the impact on families who 
serve, as well as families who are served.
1. Presidential leadership
Presidential leadership in recent years has been critical in strengthening vol-
unteerism in America. Fifty years ago, President Kennedy challenged Ameri-
cans to serve with his famous quote, “ask not what your country can do for 
you; ask what you can do for your country”. Kennedy went on to initiate 
The Peace Corps programme. Next, President Johnson created Volunteers in 
Service to America (VISTA) and the National Civilian Community Corps. The 
seeds of organised, widespread volunteerism were planted.
In his 1989 Inaugural Address, President George H.W. Bush described, “a 
thousand points of light, all the community organisations that are spread 
like stars throughout the nation, doing good”. He acted to bring this opti-
mistic vision to fruition in signing the first national service act. His efforts 
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also led to the development of the Points of Light Foundation – which ul-
timately grew into Points of Light Institute, the largest volunteer manage-
ment and civic engagement organisation in the US.
In 1993, President Bill Clinton signed legislation to align national service 
programmes under a new government entity (Corporation for National and 
Community Service) with the addition of a new programme, AmeriCorps 
– which enables individuals to serve one year to help strengthen a commu-
nity. In swearing in the first class of 20,000 AmeriCorps members, Clinton 
said, “Service is a spark to rekindle the spirit of democracy in an age of un-
certainty. When it is all said and done, it comes down to three simple ques-
tions: What is right? What is wrong? And what are we going to do about it? 
Today you are doing what is right – turning your words into deeds”.
Building on the culture of giving and service following September 11, 
2001, President George W. Bush expanded and promoted volunteer service 
by creating USA Freedom Corps, to co-ordinate volunteer efforts and help 
all Americans find opportunities to serve. He also initiated the President’s 
Volunteer Service Award programme to recognise volunteers who contrib-
ute substantial time in service to others.
Upon taking office, President Barack Obama further strengthened the 
nation’s commitment to national, organised service. After calling for legisla-
tion to expand the ability of service to solve challenges in communities, he 
signed the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act, which further expands 
volunteer opportunities and seeks to identify and take to scale volunteer 
programmes with proven results. Obama also called for a “Craigslist” for ser-
vice, getting Craig Newmark himself to help build that1. Finally, President 
Obama continues to set a powerful example for family volunteering as he 
volunteers several times each year with his own family at schools, food pan-
tries and other sites needing help.
2. More accessible volunteer opportunities
Americans have a hunger for volunteer work. Families have traditionally heard 
about volunteer opportunities through faith organisations, schools and commu-
nity groups, but many eager volunteers have had difficulty finding suitable vol-
unteer opportunities. Others may already be engaged, but are eager to do more. 
Therefore, several groups have been working to make service more accessible.
As part of that, AARP Create The Good is providing a network of opportuni-
ties for people to get connected to make a positive impact. Create The Good of-
fers the new online database of opportunities searchable by locality; the ability 
1  “Craigslist” is a centralised online network connecting people with jobs, housing, items for sale, etc.
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for anyone to post an opportunity to request more volunteer help, and simple, 
fun project ideas people can use to develop their own volunteer efforts. These 
resources also are available at compartiresvivir.org and similar websites.
The idea is to enable individuals and families to use the database to find 
local volunteer opportunities that fit their time, skills and passion. Or if they 
prefer, they can use one of the many available ‘how-to guides’ to design a 
convenient project that works for everyone in the family. As we say as part 
of AARP’s Create The Good initiative, people can make a difference in five 
minutes, five hours or five days. 
One example of such self-initiated service is that of New York resident 
Olga El Sehamy. Olga recalled that her mother often offered food to street 
vendors in Mexico, and that her husband lacked housing when he came to 
the United States. She had a strong desire to give back on a national day of 
service, but her work schedule precluded volunteering with an organised 
group. So, she recruited her family to help provide food to people living in 
the streets and subway stations. She and her husband prepared dozens of 
meals, and her son and his college friends distributed the food throughout 
the morning. The college students felt so good about the project that they 
asked if they could do it again soon – and they did!
This kind of flexible volunteering is increasingly popular. Fifty-seven per cent 
of Americans over the age of 45 reported that they engaged in service efforts they 
organised themselves in 2009, up from 34 per cent just six years earlier. Another 
survey revealed that the number of people who worked with their neighbours to 
fix a community problem rose from 15.2 million in 2007 to 19.9 million in 2008. 
3. The growing ethos of volunteering
Volunteerism has long been a part of American culture. The last decade, 
however, has embedded it far more deeply into the American psyche. 
First, service is on our calendar. We now have two national days of ser-
vice – Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Day of Service and 9/11 Day of Service and 
Remembrance. These offer regular and visible chances for families to help 
others on a possible shared day off. Further, many families are beginning to 
celebrate Veterans Day by engaging in service with and for veterans. There’s 
also National Volunteer Week in April, which includes a Youth Service chal-
lenge. And the fourth Saturday in October is Make A Difference Day.
Second, service is fully integrated into our system of education through 
student service learning. Through these programmes, students are asked to 
engage in service projects with their teacher and classmates and also help 
others in the community outside of school hours – on their own or with 
family. In practice, many younger students volunteer with family members; 
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as they grow older they begin to volunteer with their peers. Often, students 
are asked to play a role in selecting the service project and reflecting on 
what it means to them. These programmes begin as early as kindergarten 
and run through high school – sometimes as a graduation requirement. 
Most colleges also offer service learning opportunities.
At their best, student service learning programmes empower students 
to learn skills, develop leadership, solve problems and help others. Teach-
ers increasingly integrate service with curricula – for example, learning how 
chemistry might be used to clean up a river. Additionally, these programs 
aim to develop a love of service, setting the stage for successful family volun-
teering. A recent focus group conducted among teens and 20-somethings 
in the state of Maine revealed a lasting positive impression about service. 
Participants said they volunteer for many reasons, including self-improve-
ment, peer pressure, a desire to give back, because they’ve been involved 
from a young age, a desire for new experiences and…for fun!
Third, there has been a boom in volunteering in the workplace. Many employ-
ers find they are more likely to attract and retain talented staff if they include ef-
fective service opportunities as part of the workplace environment. And many 
corporations are including engagement and support of service as part of their 
overall marketing plan, e.g. in advertisements, in stores and at sporting events.
Finally, service is increasingly evident in a growing number of cities. A 
new “Cities of Service” initiative was introduced in 2008 by New York City 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg. Already it includes over 100 major cities, and it is 
spreading all across America. Mayors are taking a leadership role, bringing 
communities together to identify which challenges to address, and decid-
ing how they can leverage assets to achieve strong impacts together. While 
this initiative is just beginning to come to fruition, there are already innova-
tive and effective efforts underway to support youth in staying in school, to 
plant and maintain community gardens far and wide, to empower an entire 
city to learn emergency response skills, and much more.
So, whether in school, at work, on holiday or attending a football game, 
American families are surrounded by opportunities to help others. As they 
engage, they benefit from the opportunity and the reward – whether they 
are in a giving or taking position any given day.
4. More people are engaged in service and benefiting from 
volunteerism
Wealthy or not, young or old, single or married, across all cultural and eth-
nic groups, Americans are stepping forward to make things better for in-
dividuals and communities. The growth in volunteering reported in 2009 
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represented the greatest annual increase since 2003. A government survey 
capturing a broad definition of service revealed that 58 per cent of Ameri-
cans helped a neighbour at least once a month in 2009. Even people facing 
challenges of their own are helping, often verbalising that they know how 
tough it is to have even less. 
Families are very much a part of this trend. Married people, especially mar-
ried women, have some of the highest rates of volunteering around. And, 
rates of volunteering are up for all population groups, including children. 
What are the effects on families or anyone who volunteers? Numerous 
research studies have revealed that volunteers tend to be happier and enjoy 
lower levels of stress, lower incidence of depression and higher self-esteem. 
Yet, while volunteerism is booming, it hasn’t yet grown to full capacity. 
Tens of millions of Americans want to volunteer more than they do today. 
And, of course, millions of families need more help. This conundrum exists 
because many interested volunteers don’t know how to find their best role – 
and at the same time, volunteer organisations lack capacity to fully engage 
all those who want to help more.
Renewed efforts to make volunteering more accessible should give more 
Americans access to the benefits of “doing good”. And, with that increased 
capacity to reach out to others, we hope to solve more of the problems we 
face as a society.
5. Measuring the impact of service in improving our world
It seems fair to assume that increases in volunteerism will directly improve 
our society. More youth mentors, more people helping prepare for disasters, 
and more soup kitchen volunteers should mean a better world. But it’s also 
fair to assume that some service programmes are more effective than others.
Today there is a serious effort to identify the service programmes that 
make the greatest difference. While many programmes already have proven 
effectiveness, others lack demonstrated results. We think they work well, 
but we don’t know. Organisations interested in improving service are today 
finding ways to measure the impact of nearly every volunteer effort around 
(not always easy), identify those that are most effective, and to find the re-
sources to expand the most effective initiatives to a size that enables them 
to solve key challenges.
For example, what is the best way to help young people? Data demon-
strates that mentoring and tutoring programmes are effective, so increasing 
the number of volunteers in programs such as Big Brothers/Big Sisters, Ex-
perience Corps, JumpStart or City Year makes sense. But with so many high 
schools dubbed dropout factories, some communities are testing whether 
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it’s also helpful to engage neighbourhood adults in knocking on the doors 
of students who don’t arrive at school each morning.
Or take a look at emergency preparedness: the American Red Cross and 
other organisations train and deploy volunteers in the event of disaster – to 
help supplement the good efforts of rescue personnel. These are effective 
programs, but are there other ways communities should prepare for emer-
gencies? For example, New York City service leaders are inspiring thousands 
of residents to learn first aid from local firemen, and will measure and test 
whether this is a valid way to help prepare for emergency situations.
The volunteer component is part of identifying and deploying strategies 
with the strongest impact. It’s critical to identify, recruit and retain the right 
volunteers for each effort. Depending on the situation, the most effective 
volunteer might be a highly skilled individual who can contribute at least 
ten hours per week, or it might be a family who lives in the neighbourhood 
who can help out ten minutes a day. 
In 2011, helping others is increasingly in the mainstream of American 
life. Families and individuals have more ways - and more effective ways than 
ever - to volunteer their time to help solve pressing societal challenges. And 
we’re aware that in “doing good” we’re also improving our own lives: in ad-
dition to the warm feeling that comes from helping others, families also can 
build enjoyable memories together.
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Ursula Adam has been a student of sociology at the Otto-Friedrich-Uni-
versity of Bamberg since 2005. From 2007 until 2008, she was at the Rad-
boud Universiteit in Nijmegen, supported by the Erasmus programme. She 
worked for a period as an assistant at the Institute for Family Research at 
University Bamberg (ifb) in a state-funded project on demographic change. 
Currently she is a visitor at the IMES-institute in Amsterdam. Her main in-
terests include methods of empirical research, gender and family research, 
migration as well as international comparison.
Loreen Beier 
Loreen Beier (Dipl. Soz.) studied sociology at the Otto-Friedrich-University of Bam-
berg, from where she graduated in April 2008. During her course of studies she 
focused on empirical research methods and statistics, as well as demography. Her 
research interests include quantitative and qualitative research methods, com-
parative analyses of welfare states and their effects on families, especially gender 
issues and the compatibility of work and family, with specific attention to particu-
lar differences between the new and old Länder in Germany.
Francesco Belletti 
Francesco Belletti is a sociologist and is currently President of Forum delle 
Associazioni Familiari (FDAF), an Italian umbrella NGO representing 49 fam-
ily associations and 20 regional forums. He is also Director at CISF – Centro 
Internazionale Studi Famiglia (International Center for Family Studies), a 
research centre based in Milan, and editor of a bi-annual report on Italian 
families. He has published many articles and books on family life and local 
family policies projects.
Julie de Bergeyck 
Julie de Bergeyck joined the MMM team to work on FAMILYPLATFORM as 
Project Manager. She is a mother of three and has a background in commu-
nications. She worked in the internet advertising business in Brussels and 
in the US where she spent eight years in a leading advertising agency, be-
fore working at Microsoft in Brussels. She recently took a three-year break to 
raise her third child and has volunteered for different local organisations.
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Herwig Birg 
Herwig Birg is Professor Emeritus for demographics and long-time Direc-
tor of the Institut für Bevölkerungsforschung und Sozialpolitik (Institute for 
Population Research and Social Politics) at the University of Bielefeld. He has 
published many books on demographic change.
Zsuzsa Blaskó 
Zsuzsa Blaskó studied Economics and Sociology and did her Ph.D in Sociol-
ogy. She has been a research fellow at DRI since 2002. Her research interests 
include social inequalities, gender issues and family policy – with a special 
focus on families with young children.
Gabriella Civico 
Gabriella is Project Manager of the European Year of Volunteering 2011 Alliance. 
She has a degree in Social Policy and Education from Surrey University (UK) and a 
Masters in Education in E-learning from the University of Hull (UK). Her profession-
al background is in business and the youth NGO sector where she has worked as 
an administrator and also as a trainer and expert. Through her work in the youth 
field she was involved in the campaign to establish 2011 as the European Year of 
Volunteering and has been a volunteer in a variety of fields since childhood.
Paul Demeny 
Paul Demeny has been Distinguished Scholar at the Population Council 
since 1989. He has served as the editor of the Council’s Population and De-
velopment Review, which he founded, since 1975. His research focuses on 
population policy, international migration, and replacement fertility issues. 
Among Demeny’s professional affiliations are the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science, where he has been a Fellow since 1974; the 
Population Association of America, whose president he was in 1986; and 
the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, which named 
him Laureate in 2003. In addition, he was recipient of the 2003 Olivia Schief-
felin Nordberg Award for Excellence in Writing and Editing in the Population 
Sciences and is now an External Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sci-
ences. Invited lectures and professional engagements have taken Demeny 
overseas more than 180 times during the past four decades and he has been 
a consultee for many international organisations including the World Bank, 
the United Nations, and the National Academy of Sciences.
213
Spotlights on Contemporary Family Life - Contributors
Christiane Dienel 
Prof. Dr. Christiane Dienel is Scientific Director of the Nexus Institute for Co-
operation Management and Interdisciplinary Research. From 2006-2009, 
she was Secretary of State in the Ministry for Health and Social Affairs in 
Magdeburg, Saxony-Anhalt. She teaches Social Policy at the University of 
Applied Sciences Magdeburg. Her research concentrates on demography, 
family policy, social policy and citizens’ participation in Germany and Europe.
Claudine Attias Donfut 
Dr Claudine Attias Donfut is a sociologist and the Director of the Ageing Research 
Department of the CNAV (National Social Security Pension Fund) in France. She 
also works as Associate Senior Researcher at Centre Edgar Morin, EHESS (Ecole des 
Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales). Her research interests are in social relations 
and economic transfers between generations, family and the welfare state, sociol-
ogy of the life course, transition to retirement and ageing, ageing in developing 
countries, European comparative studies, and the sociology of immigration.
Carla Facchini 
Carla Facchini is Professor of Sociology of the Family at the University of Mi-
lan-Bicocca. Her research interests include the condition of the elderly and 
changes in family structures and relations. 
Linden Farrer
Linden Farrer joined COFACE (the Confederation of Family Organisations in 
the European Union) to work on FAMILYPLATFORM in 2009. Educated at Ox-
ford Brookes where he obtained a BA (Hons) in History and Anthropology, 
and at the University of Sussex where he obtained an MSc in Social Research 
Methods, he has experience working on projects funded by the European 
Social Fund, Youth in Action, and the Seventh Framework Programme.
Leeni Hansson 
Leeni Hansson, Ph.D, is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Interna-
tional and Social Studies (IISS) at Tallinn University, Estonia. She has par-
ticipated in several research projects funded by the European Commission, 
Nordic Council of Ministers and Estonian Science Foundation in the area of 
gender studies, family studies and female employment studies.
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Dirk Hofäcker, Dr. rer. pol., studied Sociology and Political Economics at the 
University of Bielefeld, Germany. During his years of study, he spent a re-
search term in 1997 at the State University of St. Petersburg, Russia, finan-
cially supported by a TEMPUS/TACIS scholarship. His major research inter-
ests include comparative analyses of welfare states, the effects of welfare 
systems on the social structures of families and labour markets, and quanti-
tative multivariate methods of social science data analysis.
Kimmo Jokinen 
Dr. Kimmo Jokinen is the head of the Family Research Centre at the Uni-
versity of Jyväskylä. He was educated at the University of Jyväskylä, where 
he obtained a Ph.D degree in 1997. His research interests have focused on 
family studies (recently complex and challenging family relations and emo-
tional security in these relations), cultural studies, children and the media, 
and school and youth. 
Zsuzsanna Kormosné-Debreceni 
Zsuzsanna Kormosné-Debreceni is Social Policy Officer at the National As-
sociation of Large Families in Hungary (which has 14,000 member families) 
and Vice-President of the European network FEFAF (Fédération Europée-
nne de Femmes Actives au Foyer). Having been a member of the Hungar-
ian Council for the Equal Opportunities of Women and Men for more than 
ten years (and a mother of five children) she is a well-known promoter of 
work-life balance. 
Teppo Kröger 
Dr. Teppo Kröger is a social policy and social work researcher who has been in-
volved in a number of Nordic, European and global research projects. His research 
has focused on comparative study of work-family reconciliation and social care 
systems, covering childcare as well as care services for older and disabled people. 
Marjo Kuronen 
Dr. Marjo Kuronen is a Senior Lecturer in Social Work at the University of 
Jyväskylä, Department of Sciences and Philosophy. She was awarded her 
Ph.D at the University of Stirling (UK) in 1999. Her research interests include 
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gendered practices of parenting and post-divorce family relations, feminist 
issues social work, and qualitative cross-cultural research methodology.
William Lay
 
William Lay is an economist and a post-graduate of the College of Europe in Bru-
ges. He has professional experience working in a large multinational companies 
such as Unilever, and in different European organisations such as Beuc (Euro-
pean Consumers Bureau) and Comitextil (European textile industry lobby). He 
has been Director of COFACE (the Confederation of Family Organisations in the 
EU) since 1983 and has a wide experience of NGOs and of the EU institutions.
Carmen Leccardi 
Carmen Leccardi is Professor of Cultural Sociology at the University of Milan-
Bicocca, where she has been appointed by the Rector as Scientific Coordinator 
for Gender Issues. She has researched extensively in the field of youth cultures, 
cultural change, gender and time. Co-editor (1999-2009) of the Sage journal 
Time & Society, and now Consulting Editor, she was Vice-President for Europe 
of the International Sociological Association, Research Committee ‘Sociology of 
Youth’ (2006-2010). Her recent books include Sociologie del tempo (Sociologies 
of Time), Laterza (2009); A New Youth? Young People, Generations and Family 
Life (Editor, with Elisabetta Ruspini), Ashgate (2006); Sociologia della vita quo-
tidiana (Sociology of Everyday Life) (with Paolo Jedlowski), il Mulino (2003).
Sara Lesina 
Sara obtained a Bachelor's degree in Communications and Journalism from 
the University of Torino, Italy, and a Master's degree in Multimedia and Mass 
Communications from the University of Torino and the University of Helsinki, 
Finland. Sara is currently a Trainee at the European Commission, DG Commu-
nication, working in the Task Force for the European Year of Volunteering 2011. 
Before that she earned the fellowship "Master dei Talenti 2009" from Fondazi-
one CRT, Torino, to do a one-year internship at the European Foundation Cen-
tre in Brussels, working in the Information, Knowledge and Communications 
Department. Sara is part of the BETA e.V. – Bringing Europeans Together asso-
ciation, Mainz, Germany, where she works as Head of the Translation Services 
for the organisation of the Model European Union in Strasbourg.
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three years. Its mission is to represent the voice of mothers to European in-
stitutions and to raise awareness of the importance of mothers’ role in the 
social, cultural, and economic development of our societies. She is an art 
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in many different parts of the world, which has given her the opportuni-
ty to gain experience as a volunteer, with professional commitments. She 
also launched the yearly guide “Expats in Brussels”, of which she was until 
recently Co-editor.
Ariela Lowenstein 
Ariela Lowenstein is Full Professor at the Department of Gerontology, and 
Director of the Center for Research & Study of Aging at the Faculty of Wel-
fare and Health Sciences at University of Haifa; within the Center she col-
laborates closely with scholars from Israel and internationally. She is also 
Head of the Department of Health Services Management and Head of Re-
search at the Max Stern Yezreel Academic College in Israel, and Chair of a 
National Advisory Committee to the Israeli Ministry of Senior Citizens.
John Macdonald 
After brief periods working in the (then) Scottish Office in Edinburgh and in 
the Cabinet of Sir Leon Brittan QC, Vice-President of the European Commission, 
John was recruited as an official by the European Commission in 1995. Here he 
worked in the Directorates-General for Trade, Economic & Financial Affairs, and 
Education & Culture. More recently, he was the Spokesperson for Education, 
Training, Culture & Youth with the Slovak Commissioner, Ján Figel'. John began 
his newest mission, as Head of the European Commission's Task Force for the 
European Year of Volunteering 2011, in February 2010. John holds a bachelor's 
degree in Economics from the University of Cambridge, which he complement-
ed with subsequent studies in Law at Cambridge and Heidelberg, Germany. His 
studies in Germany culminated with a Master's Degree in European Economic 
Studies at the Europe Institute of the University of the Saarland. 
Elisa Marchese 
Elisa Marchese, Dipl. Soz., studied Sociology at the Otto-Friedrich-Universi-
ty of Bamberg, from where she graduated in 2009. Her research and work 
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interests include both empirical and theoretical issues, especially in the so-
ciology of family and work, in gender and intercultural studies, youth and 
welfare services and optimisation of organisations, as well as quantitative 
and qualitative research methods.
Livia Sz. Oláh 
Livia Sz. Oláh is Associate Professor and Lecturer in Demography. Her main 
research interest is family demography, with a focus on the impact of public 
policies and gender relations on childbearing, partnership formation and 
disruption in Europe, especially Sweden and Central-Eastern Europe. In the 
years 2003-2008 she had a postdoctoral fellowship for studies of gender re-
lations and family behaviour from the Swedish Council for Working Life and 
Social Research (FAS). She is the co-ordinator of a European research net-
work on gender and contemporary family dynamics, also supported by FAS.
Miriam Perego 
Miriam Perego, Ph.D in Sociology and Methodology for Social Research at 
the University of Milan-Bicocca, carries out research in the field of gender, 
social change and youth cultures. Within FAMILYPLATFORM, she is working 
as a Research Assistant on the changing processes in family life in Europe.
Barb Quaintance 
Barb Quaintance, graduate of University of Southern California and the 
University of Illinois, is the Senior Vice President of the Office of Volunteer 
and Civic Engagement at AARP. This newly created office will help redefine 
volunteerism by integrating flexibility with challenging opportunities that 
fit with the nature of members’ lives, making volunteering easier and more 
accessible. Barb has a rich history of collaborating with volunteers, from pro-
grammes to state offices, and was instrumental in creating the Annual Day 
of Service and recently, successful presence at the ServiceNation volunteer 
summit in September 2008. Barb established AARP’s Medicare/Medicaid 
Assistance Program, an early model of what ultimately grew into the State 
Health Insurance Programs (SHIP).
Marita Rampaz 
Marita Rampazi is Professor of General Sociology at the University of Pavia. 
Her research interests include social uncertainty, time and identity in refer-
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ence to the condition of young people in contemporary societies and trans-
formations in family relations.
 
Lorenza Rebuzzini 
Lorenza Rebuzzini works for Forum delle Associazioni Familiari. She gradu-
ated in Philosophy and collaborates as a researcher with CISF (Centro Inter-
nazionale Studi Famiglia – International Center for Family Studies in Italy). 
She has published research on widowhood in Italy, in collaboration with 
Francesco Belletti and also writes for the Italian review Famiglia Oggi.
Epp Reiska 
Epp Reiska (BA) is a Master’s student in Sociology at the Institute for Inter-
national and Social Studies of Tallinn University. She has previously partici-
pated in projects in the fields of teacher education (annual monitoring of 
the Induction Year Programme since year 2006) and youth work (assessing 
the quality of services and opportunities at youth centres from the perspec-
tive of both users and providers).
Marina Rupp 
Marina Rupp, Dr. rer. pol., studied Sociology at the University of Bamberg, 
Germany. Her issues are wide-ranging, including questions related to preg-
nancy, the paths to parenthood, divorce, as well as gay and lesbian families 
and large families.
Raul Sanchez 
Raul Sanchez is Director of the "Institut d'Estudis Superiors de la Família” (IESF) (Insti-
tute of Advanced Family Studies), Universitat Internacional de Catalunya (Barcelona) 
and General Secretary of the European Large Families Confederation (ELFAC).
Birgit Sittermann 
Birgit Sittermann, M.A. works as Research Officer for the Observatory for So-
ciopolitical Developments in Europe at the Institute for Social Work and Social 
Education in Frankfurt (Main), Germany. She studied politics, and her current 
work focuses on comparative European Social Policy and Volunteering.
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Zsolt Spéder was educated as an economist at the Budapest (former 
Karl Marx) University of Economic Sciences, studied sociology in Ger-
many, and in 2001 earned his Ph.D in Sociology. He is currently Director 
of the Demographic Rresearch Institute, and has taken part in several 
international comparative projects. His research interests are in family 
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methods. He is Consortium Board Member at UNECE “Generation and 
Gender Program”, and member of the editorial board of the journal In-
ternational Sociology.
Joan Stevens 
Joan Stevens has been Secretary General of MMM Europe for over four years. 
She has lived in Europe for 17 years and is the mother of five and grand-
mother of 16 children. Joan is a professional music teacher, and also served 
as Chairman of a Foster Care Citizen Review Board. She has long experience 
with volunteer organisations and causes.
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